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Chairperson:  Marian R. Williams 
 
 
 Wrongful conviction is defined as the conviction of a factually innocent 
person and is estimated to occur in about 1 to 5 percent of all convictions in the 
United States.  Wrongful convictions encompass both culpability issues and 
procedural issues found to have a substantial effect on the initial conviction.  While 
an individual may be released and found not to be criminally liable, he/she may still 
face repercussions stemming from the charges, such as civil suits, as well as a 
criminal record indicating prison time served.  In order for the charges, as well as 
possible prison time served, to disappear, a defendant must seek exoneration, which 
has been shown only to be granted in a small proportion of wrongful conviction cases 
(Smith, Zalman, & Kiger, 2011).  Exonerations are official declarations of innocence 
by a governor’s pardon, a court’s dismissal of charges, acquittals after retrials, and 
acknowledgements of innocence for those inmates who died in prison (Konvisser, 
2012; Smith et al., 2011).  While eyewitness evidence has been suggested to be the 
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leading cause of wrongful convictions, there are many other sources of error that are 
likely to be possible causes of wrongful convictions.  These sources of error include 
suggestive lineups, false confessions, perjured testimony, forensic error, tunnel vision 
by police and prosecutors, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, 
issues with the criminal justice system, and the racial history of the United States 
(Davies & Hine, 2007; Gould & Leo, 2010; Penrod & Cutler, 1995; Smith et al., 
2011).  Each of these reasons can greatly affect the possibility of a false conviction 
alone or serve to combine with other issues to produce a culminating effect on 
individual cases.  Wrongful conviction has been shown to have an incredible amount 
of human cost, both physical and monetary.  Those who have been wrongfully 
convicted are subject to a loss of liberty and freedom, preventing many of them from 
taking part in normal daily activities, even after release, as well as the pains of 
imprisonment, including increased risk of psychological issues associated with 
incarceration (Konvisser, 2012).  Additionally, it has been estimated that overall, as 
of 2011, about $87 million has been spent on the 250 exonerates reported nationwide 
(Smith & Hattery, 2011).  As it is clear that wrongful convictions are harmful to 
innocent citizens, as well an already overburdened criminal justice system, it is even 
more important to right the wrongs of these mistakes and prevent future mistakes.  
Suggestions for improvement include increased use of compensation lawsuits for 
those wrongfully convicted, increased access to postconviction DNA testing, more 
reliable evidence preservation, eyewitness identification reforms, increased forensic 
oversight, recording of interrogations, and increased formation and use of innocence 
commissions nationwide.  
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Previous literature has indicated that wrongful convictions are estimated to occur in 
about 1 percent to 5 percent of all convictions in the United States (Gould & Leo, 2010; 
Konvisser, 2012; Smith, Zalman, & Kiger, 2011).  Annually, about 10,000 convictions 
handed down in the U.S. are thought to be wrongful convictions (Smith et al., 2011).  
Wrongful convictions are generally defined as the conviction of a factually innocent person.  
Typically, the person is found to be factually innocent by the revelation of DNA evidence or 
testimony that indicates flaws in the initial conviction.  It is important to note that wrongful 
convictions may also encompass cases in which there were issues concerning culpability and 
procedural factors (Gould & Leo, 2010; Smith et al., 2011).  Regarding culpability, for 
example, a person may have been known to perform the criminal act, but they are not 
culpable, or blameworthy, for the act.  This is typically the case when the defendant is known 
to have committed the act due to insanity or any other particular mental state.  Regarding 
procedural factors, for example, the defendant is convicted on the basis of constitutional or 
legal errors that were not found to be harmless by the court.  If it is evident that one of these 
issues may have been a causal factor in the defendant’s conviction, the defendant may later 
be released of his/her charges, which indicates that he/she was found not to be criminally 
liable for the said charges.  Even if this occurs, whether it is on the basis of factual findings, 
culpability issues, or procedural issues, the defendant may not always be factually innocent, 
but he/she may be subject to later repercussions, such as civil liability.
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Additionally, although a person may be released from past charges, the charges and 
repercussions of said charges do not always disappear after the release, as already indicated 
with the possibility of civil liability.  In order for the charges, as well as possible prison time 
served, to disappear, a defendant must seek exoneration.  Exonerations are official 
declarations of innocence by a governor’s pardon, a court’s dismissal of charges, acquittals 
after retrials, and acknowledgements of innocence for those inmates who died in prison 
(Konvisser, 2012; Smith et al., 2011).  While there may be different ways in which an 
individual may gain an exoneration, each method must be based on evidence of innocence.  
This is important, in that exonerations do not address culpability or procedural issues.  
Although exonerating an individual would seem to be the morally right thing to do, 
especially for those defendants found to be factually innocent, they occur only in a small 
proportion of wrongful conviction cases (Smith et al., 2011).   
Although it is thought that many of the exonerations that have been given in the past 
few decades have been based on the increase in the use of DNA evidence, it should be noted 
that fewer than 20 percent of violent crimes involve biological evidence (Gould & Leo, 
2010).  With this said, previous literature indicates that there are many other traditional 
sources of error that are likely to be a possible cause of wrongful convictions, which include 
eyewitness misidentification and change blindness, suggestive lineups, false confessions, 
perjured testimony, forensic error, tunnel vision by police and prosecutors, prosecutorial 
misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and the racial history of the United States, 
specifically in rape cases (Davies & Hine, 2007; Gould & Leo, 2010; Penrod & Cutler, 1995; 
Smith et al., 2011).  All of these reasons greatly affect the possibility of a false conviction for 
individual cases.  According to Shermer, Rose, and Hoffman (2011), data from The 
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Innocence Project have indicated that an overwhelming majority of wrongful convictions are 
associated with eyewitness misidentifications; specifically, eyewitness errors were shown to 
be responsible for more than 75 percent of the DNA exoneration cases this group has 
handled.  It is important to note that the issues surrounding eyewitness error can be 
compounded by other factors previously mentioned, such as prosecutorial misconduct, 
suggestive lineup procedures, and change blindness (Wise, Dauphinais, & Safer, 2007).   
 As it is evident that there are many sources of bias and error that can explain the 
wrongful conviction phenomenon, it is important that research address the problems that 
stem from this error.  One of the most highly emphasized issues stemming from wrongful 
convictions is that those who are wrongfully convicted are denied the freedom to take part in 
actions that many people take for granted (Smith & Hattery, 2011).  Examples of activities in 
which a person who is imprisoned may not be able to participate in can include getting 
married, having children, getting an education, or starting a professional career.  It has also 
been indicated that these milestones in life are typically missed by those who are exonerated 
due to the fact that most of these defendants were charged and convicted at an early age, 
which can be a critical time for many of these stepping stones.  It is important to note that not 
only are those who are wrongfully imprisoned denied certain freedoms, but families and 
communities are denied fathers, husbands, and sons, as well as an increasing number of 
mothers, wives, and daughters.  The children of these families are those who are thought to 
suffer the most, as they face the same risk as all children of incarcerated parents suffer, which 
includes an increased likelihood of incarceration themselves (Smith & Hattery, 2011).   
As deprivation of freedoms is a large issue surrounding wrongful conviction, it is 
even more problematic that there seems to be evidence of racial disparity among those who 
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are subject to wrongful conviction, which could lead to increased deprivation of freedoms 
among particular groups.  Specifically, Smith and Hattery (2011) found that, of the 250 
exonerations in the United States as of 2010, approximately 75 percent are members of 
minority groups.  Additionally, it has been shown that African American men are 
disproportionately represented in the population of exonerees (Konvisser, 2012; Smith & 
Hattery, 2011).  As previous research has indicated trends of increased incarceration levels of 
African Americans in general, it is even more problematic that it has also been shown that 
African American men account for about 70 percent of the current exonerees (Smith & 
Hattery, 2011).  This could suggest that the increased incarceration rate among African 
Americans could be at least partially due to wrongful conviction.  The issue of racial 
disparity among exonerees is highly problematic, especially as a large percentage of the 
current inmate population consists of minority groups. 
Additionally, it has been shown that those who are wrongfully convicted are subject 
to the same psychological issues that result from incarceration of the guilty.  Konvisser 
(2012) indicates that the trauma of wrongful conviction is comparable to trauma experienced 
by war veterans, torture survivors, and those who were imprisoned at concentration camps 
for long periods of time and then released back into society.  While this comparison may 
seem somewhat extreme, it is important to note that these individuals could become subject 
to various psychological issues, such as anxiety, depression, or post-traumatic stress disorder.  
Konvisser (2012) indicates that these issues may arise due to the wrongfully convicted 
individual being subject to the pains of imprisonment.  The “pains of imprisonment” refers to 
the idea that the inmate must adapt to the deprivations and frustrations of life inside prison.  
It has been suggested that, as the prison population has been increasing over the past few 
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decades, the effects of incarceration have increased as well, partly due to the increased peril 
as a result of overcrowding within the prison system.  This process of adapting may also lead 
the individual to become institutionalized or subject to prisonization.  This is important in 
that the individual can become accustomed to such a lifestyle and have extreme difficulties 
re-adapting to the outside lifestyle when they are released.   
Konvisser (2012) also suggests that these effects are higher for women who are 
wrongfully convicted and incarcerated than for men.  In regards to female incarceration, 
research has indicted that women face specific problems, including increased histories of 
substance abuse and mental health issues, greater need for treatment, and female specific 
health care services, including prenatal care and obstetric care if the inmate is pregnant upon 
entry.  Women may also be more susceptible to sexual vulnerability and/or victimization 
within some institutions.  Additionally, a large number of female inmates have children and 
families from whom they are separated, which causes much stress and anxiety for the inmate, 
as well as the inmate’s family (Konvisser, 2012).   While the overall effects of incarceration 
on both women and men are detrimental to a successful reintegration into society upon 
release, it is even more problematic that those who are wrongfully convicted are subject to 
these same issues.   
Aside from the effects on the individuals who have been subject to wrongful 
conviction, Smith and Hattery (2011) indicate that there is an immense amount of money 
spent on incarceration of the wrong individuals.  Overall, it has been estimated that, as of 
2011, about $87 million has been spent on the 250 exonerates reported nationwide.   Aside 
from the cost of incarceration, it has been estimated that 7 million hours of work have been 
lost, along with $42 million in lost wages of those who were factually innocent (Smith & 
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Hattery, 2011).  This issue speaks large volumes about the many issues faced by the criminal 
justice system as a whole, especially due to the lack of funding and resources the system has 
become increasingly burdened with, especially the correctional system.   
As it is clear that wrongful conviction has an incredible human cost, both physical 
and monetary, there is also evidence that there is still some doubt circulating about the 
general phenomenon of wrongful conviction.  Specifically, Smith et al. (2011) found 
discrepancies in the estimated seriousness of specific causal factors linked to wrongful 
convictions by police, prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys.  While most individuals in 
these groups have been thought to believe that serious and intentional wrongdoing by 
forensic experts, police, and prosecutors is substantially less prevalent than negligent or good 
faith errors, there is a large amount of disagreement on the likelihood of error from each 
group.  Although it has been shown that respondents in each group believe that potential 
causes of wrongful conviction occur, including within their own professional group, they 
have been known to disagree about the need for reform.  Police, prosecutors, and judges have 
indicated that they are satisfied with the current procedures in place.  On the other hand, 
nearly all defense attorneys indicate that wrongful conviction occurs frequently enough to 
warrant some type of reform (Smith et al., 2011).   
Lastly, although there may be not be strong support from all participants of the 
criminal justice system for reform surrounding wrongful conviction, it is still apparent that 
wrongful conviction is a serious problem.  While it is apparent that wrongful conviction is a 
large issue, it has been indicated that the issue is further complicated by a “dark figure” of 
wrongful convictions that actually take place (Poveda, 2001).  This idea of a “dark figure” of 
wrongful convictions is used to describe the amount of unreported and undiscovered 
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wrongful convictions that occur within the criminal justice system.  As a whole, it is known 
that criminal justice agencies do not keep statistics on errors made at the various stages of the 
criminal justice process, including wrongful convictions at the end of the process.  Poveda 
(2001) proposes that there be two approaches to quantifying the problem, one being the 
examination of official agency records and the other relying on inmate self-reports of their 
own criminal record and possible wrongful conviction.  Both of these methods lack reliability 
due to the fact that neither is directly examining wrongful conviction and both could be 
highly biased reviews.  Official agency records have been shown to exclude errors made at 
each level, especially wrongful convictions.  Generally, self-report data in and of itself is 
thought to be unreliable.   
As previous research has pointed to a clear issue surrounding wrongful convictions, it 
is essential that this issue be further examined to determine the overall history of such cases, 
as to how often they actually occurs, the types of cases within which they occur, and the 
actual reasons for such wrongful convictions.  Additionally, it is essential to uncover 
wrongful convictions by examining appeals, through lawsuits, with social movements, and 
by organizations aimed at addressing the issue, such as The Innocence Project.  It is also 
important to indicate the findings of such appeals and to publicize the case law that has been 
developed to address wrongful conviction.  Lastly, as the issue of wrongful conviction has 
become more commonly discussed in a general sense, it is important to address possible 
remedies or tactics that may help prevent the problem.   
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Chapter 2: History of Wrongful Convictions 
Occurrence of Wrongful Conviction 
Although wrongful conviction is an increasingly common topic of discussion for 
those in the criminal justice field and academics, it is difficult to determine how often it 
actually occurs.  According to Zalman, Smith, and Kiger (2008), there is no specific way to 
measure these miscarriages of justice, but there are two common methods used to estimate 
the level of occurrence.  These methods include enumerating specific cases and having 
criminal justice experts estimate how often it occurs.  The count or catalogue of wrongful 
convictions typically underestimates its actual occurrence, as it is unlikely to be able to count 
each and every case, due to the fact that only a small number of wrongfully convicted 
individuals actually reach the appeal stage.   
On the other hand, when using estimates from different experts in the field, there are 
likely to be significant differences between estimates in their own jurisdiction and the United 
States as a whole.  For example, a sample of judges, prosecutors, police, and defense 
attorneys estimated that wrongful conviction occurred in about one half of one percent of 
cases in their own jurisdiction and in about 1 to 3 percent of cases in the United States as a 
whole (Zalman et al., 2008).  This is significant in that this type of data could seem unreliable 
if these officials are hesitant to accept that the practice happens in their own jurisdiction. 
Both of these methods have been known to have their individual flaws; the biggest is the 
subjectivity behind each estimate.  Additionally, counts of wrongful conviction by The 
Innocence Project and other similar agencies may be high due to hopes of raising awareness
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of the issue, while estimates from criminal justice experts may be low in order to protect their 
status quo.  It should also be noted that some studies have attempted to gather estimates of 
wrongful convictions from inmate self-report data (Poveda, 2001).  While it is obvious that 
there could be many issues surrounding the reliability of their reports, it was surprising to 
find that these reports disprove the idea that inmates are likely to underreport their 
criminality.  Although all of these methods have their flaws, it is clear that there is a serious 
problem with wrongful conviction.  Of all of the issues associated with wrongful conviction, 
the largest issue is that, if there is no way to precisely estimate how large a problem there is, 
it is more difficult to advocate for reform.  While there have been hundreds of people 
exonerated for multiple reasons, as shown by the data from The Innocence Project and other 
organizations, it is clear that some participants in the criminal justice field do not view 
wrongful conviction as a problem  serious enough to warrant reforms (Smith et al., 2011).   
Catalogue Estimates 
 Although each method may seem to be biased, it is important to consider the 
estimates from each, as there are very limited options available when trying to quantify the 
occurrence of wrongful convictions.  Specifically, The Innocence Project maintains a list of 
individuals exonerated by DNA evidence in both capital and non-capital cases.  As of this 
year, The Innocence Project indicates that there have been 312 postconviction DNA 
exonerations in the United States since 1989 (Innocence Project, n.d.).  As indicated by 
Zalman et al. (2008) and Webster (2012), the data from The Innocence Project are not 
completely conclusive of wrongful conviction estimates due to the fact that only a small 
number of criminal cases involve DNA evidence.  While those that do involve DNA 
evidence tend to be capital murders or rapes, which are of large importance, this does not 
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take into account the totality of wrongful convictions that may occur with other types of 
crime as well.   
While using The Innocence Project’s data may have some downfalls, it is considered 
to be one of the leading sources for obtaining a count on wrongful convictions.  Two other 
organizations that provide data on wrongful conviction cases, the Center on Wrongful 
Convictions and the Death Penalty Information Center, have long been criticized about their 
subjective and over-inclusive definitions of wrongful conviction (Webster, 2012; Zalman et 
al., 2008).  The Center of Wrongful Convictions, which provides a state-by-state list of 
exonerations, does not specifically state their basis for inclusion on the lists.  The Center on 
Wrongful Convictions is partnered with Northwestern School of Law to form the National 
Registry of Exonerations.  According to the Center on Wrongful Convictions, as of 2014, 
there have been 1,283 exonerations, with the most current being January 10, 2014 in Illinois 
(The Center of Wrongful Convictions, 2014).  Although these data seem to be the most 
recent, Zalman et al. (2008) indicated that the individual state lists are not conclusive; 
specifically there were 11 exonerations missing from the Florida list as of December 2006.   
On the other hand, the Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC), which provides a 
list of death-sentence exonerations that meet an objective definition of wrongful conviction, 
has been known to include factually guilty persons and to exclude factually innocent persons 
(Death Penalty Information Center, n.d.; Zalman et al., 2008).  Specifically, the DPIC 
includes individuals who may have been wrongfully convicted due to case factors, such as 
procedural issues, who may not necessarily be innocent. Although this may seem to be an 
issue for some, it can actually be beneficial, as it provides a rough estimate of those placed 
on death row who were not properly convicted, both due to actual innocence and to 
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procedural issues.  The DPIC lists 117 persons sentenced to death between 1973 and 2004 
who were later exonerated (Death Penalty Information Center, n.d.).  As there were 7,529 
individuals sentenced to death during this time period, this is indicative of a 1.55 percent 
exoneration rate in capital cases during this time.   
This rate provided by the DPIC is similar to that found in outside research, including 
Poveda (2001) and Zalman et al. (2008), which indicated that the wrongful conviction rate in 
New York murder cases was about 1.4 percent.  Similar research was conducted by Risinger 
(2007), in which he evaluated the factual rate of error in capital murder and rape cases 
nationwide in the 1980s.  Risinger (2007) found that the overall empirical minimum rate of 
error for factually wrong convictions was 3.3 percent and the maximum was 5 percent 
nationwide.  Risinger (2007) argues that while the increased use of DNA evidence and the 
closing window of DNA exonerations is a positive improvement stemming from the 
innocence movement, there may also be some side effects from this increased use of DNA 
testing, such as increased confidence of individual convictions and decreased chances of 
exoneration, for those wrongfully convicted, after the trial is over.  This is problematic in that 
the majority of the wrongful convictions in non-DNA cases, such as murders and other 
crimes that rely heavily eyewitness testimony and false confessions, are still regarded as 
strong convictions and are subject to the decreased chance of exoneration (Risinger, 2007; 
Webster, 2012). 
 While the estimates by the previously mentioned organizations primarily recognize 
official exonerations, which include cases in which pardons, court dismissals, acquittals on 
retrial, and posthumous acknowledgement have been given, research by Gross and 
colleagues has included some subjective criteria of factual innocence in order to address 
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cases in which DNA evidence is not involved (Zalman et al., 2008).  The research indicated 
that there were 340 exonerations between 1989 and 2003, but this number was not totally 
inclusive of all wrongful convictions (Zalman et al., 2008). It has been indicated that much of 
the data on wrongful convictions excludes mass exonerations, is exclusively limited to 
murder and rape cases where DNA is involved, does not include data on robbery and 
burglary cases that are much more numerous and have much less physical evidence, and does 
not include subjective evaluations, such as those involved in cases in which guilty pleas were 
given but the person was not guilty of the crime (Webster, 2012; Zalman et al., 2008).  
According to Webster (2012), if mass exonerations, which are typically due to police 
misconduct, were included, there could be up to 2,000 wrongful convictions between 1989 
and 2012.   
Although there have been noted downfalls in data on wrongful conviction, there has 
been a rise in the average annual number of exonerations.  According to Zalman et al. (2008), 
from 1989 to 1994, there were about 12 per year, which increased to 19 per year from 1995 
to 1998, then to 42 per year from 1999 to 2003.  Much of the research suggests that the rising 
number of exonerations per year is due to the increased effort to uncover the error present in 
capital cases, particularly by way of innocence projects.  Additionally, it should be noted that 
some states have passed the Justice for All Act that advocates for DNA testing for inmates 
who are claiming innocence (Zalman et al., 2008).  These two factors in combination have 
recently begun to shed much light on the wrongful conviction phenomenon.   
Estimates from Criminal Justice Officials 
 As previously discussed, there have been studies that have requested estimates of 
wrongful convictions from officials within the criminal justice field.  While this method is 
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wrought with as many issues as the counting method, there are many insights that can be 
gained from looking at the way different criminal justice actors view wrongful convictions.  
These officials were asked to estimate the rate at which persons convicted of felonies were 
later found to be factually innocent (Huff, Rattner, & Sagarin, 1986; Ramsey & Frank, 2007; 
Zalman et al., 2008).  In the study conducted by Huff et al. (1986), which looked at responses 
from all state attorney generals, as well as Ohio judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and 
police chiefs on the status and occurrence of wrongful convictions, it was found that 5.6 
percent of respondents denied that wrongful conviction existed, 71.8 percent indicated that 
the phenomenon occurred in less than one percent of all convictions, and lastly, 22.6 percent 
estimated that it occurred in more than one percent of all criminal convictions.  Ramsey and 
Frank (2007) and Zalman et al. (2008) assessed the opinions of criminal justice officials 
regarding their estimates of wrongful conviction in felony cases in both their jurisdiction and 
the United States as a whole, as well as what an acceptable level of wrongful conviction 
would be.  As previously indicated, the respondents in both studies predicted higher rates of 
wrongful conviction in the United States as whole in comparison to their own jurisdiction.  
Specifically, most respondents, which consisted of Ohio justice officials, estimated that 
wrongful conviction occurred in less than one-half percent of cases in their own jurisdiction 
compared to one to three percent of cases nationwide (Ramsey & Frank, 2007; Smith et al., 
2011; Zalman et al., 2008).   
In regards to the way in which each group responded to the survey, it was found that 
prosecutors provided the highest response to the zero percent category, indicating that they 
were skeptical about the existence of wrongful convictions in general (Zalman et al., 2008).  
On the other hand, defense attorneys were the least likely to agree with this assertion by 
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prosecutors and were the most likely to report a higher prevalence of wrongful convictions 
than any other group.  Lastly, judges fell in the middle of prosecutors and defense attorneys 
by indicating higher rates of wrongful conviction than prosecutors but lower estimates than 
defense attorneys (Ramsey & Frank, 2007; Smith et al., 2011).  It is important to note that 
these differences in views from each group are likely due to differing working personalities 
and norms for each occupation.   
Although there are clear differences on estimates of how often wrongful convictions 
occur, Zalman et al. (2008) added that there was a high level of agreement among officials 
that there is no acceptable level of wrongful conviction.  This agreement indicates the 
importance and increased awareness of the wrongful conviction phenomenon.  Lastly, 
Zalman et al. (2008) indicates that the findings from their study, as well as from Ramsey and 
Frank (2007), show higher estimates of wrongful conviction than estimates taken two 
decades prior by Huff et al. (1986).  As previously discussed, these increases in estimates of 
wrongful conviction could be caused by the increasing accessibility to DNA testing for 
inmates and the creation of multiple innocence projects, which is likely to bring about 
increased awareness of wrongful conviction by criminal justice officials, as well as the 
general public.  Although there have been notable increases in estimates of wrongful 
conviction, Smith et al. (2011) note that a majority of police, prosecutors, and judges believe 
that wrongful convictions do not occur with sufficient frequency to warrant system reforms.  
This is problematic in that the culture among criminal justice officials is not changing even in 
light of this relatively new evidence of how large of a problem wrongful conviction actually 
is.   
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Inmate Self Report Data 
As previously indicated, there seems to no way of concretely knowing how many 
wrongful convictions actually occur in the United States, which leads some researchers to 
consider the reliability of inmate self-reports of wrongful conviction.  According to Poveda 
(2001), the RAND survey conducted in 1978 and 1979 in California, Michigan, and Texas, 
found that convicted male offenders were likely to report rates of conviction in line with 
official records.  For instance, in California and Texas, the respondents reported six percent 
more convictions than official records, while in Michigan, they underreported by six percent.  
This similarity between inmate reports and official records is important when trying prove 
the reliability of inmate self-report measures.   
In regards to the inmate self-report of wrongful conviction, 197 of the 1,282 prison 
inmates questioned claimed that they had not committed the crime for which they had been 
convicted and imprisoned (Poveda, 2001).  This equates to a 15.4 percent wrongful 
conviction rate. The finding did not vary widely by state, with 14.1 percent of Michigan 
prisoners denying having committed any crime, 14.6 percent in California, and 16.7 percent 
in Texas.  According to Poveda (2001), the wide difference in the rate of wrongful conviction 
reported by inmates and those reported by court-ordered discharges could be due to inmate 
perceptions of their criminal conduct.  For instance, research has suggested that post-event 
information could reshape or influence the inmates’ memory of their criminal conduct, as 
well as their subsequent criminal conviction.  Additionally, inmates’ perception of their 
criminal conduct could vary from the legal definition of their crime.  For instance, some 
inmates may not fully understand the legal definition of their crime or may even lessen the 
seriousness of their offense and argue that it does not meet the standards for that crime 
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(Poveda, 2001).  Although inmate estimates of wrongful conviction vary greatly from court 
records of wrongful conviction, it is important to consider such estimates as they can serve as 
an upper boundary of opinion about wrongful convictions (Poveda, 2001; Zalman et al., 
2008).    
Associated Types of Crimes 
 While it is clear that wrongful conviction does occur, and possibly at alarming rates, 
it is important to discern what types of crimes are more likely to be subject to error.  
Although The Innocence Project reports on convictions that have been overturned due to 
DNA evidence, research has indicated that DNA evidence only applies to a small number of 
criminal cases (Balko, 2011; Webster, 2012; Zalman et al., 2008).  With this said, most of the 
current data has only addressed cases that involve DNA evidence, such as rape and murder 
(Risinger, 2007; Zalman et al., 2008).  As previously discussed, Risinger (2007) indicated 
that the wrongful conviction rate for capital rape-murder cases from 1982 to 1989 was 
anywhere from 3.3 to 5 percent.  Zalman et al. (2008) also states that wrongful conviction 
rates may be higher in capital than non-capital cases, which typically include murder and 
rape.  According to Konvisser (2012), the false conviction rate for death penalty cases ranged 
from 2.3 to 5 percent from 1973 to 1989.  While Risinger (2007) indicates that DNA 
evidence has aided in the reduction of many problems in stranger rape cases, there has also 
been much research that indicates that there are many other issues that can be compounded to 
produce a wrongful conviction, even in capital cases where DNA evidence is present, such as 
eyewitness evidence and false confessions. 
In addition, Webster (2012) asserts that, while a majority of the registry cases involve 
violent crimes such as murder, rape, and sexual assault, exonerations for nonviolent crimes 
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are now better represented than ever.  According to Zalman et al. (2008) other types of cases 
in which wrongful conviction may occur can include robbery and forgery.  Roberts (2003) 
adds that the War on Drugs and other policies that focus on common law and street crime 
have led to increasingly crowded court dockets and a serious problem surrounding the 
practice of plea bargaining.  This is important in that it suggests that wrongful conviction 
may also be occurring in less serious street crimes, such as non-violent drug offenses, by way 
of the increased use of plea bargaining.  Roberts (2003) suggests that the practice of plea 
bargaining creates fictional crimes in the place of real ones.  In this case, defendants may 
falsely confess to a crime in hopes of ending their case quickly and/or to avoid serious 
punishment.  While there is not much evidence to indicate directly the other types of crimes 
in which wrongful conviction occurs, besides capital rape and murder cases, due to the lack 
of DNA evidence in many criminal cases, it has been suggested that the wrongful conviction 
rate is probably just as high, if not higher, for other types of crimes as it is for capital cases 
(Risinger, 2007; Roberts, 2003).  This could potentially be the case, as Keene et al. (2012) 
suggest that false confessions, which are a leading cause of wrongful conviction, can occur 
for every type of crime.   
Causes of Wrongful Conviction 
 As previously discussed, wrongful conviction can have many causes, the most 
commonly cited being mistaken eyewitness identification (Clark, 2011; Orenstein, 2011; 
Webster, 2012).  Other common errors include police misconduct, including faulty lineup 
procedures; false confessions; perjured or false testimony by witnesses, informants, and 
police; forensic error; prosecutorial misconduct; inadequate assistance of counsel for the 
defendant; racial disparity; and even issues within the criminal justice system, which include 
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overburdened caseloads and budget issues (Balko, 2011; Davies & Hine, 2007; Gould & Leo, 
2010; Penrod & Cutler, 1995; Smith et al., 2011; Zalman et al., 2008).   
Eyewitness Evidence 
 According to Gould and Leo (2010) and Shermer et al. (2011), data from The 
Innocence Project has indicated that mistaken eyewitness identifications account for over 
three-quarters of wrongful convictions.  Additional research suggests that, of the first 225 
wrongful convictions documented by The Innocence Project, approximately 77 percent were 
due to mistaken eyewitness identification (Balko, 2011; Clark, 2011).  With this said, it is 
clear that faulty eyewitness evidence is one of the primary causes of wrongful convictions in 
the United States (Clark, 2011; Orenstein, 2011; Webster, 2012).  
 As it is clear that eyewitness evidence is a large issue when discussing the factors of 
wrongful conviction, it important to note that there are many potential issues with eyewitness 
identification.  Specifically, there are issues that may happen due to circumstances relating to 
the witness, such as memory and change blindness issues, as well as issues that stem from the 
prosecutors and police involved in the investigation, such as suggestive lineup procedures 
(Balko, 2011; Shermer et al., 2011; Vallas, 2011; Wise et al., 2007).  Clark (2011) groups 
these factors into non-system variables, which include the limitation of witness memory, and 
system variables, which include the procedures used by police.  
 First, in regards to the memory of the witness, a general rule of thumb is that the 
longer the time period between acquisition, retention, and retrieval, the more difficulty 
individuals have retrieving a memory (Clark, 2011; Shermer et al., 2011). This is important 
in regards to eyewitness identification, as it can take days or weeks for the initial 
identification to take place during the investigation.  Additionally, as trials in the United 
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States typically do not take place until at least 90 to 120 days have passed, it can be months 
before the witness is asked to testify at the trial (Shermer et al., 2011).  These delays can 
allow for significant decay in memory and even confusion and replacement of memories.  In 
this same regard, the increased length of time can cause the witness to become subject to 
misinformation and source monitoring errors (Wise, Fishman, & Safer, 2010).  Specifically, 
since the eyewitness is likely to have a substantial amount of time to reconstruct his/her 
memory of the incident, he/she may receive additional information from other sources, such 
as other eyewitnesses, the police, the prosecutor, and the media.  These sources could change 
his/her own memory of the crime and potentially alter or impair his/her ability to identify the 
perpetrator and explain the incident.  In this same manner, the witness may become confused 
as to where he/she learned information or where he/she saw an individual and either 
incorporate this into the identification or change the story.  This can be highly problematic as 
there have been situations where an individual could mistakenly identify a bystander to the 
crime or an individual they had seen in another situation as the perpetrator (Wise et al., 
2010).  Lastly, this addition of information after the fact has also been shown to lead to 
hindsight bias, in which the individual’s memory can be altered by specific case-related 
factors, such as the indictment of a particular suspect.  The witness may change his/her 
opinion of guilt about the suspect or even what he/she was thinking about when the crime 
occurred (Wise et al., 2010).  
 These issues with poor memory recall can be further compounded by stress, age, 
gender, stereotype expectancies, and personality factors the witness may have (Clark, 2011; 
Gould & Leo, 2010; Shermer et al., 2011; Vallas, 2011; Wise et al., 2010).  Specifically, 
stressful situations can impair the perception of an event, especially if the witness has 
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observed a violent event.  Research has suggested that the negative effects of stress on 
perception and memory recall can be highly increased in situations involving a weapon due 
to the fact that the witness will likely spend more time focusing on the weapon than other 
aspects of the event (Shermer et al., 2011; Vallas, 2011).  In regards to personality factors of 
the witness, Wise et al. (2010) indicate that, when the witness reconstructs his/her memory of 
the crime, it is based on the eyewitness’s expectations, attitude, beliefs, and knowledge of 
similar events.  For instance, if the individual has certain stereotypes, he/she may be more 
likely to have difficulties when participating in cross-racial and cross-ethnic identifications.   
Shermer et al. (2011) indicated that this can pose an issue, especially when Caucasian 
eyewitnesses identify an African American suspect.  While this eyewitness bias can be 
thought to cause the eyewitness to generalize or miss evidence, it can also cause them to 
focus only on specific factors, such as those that relate the most to their own life.  Wise et al. 
(2010) provides the example of a hair stylist who may be more inclined to notice a specific 
hairstyle of the perpetrator, which is likely because he/she is used to paying more attention to 
this characteristic.   
In addition to the stressors and factors that can affect a witness’s memory of the 
situation, some research has suggested that these difficulties can be explained by a 
phenomenon termed change blindness (Davies & Hine, 2007).  Change blindness refers to 
the difficulties observers face in detecting major changes in their perceptual environment.  
Davis and Hines (2007) indicate that, in most studies, only about one third of participants are 
able to notice differences in physical appearance, both when viewing media clips as well as 
in real-life situations.  It has been found that, of those participants who are able to notice 
these changes, they are also more likely to be able to identify the correct people in the 
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experiment when given a line-up of potential individuals.  Additionally, this phenomenon can 
be found within face processing tasks, in which participants were instructed to match a 
picture with the face of the individual they viewed in a video or met in person.  Previous 
literature suggests that change blindness can be induced by social and cultural factors.  For 
example, individuals are more likely to recognize someone more similar to themselves, 
especially in face processing tasks.  Davies and Hines (2007) focused on change blindness by 
instructing participants to watch a two minute video presenting a burglary in progress, which 
included two different suspects.  The second individual was introduced following a change in 
camera angle halfway through the clip.  Only about 39% of individuals reported the change 
in suspects during the video.  When the individual was instructed to pay close attention, more 
women than men detected the change.  This goes along with the research by Shermer et al. 
(2011), which indicated that gender of the witness had an effect on the memory of the 
incident.  Participants who detected the change also had a higher recall of events from the 
video and were more likely to be able to detect both suspects in a lineup.  The change 
blindness found by Davies and Hines (2007) is a demonstration of the rather poor accuracy 
that can be exhibited by eyewitnesses.  It is important to note that particular features of the 
incident can exacerbate change blindness, such as familiarity of the target person, exposure 
time, and race of the target person (Davies & Hines, 2007).  Although change blindness is 
not widely discussed, it points to the great amount of unreliability within eyewitness 
evidence and how the issues with general memory limitations can be further compounded by 
situational factors such as quick changes in a fast moving and stressful situation.   
Although it is clear that there are many biases and factors that can affect the witness’s 
memory, Clark (2011) found that limitations of memory do not cause innocent people to be 
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misidentified.  Specifically, although limitations in memory do undermine the evidence, 
when the witness’s memory is less accurate or complete, it is only more likely that an 
identified suspect is in fact innocent.  Clark (2011) found that the risk of false identification 
was .08 for better memory conditions and .085 for poorer memory conditions.  This research 
can suggest that there may not be much difference in the probability of identifying the wrong 
suspect, regardless of favorable or unfavorable memory conditions (Clark, 2011).  Overall, 
this is problematic, as it is almost as likely that someone with good memory conditions could 
identify the wrong suspect as someone with poor conditions. 
While it is clear that memory limitations and other non-system variables can 
negatively affect the identification of the suspect and the recall of events, this issue can be 
compounded by issues relating to system variables, or the procedures by which police 
conduct the lineup or showup, as well as the investigation (Clark, 2011).  Some of the major 
decisions on the part of the police in regards to eyewitness evidence include the decision of 
whether to conduct a lineup or showup, the decisions involved in the construction of the 
lineup, the decision of how to instruct the witness and how to present the lineup to the 
witness, as well as the decision about what the police officers and detectives say to the 
witnesses during the identification procedures. As previously mentioned, the witnesses can 
be highly influenced by outside information, especially information from police officers, as 
they are more likely to provide information on the target suspect in the case.   
It is important to note the difference between a lineup and a showup, as these two 
methods may have some influence on the identification process.  First, a showup is usually 
the quickest way in which police can ask the witness for an identification (Clark, 2011).  The 
showup consists only of the suspect and contains no fillers or other individuals who resemble 
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the characteristics described by the witnesses.  On the other hand, a lineup may take longer to 
arrange and consists of more steps, as the selection of fillers is not always simple.  The fillers 
selected for a lineup must resemble the characteristics of the described perpetrator without 
specifically drawing the witness to the suspect based on non-case specific factors.  The initial 
decision between a showup and a lineup is important as the showup consists of a one-on-one 
identification, whereas the lineup requires the witness to pick the suspect out a line of similar 
individuals.  Showups are often used when the police find a suspect very soon after the 
commission of the crime.  Although psychological research on eyewitness lineup methods is 
somewhat inclusive and highly debated, Clark (2011) indicates that there is a slight 
advantage for showups that are conducted immediately versus a lineup conducted one to 
three days later.  This is likely due to the fact that the witness’s memory typically weakens 
and he/she may become subject to additional and/or outside confusing information as time 
passes.   
 The issues surrounding the procedures put in place extend far beyond the decision of 
a showup or a lineup; the police must also choose the fillers to put in the lineup, if it is the 
selected method of identification and the way in which to conduct the lineup.  The police 
must choose between a sequential lineup, in which each individual is presented one after 
another, or a simultaneous lineup in which all of the individuals are presented at the same 
time.  Clark (2011) and Gould and Leo (2010) indicate that most police officers and 
departments prefer sequential lineups so that the witnesses cannot make comparisons 
between lineup members and make relative judgments.  Additionally, in order to make sure 
comparative judgments are not made and there is not a direct indication of who the suspect 
is, it is important to make sure the correct fillers are chosen.  According to Clark (2011), 
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meeting the standards for lineup, which include having similar fillers in order to make sure 
the suspect does not stand out, comes with a tradeoff.  Specifically, increasing the similarity 
of the fillers does reduce the false identification rate, as hoped, but it also reduces the correct 
identification rate.  Overall, it has been found that sequential lineups reduce the risk of false 
identification, but they also reduce the rate of correct identification (Clark, 2011).  With this 
said, it has been shown that the most commonly advocated method is the sequential lineup 
procedure, due to the fact that there is not a direct suggestion of the suspect, and there is a 
decrease in the risk of false identification, although some departments may still use outdated 
simultaneous lineup procedures. 
 It is important that police abstain from providing biased instructions during the lineup 
procedure in order to refrain from appearing and actually being suggestive to the witness.  As 
has already been indicated, since witnesses can be significantly influenced by outside 
information, it is important that the police do not provide any information that directly 
implicates the suspect in the case.  Clark (2011) indicates that, if the police convey their 
expectations, the witness may conform to this to aid the investigation or to match the story 
with the police, but this can be a large problem for wrongful convictions, as it is known that 
the police do not always have the right person.  This matching of the story is also likely to 
provide the witness with increased confidence in his/her identification, as well as in the 
testimony given at the trial (Clark, 2011; Gould & Leo, 2010).  According to Clark (2011) 
and Shermer et al. (2011) eyewitness confidence has been shown to account for nearly 50 
percent of the jurors’ decisions of whether or not to believe the witness.  This can be highly 
problematic, as the witness could exhibit false confidence if he/she has been subject to 
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suggestions and outside information from either police or prosecutors during the course of 
the investigation (Clark, 2011; Gould & Leo, 2010; Shermer et al., 2011).   
 As it is obvious that there is a culmination of factors that affect and hinder eyewitness 
identification, it is surprising that eyewitness identifications remain among the most 
commonly used and compelling evidence against criminal defendants (Shermer et al.  2011).  
This is extremely problematic, as eyewitness identifications are subject to the highest rate of 
human error when compared to other factors of wrongful conviction, due to the participation 
of many different parties in the process.  The faulty eyewitness identification can be further 
compounded by other case issues, especially those that do not allow for the discovery of the 
true suspect, such as police and prosecutorial misconduct and forensic error in cases 
involving DNA.  
Police Misconduct 
 As previously discussed, police can be involved in wrongful conviction in many 
ways.  It is important that police not only make the right decisions during the investigation of 
the case in regards to how to conduct lineup and eyewitness procedures but also maintain a 
clear, objective perspective throughout the case.  Police misconduct can directly lead to 
wrongful conviction if they engage in suggestive practices or become subject to the tunnel 
vision phenomenon (Gould & Leo, 2010; Leo & Davis, 2010).  Tunnel vision occurs when 
law enforcement officers become so convinced of a conclusion that they are less likely to 
consider alternative information and scenarios that conflict with their conclusion.  This can 
be problematic, as the officer can focus on a suspect and filter the evidence that builds a case 
for conviction, while ignoring or suppressing the evidence that points away from guilt.  
According to Leo and Davis (2010), this idea of focusing on evidence to support their 
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conclusion is thought of as a confirmation bias.  This confirmation bias is reinforced by the 
officer behaving in such a way that causes his/her expectations to be fulfilled, which is 
termed “self-fulfilling expectations” (Leo & Davis, 2010).  Additionally, these practices can 
place the officer at risk for focusing on the wrong suspect without being aware of the bias or 
even ignoring it (Gould & Leo, 2010).  Tunnel vision can also lead the officer to make 
suggestive comments or even reinforce eyewitness testimony in order to make sure the 
eyewitness evidence fulfills their own expectations (Leo & Davis, 2010).  
While tunnel vision and suggestive lineup procedures can go hand in hand, it should 
be noted that the phenomenon can take place at any other stage in the criminal justice 
process.  For instance, the police officer may be so set on prosecuting and convicting one 
suspect that he/she will ignore specific forensic evidence in light of evidence that confirms 
and supports his/her theory of the case.  This practice of overlooking key pieces of evidence 
or failing to turn over potentially exculpatory evidence to the prosecution is thought to have 
been a large cause of wrongful conviction (Gould & Leo, 2010; Leo & Davis, 2010).  
Specifically, with the abundance of defendants who have been exonerated by way of DNA 
evidence, it is clear that the police either heavily relied on eyewitness evidence or even used 
suggestive procedures in order to gain a conviction.  These suggestive procedures can include 
the lineup procedures, as well as aggressive methods of interrogation in which the police 
engage in the coaching and forcing of confessions.  The practice of adding undue pressure 
during interrogation has been shown to be a leading cause of false confessions, which are 
substantially common in wrongful conviction cases (Gould & Leo, 2010; Keene et al., 2012; 
Leo & Davis, 2010; Orenstein, 2011).  While this is not always the case for those wrongfully 
convicted, some research indicates that police are engaging in misconduct by focusing on one 
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suspect and ignoring or overlooking evidence that could have prevented a false conviction in 
the first place (Gould & Leo, 2010; Leo & Davis, 2010). 
 One of the main problems with police misconduct is that it is not considered to be 
important or a large problem within the system.  According to the Smith et al. (2011) study, 
which looked at estimates from police, prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys on the 
occurrence of the main types of error within the system, when criminal justice officials have 
been asked to estimate the frequency of police error, police and prosecutors gave the lowest 
estimate for using incorrect evidence.  Judges gave higher estimates, indicating that it almost 
never happened or that it was infrequent.  On the other hand, defense attorneys indicated that 
it was somewhere between infrequent and moderately frequent.  These same findings were 
found for predictions of the police suppressing exculpatory evidence.  Even more surprising 
was that the estimates for coaching witnesses and police using pressure to obtain a confession 
were much higher than other categories.  Specifically, police and prosecutors estimated that 
such misconduct is less than but closer to infrequent.  Defense attorneys indicated that 
witness coaching happened more than moderately frequently and pressure during 
interrogation was very frequent.  On the other hand, judges fell in the middle of the spectrum, 
indicating that these two forms of misconduct occurred infrequently and moderately 
frequently. 
Smith et al. (2011) also examined police error by way of inadequate investigation, 
which implies negligence rather than misconduct, and found that police made higher 
estimates of this type of error than any other form of deliberate misconduct.  On the other 
hand, the estimates of prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges were actually lower for this 
type of error than for police using excessive pressure in order to obtain a confession.   
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Although it is clear that there are substantial differences in the estimates of police 
error when considering the opinions of police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges, 
which is also seen with general estimates of wrongful conviction, this is still evidence that 
there are overarching problems with how the police conduct themselves and their work 
during criminal investigations (Smith et al., 2011).  These issues, which include falsifying 
evidence, failing to provide exculpatory evidence, coaching witnesses, pressuring suspects to 
obtain a confession, and inadequate investigation can all stem from and be compounded by 
the issue of tunnel vision, which has been shown to lead to wrongful convictions in a variety 
of ways (Gould & Leo, 2010; Leo & Davis, 2010; Smith et al., 2011). Alone, these errors on 
behalf of the police may not stand to do much harm, but when combined with incorrect 
eyewitness evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, false confessions, and many of the other 
culprits of wrongful conviction, there is a culminating effect that serves to increase the 
chance of the error. 
False Confessions 
 According to Keene et al. (2012), false confessions occur for every type of crime and 
can occur for a variety of reasons.  Additionally, Balko (2011) indicated that false 
confessions happened in about one-quarter of the first 225 DNA exonerations.  Keene et al. 
(2012) also indicates that about 65 percent of suspects in custody either fully or partially 
confess.  It is important to note that false confessions are more common among suspects who 
are minors or who are mentally disabled but can also happen as a result of intensive or 
abusive police interrogations (Balko, 2011; Keene et al., 2012).  Those more likely to falsely 
confess are generally young, intellectually impaired, low in self-confidence, naïve, mentally 
ill, dependent or anxious, always wishing to please others, angry, extroverted, or on some 
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type of psychiatric medication (Gould & Leo, 2010; Keene et al., 2012; Leo & Davis, 2010; 
Orenstein, 2011).  Additionally, it is important to note that, of the juveniles who falsely 
confess, 85 percent are African American, which is much greater than the 53 to 73 percent of 
African American adults who falsely confess (Keene et al., 2012). Much research suggest 
that this overrepresentation of African Americans who falsely confess is due to the negative 
stereotypes placed on them and their individual attempts to overcome these stereotypes 
(Keene et al., 2012).  
There are three common reasons that one would falsely confess, which include 
voluntary confessions, internalized false confessions, and compliant false confessions (Keene 
et al., 2012).  First, a voluntary confession is either made to protect someone else, made 
because the person incorrectly thinks they committed the crime, or made because they are 
trying to attract attention to themselves.  Second, internalized false confessions occur when 
the interrogation itself persuades the person to think that he/she did something that he/she did 
not actually do.  This is typically the case when the suspect is a juvenile, mentally disabled, 
or is experiencing a great amount of grief or sleep-deprivation while under the pressure of the 
interrogators.  This type of confession has been known to lead directly to wrongful 
convictions.  Lastly, compliant false confessions are the largest category of false confessions, 
which occur when the person mentally and physically breaks down and confesses in order to 
escape the interrogation process (Keene et al., 2012).  This process of breaking down the 
suspect is called the “wearing down process” (Keene et al., 2012; Leo & Davis, 2010).  As 
previously discussed, this process is considered to be the result of undue pressure upon the 
suspect by the police.  Typically, the police try to convince the suspect that he/she will be 
seen as a better person, will be less likely to suffer harsh legal outcomes, or that, if he/she 
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assigns blame to his/her co-perpetrator, he/she will avoid harsh punishment.  During this 
process, the detainee may also be kept for hours without food, drink, and sleep, which can 
lead to poor decision-making, cognitive decline, and over-reactivity to stress. This wearing 
down process is likely to lead the suspect to become vulnerable, subsequently causing 
him/her to make short-sighted decisions, such as confessing in effort to quickly get out of the 
situation (Keene et al., 2012).  Detainees who typically engage in these behaviors may 
assume that, if they confess, they will still be proven to be innocent in the long run by the 
other evidence in the case.  This is problematic due to the fact that the detainees who are 
most likely to do this are innocent.  Furthermore, as previously discussed, if the police 
become subject to tunnel vision or confirmation bias, they are less likely to pay attention to 
exculpatory evidence that would conflict with their theory of the case (Leo & Davis, 2010).  
 Aside from the three ways in which a false confession can occur, Keene et al. (2012) 
indicates that there are three common errors that the police may commit that are likely to lead 
to a false confession.  These include misclassification errors, coercion errors, and the 
supplying of key details of the case (Gould & Leo, 2010; Keene et al., 2012; Leo & Davis, 
2010).  First, if the investigator enters the interrogation believing the suspect is guilty, the 
investigator will seek to confirm this bias, thus leading to coercion errors and the providing 
of key details.  Coercion can range from implying guilt to direct threats in order to convince 
the suspect to confess (Gould & Leo, 2010).  Additionally, the interrogator can knowingly or 
unknowingly provide the suspect with non-public details of the crime, which the suspect can 
then incorporate into a false confession (Gould & Leo, 2010; Keene et al., 2012; Leo & 
Davis, 2010).  When the suspect incorporates these details, it is more likely it will strengthen 
the confession and it will be less likely that the confession will be disproved or even given a 
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second glance (Keene et al., 2012).  Additionally, these deceptive strategies can be 
supplemented with false evidence or even lies from the police in order to coerce or convince 
the detainee that he/she committed the crime (Orenstein, 2011). 
 While most of those who falsely confess assume that their confession will be 
disproven by other evidence, and it will be obvious that they falsely confessed, it is actually 
quite difficult to distinguish between false and true confessions.   Research shows that 
humans are very poor at detecting any type of deception.  Specifically, only about 54 percent 
of people are able to tell the truth from lies when not using specialized techniques (Keene et 
al., 2012).  While it is problematic that it is difficult for the police to detect false confessions, 
it is even more troubling that jurors and the courts have the same difficulty at trial.  Much of 
this stems from the stereotype that “if you confess, you must have done it.”  Additionally, the 
supporting non-public details and inside information contained in the confession strengthen 
the idea that the suspect was associated with the crime.  The largest problem is that the 
system is not self-correcting, meaning that law enforcement and other departments will likely 
not identify the error because they tend to support the pre-existing errors rather than 
reviewing evidence individually and coming to their own conclusions (Keene et al., 2012).  
This is challenging because a false confession can lead directly to wrongful conviction if 
exculpatory evidence is not considered after a confession, whether it is ignored by police or 
prosecutors (Leo & Davis, 2010).  Leo and Davis (2010) found that false confessions are 
highly likely to lead to wrongful convictions if introduced against the defendant at trial.  
Specifically, anywhere from 73 to 81 percent of false confessors were erroneously convicted 
at trial.  It is important to note that false confessors are more likely to plead guilty than those 
who do not confess, thus voiding their chance for appeal and making it difficult to obtain a 
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postconviction review of their case.  Leo and Davis (2010) note that around 78 to 85 percent 
of false confessors plead guilty rather than taking their case to trial.  This is a large issue in 
regards to wrongful convictions, as these individuals are likely to be those who are not 
accounted for because they are not granted a case review and have no way of refuting their 
conviction.  One of the most commonly suggested solutions to preventing false confessions is 
to require the recording of interrogations in order to curb police misconduct and to ensure 
suspects are not being pressured or coerced (Gould & Leo, 2010; Keene et al., 2012).  This 
also would aid suspects in their defense if they later recant their confession. 
Forensic Error 
 While DNA testing has been responsible for the exoneration of hundreds of people, it 
has also uncovered the issues with other forensic methods previously used.  Some of these 
methods, such as fingerprinting and hair comparison analysis, are still used today (Gould & 
Leo, 2010).  Recent evidence has come to light about both of these practices that indicates 
that they should no longer be admissible as evidence in a criminal trial.  First, fingerprint 
analysis has not been found to be valid or backed by any scientific evidence (Gould & Leo, 
2010).  Secondly, hair comparison analysis has been shown to be the weakest of all forensic 
laboratory techniques used, with error rates as high as 67 percent on individual samples.  
Additionally, it has been found that most laboratories that do utilize this type of testing reach 
incorrect results four out of five times (Gould & Leo, 2010).  Additional problems have been 
shown in regards to carpet fiber analysis, blood spatter analysis, shoe print identification, and 
bite mark analysis (Balko, 2011).  While some courts have ruled these types of evidence as 
inadmissible, it is problematic that they are still commonly analyzed pieces of evidence 
across the United States.  Even if the evidence is deemed inadmissible in court, the evidence 
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can be used to investigate the case and support any leads or “hunches” that are present by 
investigators (Leo & Davis, 2010).  The uncertainty of this evidence should exclude it from 
any investigation, as it can lead the investigators in the wrong direction and may further any 
type of tunnel vision problem that is already present.  As previously mentioned, the 
culmination of these factors can lead to a wrongful conviction.   
 It should be noted that, while DNA evidence has been praised for its ability to 
exonerate and free many who have been wrongfully convicted, it is not without its own set of 
problems.  First, there is always a small probability that the results will be inaccurate (Gould 
& Leo, 2010).  More importantly, as mentioned previously, DNA evidence is only present in 
a small amount of criminal cases, with estimates suggesting that fewer than 20 percent of 
violent crimes involve biological evidence.  With this said, law enforcement must rely on 
other evidence, including the previously mentioned forensic methods that carry much greater 
risks of inaccuracy (Gould & Leo, 2010).   
 Aside from the types of evidence used in criminal cases and their reliability, there is 
still the chance that the laboratory that is examining the forensic evidence is engaging in 
improper practices and providing incorrect forensic testimony.  According to Gould & Leo 
(2010), the National Research Council concluded in 2009 that the forensic science system in 
the United States is fragmented and has an uneven quality of practice, which poses a threat to 
the quality and credibility of forensic science and its service to the criminal justice system.  
This idea of poor quality of forensic testing is also supported by Balko (2011), who states 
that much of forensic evidence that is used in the courtroom is either invented in police 
stations and crime labs or is refined only for the purpose of fighting crime and obtaining 
convictions.  Most of the forensic evidence used for criminal convictions is not peer-
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reviewed, is not subject to blind testing, and is susceptible to corrupting bias, whether it is 
intentional or unintentional. This is problematic due to the fact that The Innocence Project 
indicated that about half of the first 225 DNA exonerations were due to flawed or fraudulent 
evidence (Balko, 2011).  The even larger issue behind faulty forensic evidence is that most 
police, prosecutors, and judges regard faulty forensic evidence and testimony as never or 
infrequently occurring (Smith et al., 2011).  While defense attorneys tend to be more 
skeptical of forensic evidence, especially in regards to good faith and unintentional errors, it 
still may be a hard burden to overcome if the prosecution has compelling forensic evidence, 
which has been incorrectly assumed to be the most reliable evidence by the general public 
and jurors (Smith et al., 2011).  
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 While most individuals consider misconduct occurring at the beginning of the 
investigation, there has also been evidence of misconduct in preparation and during the trial 
by the prosecutor.  Prosecutorial misconduct was found in about one-quarter of the first 225 
DNA exonerations in the United States (Balko, 2011).  Prosecutors may engage in overly 
suggestive witness coaching alongside the investigators.  Additionally, during preparation for 
the witness’s testimony, they may offer inappropriate or suggestive closing arguments, or 
even fail to disclose critical evidence to the defense (Gould & Leo, 2010).  According to 
Gould and Leo (2010), the most common transgression on the part of the prosecution is the 
failure to turn over exculpatory evidence to the defense.  Exculpatory evidence can include 
any evidence, such as physical evidence, witness testimony, etc., that could be used to find 
the defendant not guilty of the crime.  In some cases, the prosecutors may not get this 
information from the police, but the misconduct may also be intentional in some situations.  
35 
The same situation can be found with many of the other forms of misconduct that prosecutors 
may participate in, especially witness tampering or allowing witnesses to perjure themselves 
during their testimony. 
 While the prosecutors are typically responsible for preparing witnesses for trial, it is 
not surprising that they could engage in overly suggestive witness coaching and other forms 
of witness tampering.  This type of behavior is associated with tunnel vision, which, as 
earlier indicated, can be described as when individuals become so convinced of a conclusion 
that they are less likely to consider alternative information and scenarios that conflict with 
their conclusion (Leo & Davis, 2010).  This is can be detrimental, as it may lead prosecutors 
to ignore or fail to turn over exculpatory evidence, which could include conflicts in witness 
testimony, in addition to DNA and other evidence previously mentioned (Leo & Davis, 
2010).  According to Balko (2011), prosecutors are known not only to utilize incorrect 
informants as key witnesses during trial, but also jailhouse informants.  The problem with the 
use of jailhouse informants is that their motivation is to help the prosecutor obtain a 
conviction in order to have their own sentence reduced or even dismissed.  This is highly 
problematic because the true motivation behind the evidence is driven by making a deal, not 
justice.  In this case, a prosecutor who has the jailhouse informant at his/her disposal may be 
willing to have him/her lie on the stand or even tell the story that only conforms with his/her 
own, in order for them to guarantee the informant a sentence reduction or some other deal. 
This type of behavior is called witness tampering, which may take place in effort to secure a 
deal with the witness or even as a motivation to ensure a conviction (Balko, 2011).  It is 
apparent that witness tampering and perjury could lead directly to wrongful conviction, as it 
may be hard for the defense to find evidence to contradict the testimony, especially if 
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physical evidence is not present or any type of exculpatory evidence has not been turned over 
to the defense. According to Balko (2011), the Center on Wrongful Convictions in Chicago 
indicated that false or misleading informant testimony was responsible for 38 wrongful 
convictions as of 2005. 
 Many of the problems that result from prosecutorial misconduct have been suggested 
to stem from the institutional culture of the job itself (Balko, 2011; Orenstein, 2011; Roberts, 
2003).  According to Roberts (2003), prosecutors may feel motivated to coerce plea bargains 
or even withhold evidence in order to meet the demands of their career.  For instance, it is 
well known that prosecutors have long been subject to increasing caseloads and the pressures 
of the poorly funded and resourced criminal justice system.  As such, they must find ways to 
take short cuts and quickly dispose of cases before they make it to trial.  This increased 
pressure can be challenging, as it could drive prosecutors to cut corners and impede justice.  
Additionally, the pressure to meet a specific standard and hold a specific reputation can lead 
prosecutors to do anything in their power to increase their conviction rate.  Roberts (2003) 
indicates that a prosecutor today who tries to give defendants the benefit of the doubt or tries 
to be fair is regarded as a failure.  These internal pressures are likely to be reinforced daily, 
due to the fact that prosecutors are not likely to face any repercussions from these actions.  
Prosecutors may also feel as if they can get away with these types of misconduct, which 
include witness tampering, suggestive or inappropriate closing arguments, and failure to turn 
over exculpatory evidence.  Prosecutors have long been able to experience an enormous 
degree of immunity from prosecution and/or civil lawsuits, even when these improper actions 
are exposed (Orenstein, 2011; Roberts, 2003).  
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It is important to indicate that, even after the misconduct has taken place, the lack of 
accountability and the importance of a “tough on crime” reputation has been thought to 
further impede the issue of overturning wrongful convictions. According to Orenstein (2011), 
there has been an issue with prosecutors not being willing to test DNA after the conviction.  
This is can prevent those who have been wrongfully convicted from seeking justice.  
Additionally, there are many other hurdles these defendants face in regard to the prosecutor’s 
office and the courts, which include the exclusion of postconviction review for those who 
have pleaded guilty, failure to have sufficient protocols for preserving DNA evidence, lack of 
a sufficient appeals process, exclusion from postconviction DNA testing if the defendant has 
already served the sentence, and a failure to require speedy responses to requests for testing 
(Orenstein, 2011).  While some of these issues have been mitigated by way of the Innocence 
Protection Act of 2004, which has been enacted in 48 states and requires rules and 
procedures to be put in place for inmates who are applying for DNA testing, creates a grant 
program to help states pay for postconviction DNA testing, and provides grants to states to 
help improve capital prosecution and capital defense quality, it has been widely agreed that 
there are still many problems with prosecutorial misconduct (Death Penalty Information 
Center, n.d.). 
According to Smith et al. (2011), criminal justice actors, who include police, 
prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys, estimated false testimony to occur almost never 
or to be slightly above infrequent, with defense attorneys estimating the occurrence 
significantly higher than prosecutors, police officers, and judges. On the other hand, it was 
estimated that the suppression of evidence occurred almost never to moderately frequently.  
Once again, police and prosecutors estimated this occurring the least, while judges fell about 
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halfway, and defense attorneys estimated the highest occurrence of the issue.  The estimates 
of prosecutors prompting or being suggestive to a witness were significantly higher than the 
other issues examined.  Regarding inadequate investigation, the results are similar to the 
estimates of suppression of evidence, ranging from slightly higher than infrequent to higher 
than moderately frequently.  Lastly, in regards to estimates of undue pressure in plea 
bargaining, there was a disagreement seen between police and prosecutors, with prosecutors 
estimating the occurrence below infrequently, judges and police estimating it to happen 
between infrequently to moderately frequently, and defense attorneys indicating that it was 
between moderately frequently and very frequently (Smith et al., 2011). It is troublesome 
that, even with the increased use of plea bargaining in the system and the apparent awareness 
of the increased pressure placed on these defendants, there has not been anything done to 
protect those who become subdued to the pressure.  As previously mentioned, those who 
plead guilty are unlikely to be able to appeal their case or even request a postconviction 
review of their case, which can further exacerbate the problem of identifying wrongful 
conviction.   
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 As many assume that it is the responsibility of the defense attorney to protect the 
defendant from the mistakes of others, research has found that ineffective defense lawyering 
was the biggest contributing factor to the wrongful conviction or death sentence of criminal 
defendants in the last twenty-three years (Gould & Leo, 2010).  Some of the reasons that 
have been indicated to be predictors of defense attorney error include not adequately 
challenging witnesses, unwarranted plea bargaining concessions, failing to file the proper 
motions, not adequately challenging forensic evidence, and inadequate investigation (Smith 
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et al., 2011).  It is clear that, if the defense attorney does not challenge the witness, evidence, 
the plea offer, or even the investigation that the police conducted, the defendant may not be 
able to avoid the errors or even misconduct that took place during the early stages of his/her 
case by the police, prosecutors, investigators, witnesses, or even lab technicians who 
examined the physical evidence.  These errors can be compounded by issues out of the 
control of the defense attorney, such as the prosecutor failing to overturn exculpatory 
evidence (Leo & Davis, 2010).  The defense attorney is not likely to be aware of this issue 
until the trial has already begun or even after a conviction has been put in place.  According 
to Gould and Leo (2010), the reasons behind inadequate assistance of counsel stem from 
inadequate funding, an absence of quality control, and a lack of motivation.  It is important to 
note that these issues may be further exacerbated for indigent defendants who are represented 
by court appointed counsel or public defenders (Hartley, Miller, & Spohn, 2010; Williams, 
2013).  
 While it is clear that defense attorneys may have an immense amount of work on their 
plate if they are up against the culmination of all the other errors that may take place in 
pursuit of a wrongful conviction, it is important to note that there is a difference between 
poor representation and inadequate representation under the law.  It is actually rather difficult 
for a defendant to argue inadequate representation due to the subjective nature of the issue.  
According to Balko (2011), in many of the cases in which defendants have been exonerated, 
there has been an argument of poor lawyering, but many of the judges ruled that the poor 
lawyering did not prejudice the case because the evidence was overwhelming.  While it is 
clear that the evidence was not as overwhelming as it appeared, due to the exoneration, it is 
even more apparent that there are few standards set for adequate representation, especially in 
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capital cases.  According to the Death Penalty Information Center (n.d.), the Innocence 
Protection Act of 2004 hopes to improve the quality of capital defense by setting standards 
for adequate defense and providing grants to help states pay for training. While this may 
remedy some of the problems in capital cases, there are still a great number of wrongful 
convictions that take place in non-capital cases.  Additionally, the policy may provide 
funding for training, but there are still large funding issues for defense attorneys when it 
comes to the investigation of the case, the hiring of expert witnesses, and the external 
examination of forensic evidence.  As previously mentioned, these issues are exacerbated for 
indigent defendants as court appointed counsel or public defenders do not have much access 
to funding or outside resources to prepare for a trial or even fully investigate the case and 
may be subject to greater time and caseload restrictions (Hartley et al., 2010; Williams, 
2013).    
 According to Smith et al. (2011), which looked at estimates from police, prosecutors, 
judges, and defense attorneys on the occurrence of the main types of system error within the 
system, defense attorney error received greater response on all five categories than any other 
group of error examined, which included police error, prosecutorial misconduct, judicial 
error, and evidence errors.  Specifically, respondents indicated that defense attorney error 
occurs moderately frequently but not very frequently.  Judges were the most critical when 
evaluating defense attorneys, while prosecutors and police were the least critical (Smith et 
al., 2011).   
Racial Disparity 
 As much of the literature indicates, there is a large disparate effect on minorities 
within the criminal justice system, which extends as far as wrongful conviction.  According 
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to Gould and Leo (2010), there are serious race effects within the identification, prosecution, 
and sentencing of criminal suspects.  Not only are minorities more likely to be stopped by 
police, as well as sentenced to longer sentences after being convicted, but they are also more 
likely to be subject to some of the sources of wrongful conviction.  Although African 
Americans only comprise about 13 percent of the population in the United States, the over-
representation of people of color in wrongful conviction ranges from 43 to 62 percent 
(Konvisser, 2012).  The largest example of racial disparity is within eyewitness 
misidentification errors, as errors are more likely when the victim and perpetrator are of a 
different race (Gould & Leo, 2010).  This is particularly the case in rape cases in which a 
white victim is raped by an African American or Hispanic man and unintentionally identifies 
an innocent person as the suspect during the lineup.  The issue of racial disparity has also 
been found in regards to jury decision-making, as there have been a significant number of 
cases in which all-white juries have erroneously convicted African-American men based on 
questionable evidence without much deliberation (Gould & Leo, 2010).   As it is clear that 
there is a significant issue of racial disparity throughout the criminal justice system, it is 
obvious that the disparity from each stage may combine to have an even larger and more 
detrimental effect, including wrongful conviction.  This is not to suggest that one act of racial 
disparity always leads to wrongful conviction, but the culmination of these disparities could 
make it much more difficult for minorities to counter the odds of wrongful conviction.   
According to Smith and Hattery (2011), approximately 75 percent of those who have 
been exonerated are members of minority groups and, on average, have spent 13 years in 
prison for a crime they did not commit.  This simply cannot be explained by the fact that 
there are more African Americans, or minorities in general, in prison.  Specifically, while 
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African Americans are disproportionately represented in the prison population, making up 
about 40 or 50 percent, African Americans alone account for 70 percent of the exonerees.  
This phenomenon is supported through the examination of disparity in rape cases.  
Specifically, African American men are four times more likely to be exonerated for raping 
white women compared to the number of times they actually commit this crime.  Smith and 
Hattery (2011) associate this problem with the racial history of the United States.  
Specifically, accusations of the rape of white women by African American men have been at 
the center of the race relations and the justice system in this country.  Additionally, it is 
indicated that this long standing myth of the black rapist has set the way in which police, the 
criminal justice system, and even the public deal with African American men, especially in 
rape cases.  This continued disparity for minorities in the criminal justice system is 
problematic, as it is clear that this can be directly associated with the ultimate error in the 
criminal justice system— wrongful conviction.  While it is not always the result of one act of 
disparity, it is clear that this problem lies much deeper than the policies the criminal justice 
system utilizes, but also as biases within the actors of the criminal justice system.  As with 
other errors within the criminal justice system, the use of DNA evidence has helped to lessen 
the problem of racial disparities resulting in wrongful conviction, but there are many cases 
and defendants who may not be helped by forensic evidence, as it is not likely to be present 
in many criminal cases.   
System Issues  
  It has been known for quite some time that there are many issues with how the 
criminal justice system operates and functions, such as increased caseload problems, as well 
as lack of funding and resources.  It has been argued that these issues within the criminal 
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justice system can inadvertently become a source of wrongful convictions.  First, according 
to Roberts (2003), the funding and caseload problems in the system lead to an increased use 
of plea bargains.  In turn, plea bargains can negatively impact defendants, as some of them 
may become subject to increased pressure from police and prosecutors to accept a deal for a 
crime they have not committed.  Not only does this harm the defendant, it has also been 
indicated to undermine the value of the police investigative work.  Essentially, the police 
assume that they will not have to use their evidence in trial, since a majority of cases are 
resolved by way of a plea bargain, which may make them become sloppy.  This sloppiness 
can lead to the police obtaining the wrong defendant, which then starts the cycle of other 
problems to come for the defendant.  Additionally, plea bargaining leads to an increase in 
cases that can be prosecuted.  For instance, prosecutors threaten harsher charges and 
sentences to those who do not accept a plea bargain, which can lead to an increased 
conviction rate for the prosecutor and an increased amount of cases that actually make it into 
the court system, due to a net widening effect that allows more less serious cases into the 
system.  With this said, Roberts (2003) indicates that plea bargaining itself may be a 
circulatory reason for the ever increasing caseload problem in the criminal justice system, 
specifically by way of increasing the severity of charges in hopes to coerce a plea bargain for 
lesser charges and secure a conviction.  While this process is largely handled by prosecutors, 
it is clear that all actors of the system have some involvement in plea bargaining.  
 Additionally, it has been shown that these issues, specifically the lack of funding and 
resources, have been linked to wrongful conviction.  Smith et al. (2011) indicated that lack of 
funding for adequate defense services may cause wrongful conviction, usually by way of 
inability to compete with the prosecution.  As previously noted, if defense attorneys do not 
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have the funding and resources to investigate adequately and counter the resources of the 
prosecution, they may not be able to convince the court that their client is not guilty when 
he/she is not.  This can be further exacerbated for indigent defendants who have court 
appointed counsel or public defenders, as they are even less likely to have funding and 
resources (Hartley et al., 2010; Williams, 2013).  Not only can lack funding have a 
detrimental effect on wrongful conviction, wrongful conviction itself may lead to further 
funding issues.  Overall, as of 2011, about $87 million has been spent on the 250 exonerees 
reported nationwide (Smith & Hattery, 2011).  It is clear that the already struggling criminal 
justice system is only losing more money when individuals are wrongfully convicted.  It 
should be noted that these funding, resource, and caseload issues alone may negatively 
impact defendants directly, as well as indirectly, typically by way of plea bargaining, which 
has already been indicated to be subject to coercion and lead to depletion of postconviction 
rights for the defendant (Roberts, 2003; Smith et al., 2011).   
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Chapter 3: Uncovering Wrongful Conviction 
Appeals 
Process  
The process of appealing a wrongful conviction in the United States is much harder 
and difficult than most would assume.  Challenging a wrongful conviction in the United 
States, due to the introduction of new evidence or due to procedural issues, is very 
challenging and requires the defendant to jump through many hurdles.  If a defendant 
presents new evidence, he/she has the opportunity to move for a new trial (Griffin, 2009).  It 
is important to note that the defendant must make this motion before the same judge who 
heard the underlying criminal case.  This can be problematic and difficult, especially for 
those defendants who are incarcerated.  Additional barriers to this motion include the short 
statute of limitations, the high standard of proof (which requires a high likelihood that the 
new evidence would have produced a different outcome during the trial), and the large 
amount of discretion of the judge in hearing the motion.  It is important to note that the judge 
may deny the motion without a hearing.  State and federal courts differ on the length of time 
in which a motion for a new trial must be filed, as well as the standards for the consideration 
of such motions (Heder & Goldsmith, 2012).  Specifically, federal law requires that the 
motions must be filed within three years of the initial verdict, while states range from several 
months to a few years.  Additionally, federal law also leaves the decision to vacate, or set 
aside, the judgment or grant a new trial up to the judge who hears the case.  Although state
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and federal courts may have different statutes regarding the amount of time that can pass 
before the motion is heard, both generally rely on the standards found in Larrison et al. v. 
United States (1928) and Berry v. State (1851).  These standards essentially focus on whether 
the newly discovered evidence would have produced a different result during trial or not 
(Heder & Goldsmith, 2012). 
If the defendant is not granted a new trial, whether it is due to denial by the judge or 
due to the time constraints for the motion, the next step would be for him/her to focus on the 
conviction itself, from a state or federal level, by way of a collateral review (Griffin, 2009; 
Heder & Goldsmith, 2012).  Specifically, the defendant must file a motion stating that he/she 
could not have produced the newly discovered evidence with due diligence before trial.  
Additionally, the defendant must also demonstrate that the newly discovered evidence would 
produce a different result if it were to be admitted at the trial (Griffin, 2009).  As with the 
original motion, the collateral motion must be filed with the same judge who heard the 
underlying criminal case, and the judge has the discretion of whether or not to grant a new 
hearing or any type of relief.  It should be noted that the trial court’s decision is only 
reviewed for abuse after the fact, which is a highly deferential standard of review.  While 
every state offers some form of collateral review to convicted criminals, the rules involved 
differ from state to state (Griffin, 2009; Heder & Goldsmith, 2012).  In federal court, the writ 
of habeas corpus constitutes the primary collateral remedy.  Specifically, an analysis of the 
writ provides a way to determine the procedural challenges facing the defendant who is 
attempting to introduce newly discovered evidence via a collateral challenge.  It may be 
particularly difficult for a defendant to introduce new evidence in this manner, as habeas 
relief is generally available only for defendants who can establish a constitutional error with 
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their convictions (Griffin, 2009; Heder & Goldsmith, 2012).  It should be noted that the 
scope of the habeas corpus petition has become narrower over time, specifically through new 
legislation, such as the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which was enacted 
in 1996.  The U.S. Supreme Court has specified two situations in which the statute allows for 
federal habeas relief.  First, federal habeas relief may be allowed if the “state court arrives at 
a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the 
state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially 
indistinguishable facts” (Heder & Goldsmith, 2012, p. 113).  Federal courts may also grant 
relief if the state court identifies the correct principle but unreasonably applies that principle 
to the facts in the defendant’s case.  It is important to note that a freestanding claim of 
innocence based on newly discovered evidence may or may not involve a constitutional 
challenge that would be covered under the habeas petition.  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
directly stated that the federal habeas rule is to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in 
violation of the Constitution, not to correct errors of fact (Heder & Goldsmith, 2012).   
With this said, habeas corpus relief is generally not a viable option for defendants to 
challenge a wrongful conviction or even a state court’s denial of a new trial.  While there are 
many difficulties for defendants attempting to argue a constitutional violation, Heder and 
Goldsmith (2012) argue that there are some ways in which defendants may make connections 
to violations of their constitutional rights, such as alleging police coercion or prosecutorial 
misconduct, especially when false or recanted testimony was presented at trial.  Other cases 
of wrongful conviction may be associated with constitutional claims, such as the allegation of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, but may be more difficult to provide enough evidence to 
meet the high standard required for habeas relief.  As it has already been indicated that there 
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are many procedural hurdles for the defendant to jump during a motion for a new trial, it has 
been found to be even more difficult for a defendant to file a motion for habeas relief.  
Specifically, a defendant may only seek federal habeas relief if he/she is not barred from 
doing so in state or federal court.  This is problematic, in that a defendant who fails to 
introduce the new evidence within the applicable time frame or who is simply disallowed to 
present the motion in their jurisdiction would then be barred from pursuing habeas relief in a 
federal court (Heder & Goldsmith, 2012).   
Although there are some limitations and exceptions for these rules discussed, it is 
clear that these procedural hurdles and limitations make it increasingly difficult for those 
who have been wrongfully convicted to argue for a new trial or for their sentence to be 
vacated (Heder & Goldsmith, 2012).  It may be even more difficult for these defendants to 
pursue these types of relief as they are not always guaranteed an attorney or any type of aid 
in the process of filing these motions or throughout the appeals process. According to Heder 
and Goldsmith (2012), many defendants seeking postconviction relief on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence will never have a day in court.  This is due to the fact that not all 
jurisdictions in the United States allow for postconviction relief, while others impose strict 
time limits, as mentioned above.  These limitations can be even more detrimental for those 
who were wrongfully convicted, as it is not always easy for these defendants to prove that the 
conviction was incorrect, whether it is due to procedural factors or actual innocence.   
Data on Reversals for Exonerees 
Garrett (2008) addresses the number of reversals after appeal for defendants later 
exonerated by DNA evidence compared to a matched group of defendants who applied for 
the same types of appeals.  This study found that 18 of the 133 individuals who had been 
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exonerated by DNA evidence and had written decisions in their cases were granted reversals, 
which accounts for a 14 percent reversal rate.  Additionally, 12 percent of the exonerees were 
retried after reversal of the original conviction, and nine percent were tried multiple times 
because they received multiple reversals and each time were convicted again by new juries.  
Furthermore, six more exonerees’ convictions were vacated, but had no retrials due to the 
fact that their DNA testing exonerated them before their trial date.  It is important to note 
that, if capital cases are excluded, the reversal rate drops to nine percent.  This is surprising, 
as only 14 out of the 200 exonerees in this study received a capital sentence, yet this group 
had the highest rate of reversals of all of those in the innocent group (Findley, 2009; Garrett, 
2008).  The 9 percent non-capital reversal rate found by Garrett (2008) is higher than the rate 
of reversals during criminal appeals in general, which indicates that only about one percent 
of federal and state postconviction petitioners receive relief.  In this study, the capital attrition 
rate among exonerees is 58 percent, which is similar to the 68 percent rate found in other 
studies.  In regards to those who received life sentences, Garrett (2008) found that 10 percent 
of those in the study sentenced to life received a reversal.  It is important to note that, within 
these eighteen exonerees who were granted a reversal that was upheld on appeal, statements 
were made by judges in eight of the case that suggested that the defendant may be innocent.  
Additionally, in nearly two-thirds of these cases, the courts found error but indicated that the 
error was “harmless” and did not further investigate any claims of innocence.  In 10 percent 
of the cases in which the defendant was later exonerated, the courts had ruled that there was 
an overwhelming amount of evidence of guilt against the innocent defendant (Findley, 2009; 
Garrett, 2008). 
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In regards to specific types of cases that received reversals, Garrett (2008) found that 
rape cases had a lower reversal rate than murder cases, with seven percent of the rape cases 
in the study being reversed, compared to the 11 percent of murder cases reversed.  It has been 
suggested that this may be due to the fact that rape cases typically involve a victim 
identification, which may be more difficult to challenge, even when there are suggestive 
practices during the police investigation.  It was found that rape-murder cases had a higher 
reversal rate than both rape and murder cases alone, which is surprising as many suspect that 
these cases contain more bodily fluid and blood evidence from the perpetrator which would 
lead them to be less likely to be reversed.  In regards to the types of appeals granted for these 
individuals, it was found that more individuals received vacated convictions through direct 
appeal after the initial conviction than at state postconviction hearings or with federal habeas 
corpus petitions.  Specifically, 10 percent of the 200 exonerees in the study received vacated 
convictions by way of direct appeal, while only one percent received a vacated conviction 
through state postconviction hearings, and three percent were granted vacated convictions 
during federal habeas corpus proceedings (Garrett, 2008).  
On the other hand, in the matched comparison group, Garrett (2008) found a 10 
percent non-capital reversal rate.  This group was matched to the innocent group by locating 
121 cases on Westlaw with an appeal in the same state, involving the same crimes of 
conviction, and having a written decision issued in the same year as each case in the innocent 
group.  In total, the innocence group had just one fewer reversal.  It can be suggested from 
this data that exonerees fare no better during review processes than matched rape and murder 
cases.  With this said, it is also important to note that this similarity may be due to the fact 
that murder and serious rape convictions share a similar reversal rate overall, which is 
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estimated to be about nine percent.  Subsequently, this could suggest that the reversal rates in 
these cases could have nothing to do with the judges detecting actual innocence, but rather 
the higher rates of procedural errors that may occur in these types of serious cases.  Garrett 
(2008) also offers another explanation for the similarity in the reversal rates of the innocent 
group and the matched comparison group, which suggests that, in some of the exonerated 
cases, as well as the matched cases, the judge may be detecting actual innocence.  This 
explanation is further supported by the idea that six of the twelve claims receiving reversal in 
the matched group involved a ruling that the jury was misled by unreliable or incomplete 
factual evidence.  Since half of the rulings in the matched group had something to do with 
factual evidence, it is clear that there is a possibility that just as many in the matched group 
may be innocent or later exonerated.  This may especially be the case as the study does not 
have clear evidence as to whether any of those in the matched group are actually innocent, 
since some of those who were factually innocent in the innocence group were not granted 
reversals.  Overall, the similarity in reversal rates among the two groups suggests a common 
incidence of error in comparable appeals of rape and murder conviction; specifically, factual 
error.  This is a cause for concern, as this study reveals that there are a sufficient number of 
cases in which postconviction DNA evidence has exonerated individuals who were initially 
denied appellate review or relief (Garrett, 2008).  Additionally, this data is even more 
troubling when focusing on the results of the appellate process for those exonerated and those 
who have not been officially deemed as factually innocent.  One would expect the appellate 
courts, both state and federal, to be more likely to reach a correct decision and be able to 
determine factual innocence or at least a notion that the defendant could potentially be 
innocent of the crime.  As previously discussed, this is unlikely to be the case, as many 
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appellate courts have stated that the purpose of the appeal, especially habeas corpus petitions, 
is not to determine factual innocence, but to determine procedural or constitutional violations 
during the previous case (Findley, 2009; Garrett, 2008). With this said, it is still argued that 
the appellate system does not serve its intended purpose of sorting out the guilty from the 
innocent and identifying prior mistakes within the case (Findley, 2009; Garrett, 2008).   
Issues with the Appellate System 
 As it is apparent that there are issues and consequences associated with the failure for 
the appellate courts to be able to detect actual innocence and fix errors, it has been advocated 
that there are many underlying issues associated with the structure, nature of operation, and 
overall decisions of appellate courts.  Specifically, according to Findley (2009), the appellate 
courts are not structurally suited to receive live testimony or other types of new evidence 
directly, which can hinder them from being able to consider new evidence before making 
rulings on individual cases.  In this regard, it should be pointed out that, while this is an issue, 
it has commonly been suggested that there are other mechanisms for introducing new facts 
and claims on appeal that may work without radically restructuring the appellate courts. This 
inability to introduce new facts on appeal raises serious impediments for raising specific 
claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel.   While new evidence plays a large role in 
exoneration and the overturning of wrongful convictions, it has been shown that the 
reluctance and failure to examine and test existing evidence upon appeal is even more 
detrimental to those wrongfully convicted.   As previously noted, according to Garrett 
(2008), 86 percent of the cases in his study showed situations in which the reviewing courts 
failed to recognize innocence or grant any type of relief in cases involving a wrongful 
conviction.  In situations in which the appellate courts failed to recognize innocence by 
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looking at the existing evidence, they presented opinions about guilt, even if the defendant 
was not factually guilty.  As previously indicated, in nearly one third of the cases in this 
study, the courts found error but affirmed that the error was “harmless” and typically asserted 
some implication of likely guilt.  Additionally, in about 10 percent of the cases, the courts 
described the evidence of guilt against the innocent defendant as “overwhelming” (Findley, 
2009; Garrett, 2008).   
According to Findley (2009), when examining studies of DNA exoneration, it is clear 
that there are common types of procedural error and evidence claims that are overlooked by 
appellate courts.  As previously discussed, these common types of errors that are present in 
wrongful convictions include eyewitness identification errors, false confessions, false or 
misleading forensic science evidence, perjured testimony from jailhouse informants, 
ineffective assistance of counsel, and prosecutorial misconduct.  According to the data in the 
Garrett (2008) study, 79 percent of the first 200 DNA exonerations argued that mistaken 
eyewitness evidence was present, but the appellate system was unable to detect the flawed 
evidence in any of these cases.  This same pattern was found within claims of false 
confessions, in which 16 percent of those in the study argued that they falsely confessed, and 
nine percent indicated that there were mistaken self-incriminating statements.  The court did 
not reverse any of these claims of false confessions.  Additionally, it should be noted that 
only about half of the defendants in the study were able to challenge their false confession 
due to procedural hurdles involved in the appeal process.  In regards to faulty forensic 
evidence, 57 percent of the 200 cases involved some type of forensic evidence, while only 32 
percent were able to bring valid challenges against this evidence.  The study found that 19 of 
the 25 forensic science based challenges were rejected by the courts, although these 
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defendants were later exonerated by way of DNA evidence.  Next, informant testimony 
accounted for 18 percent of the cases in the study, in which 12 percent of these cases 
involved jailhouse testimony.  Of these cases, the appellate court did not recognize any of 
these claims as valid or rule the testimony as perjured when person was innocent.  In regards 
to process errors, it was found that ineffective assistance of counsel played a role in 29 
percent of the cases in the study, which seems to be low compared to the data in the 1994 
study conducted by the National Center for State Courts that found that 41 to 45 percent of 
postconviction defendants presented this claim (Findley, 2009; Garrett, 2008).   It should be 
noted that the data from the Garrett (2008) study is consistent with an earlier Department of 
Justice Study that found that 25 percent of petitioners in federal habeas corpus cases claimed 
ineffective assistance of counsel (Findley, 2009).  Of the 38 postconviction DNA exonerees 
who claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, only four were granted relief on such claims.  
In regards to prosecutorial misconduct, specifically Brady claims that related to the 
withholding of evidence, only about 17 percent of those exonerated who asserted this claim 
were successful in the study (Findley, 2009; Garrett, 2008). It should be noted that a large 
reason that the appellate courts may not detect these issues is due to the fact that the courts 
are known to rely heavily on lower court decisions and pre-existing errors (Griffin, 2009; 
Keene et al., 2012). 
While a majority of these claims would be detected with DNA testing at the appellate 
level, it has been argued that there is a widespread disagreement when allowing for 
postconviction DNA testing for inmates during appeals (Garrett, 2008; Griffin, 2009; 
Orenstein, 2011).  According to Orenstein (2011), many states do not provide sufficient 
protocols for preserving DNA evidence or avenues for appeal on the grounds of the DNA 
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evidence.  Garrett (2008) indicates that sixteen exonerees in his study were initially denied 
motions for DNA testing, some cases involving multiple denials.  While this practice may be 
changing, specifically due to the Justice for All Act, which permits defendants convicted of a 
federal offense, who have been sentenced to imprisonment or death, to apply to the court 
where the original conviction was entered for DNA testing of specific evidence, there are still 
many hurdles for defendants requesting postconviction DNA testing for appellate reasons.  
Specifically, many states require difficult preliminary showings to obtain DNA testing and 
some may even require consent from law enforcement personnel.  As previously noted, while 
many may not be able to guarantee DNA testing on their own, defendants are able to contact 
innocence projects or other state organizations aimed at protecting innocent defendants in the 
criminal justice system.  In the Garrett (2008) study, 12 percent of the defendants initially 
pursued DNA testing on their own, independent of any legal counsel, while the remainder 
contacted legal counsel or outside organizations for assistance.   
Developments in Appellate Assistance 
In addition to improvements on postconviction DNA testing accessibility, some states 
have enacted further statutes and organizations, outside of innocence projects, that are 
designed to investigate and review individual wrongful conviction claims (Griffin, 2009).  
Specifically, the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission (NCIIC) is an independent 
state-funded body that is authorized to investigate and review individual wrongful conviction 
claims in North Carolina (Griffin, 2009; Innocence Project, n.d.).  The organization has eight 
voting members who are a part of the criminal justice field in some manner, whether they are 
practicing attorneys, judges, law enforcement personnel, etc.  Additionally, the commission 
is allowed to investigate claims of innocence through the use of subpoenas and other legal 
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methods.  If the defendant is successful at the hearing, which would indicate that at least five 
members of the board concluded that there was sufficient evidence of factual innocence to 
merit judicial review, his/her case will be referred to a superior court judge for review.  Then, 
the Chief Justice will appoint a three judge panel to hold a hearing to review the initial case 
and to seek testimony of any witnesses at the time, including the defendant.  If the panel 
unanimously concludes that the convicted person is innocent by clear and convincing 
evidence, the defendant’s conviction will be vacated and the charges will be dismissed 
(Griffin, 2009; Innocence Project, n.d.).   
As previously mentioned, similar structures and organizations have been established 
in other states for the same purpose; specifically, Wisconsin developed an organization in 
which a defendant may return to the trial court after conviction and sentencing but before 
taking the case to the court of appeal (Findley, 2009). The defendant may file a motion, 
entitled a Notice of Intent to Pursue Postconviction Relief, which is part of a direct review 
process.  This motion will entitle him/her to new postconviction/appeal counsel, which will 
be part of a review process that looks at the transcript of the initial proceeding to determine if 
the case presents issues with arguable merit for postconviction or appellate review.  If the 
case does contain merit for further review, it will be directly referred to the court of appeals 
for appellate review of the specific issues noted.  This process has been deemed helpful for 
defendants, as it allows for the introduction of new evidence into the direct appeal process.  
Additionally, the appointment of new counsel also allows the defendant to pursue claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Findley (2009) indicates that this procedure benefits the 
court system, as it reduces the number cases taken into the court of appeals by resolving a 
high percentage of postconviction challenges at the motion stage.  
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Wrongful Conviction Organizations 
 As it is been previously stated, there are many hurdles, both legal and financial, that 
defendants must cross in order to appeal a wrongful conviction or to seek compensation for 
the same.  With this said, there has been a strong push for organizations, both state and 
public, to help individuals who have been subject to such miscarriages of justice.  According 
to Schehr (2005), innocence projects have been in existence since 1983, but the innocence 
movement itself did not start until the late 1990s, particularly with the first national 
conference dedicated to the topic, which was held at Northwestern University in 1998.  
Currently, there are innocence projects in 35 states, with seven states having more than one 
innocence project.  It should be noted that innocence projects typically start in one of four 
ways, which include university-based programs that operate within a law school, university-
based programs that utilize both social science and/or liberal arts departments in combination 
with law school students and faculty to provide research and legal counsel, university-based 
programs that have no law school affiliation, or community based programs that draw on 
available resources (Schehr, 2005).  Overall, innocence projects are created to investigate 
cases of wrongful conviction, and in some cases, correct miscarriages of justice.  The 
increasing use and importance of innocence projects is clear by looking out how many of the 
first 200 exonerations received help from these organizations, with 79 percent seeking DNA 
testing by contacting an innocence project or requesting it through postconviction attorneys 
(Garrett, 2008).  Many of the common organizations that are aimed at helping these 
defendants include The Innocence Project, the Center on Wrongful Convictions, the National 
Registry of Exonerations, and the Death Penalty Information Center.  While each 
organization may not be directly involved in providing legal representation and resources to 
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these individuals, each is aimed at raising awareness about the real issues involving wrongful 
conviction and how common it actually is.   
First, The Innocence Project was founded in 1992 by Barry C. Scheck and Peter J. 
Neufeld at Benjamin J. Cardozo School of Law at Yeshiva University to assist prisoners who 
could be proven innocent by way of DNA testing (Innocence Project, n.d.).  The Innocence 
Project later expanded to a nonprofit organization that operates nationwide.  Since its 
founding, The Innocence Project has aided in the exoneration of more than 300 people in the 
United States through DNA testing, which includes 18 death row inmates.  The organization 
currently has full-time staff attorneys working to exonerate the staggering number of 
innocent people who remain incarcerated, while also utilizing Cardozo Clinic law students to 
provide direct representation or critical assistance in individual cases.  It should be noted that 
this nationwide project has expanded to many law schools across the nation, as North 
Carolina houses the North Carolina Center on Actual Innocence, which is a statewide project, 
as well as The Duke Center for Criminal Justice and Professional Responsibility located at 
Duke University School of Law, and the Wake Forest University Law School Innocence and 
Justice Clinic (Innocence Project, n.d.).  Programs similar to these are also found nationwide 
as law schools are beginning to become aware of the issue of wrongful conviction and are 
training future attorneys to be aware and informed on how wrongful convictions may occur 
and how they should be remedied.  It should also be noted that The Innocence Project 
maintains a list of all postconviction DNA exonerations throughout the United States, 
whether the case was handled by The Innocence Project or some other organization.  To this 
date, The Innocence Project has a count of 312 postconviction DNA exonerations in the 
United States (Innocence Project, n.d.).  
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Second, the Center on Wrongful Convictions, located at Northwestern Law School, 
provides representation for imprisoned clients around the country with claims of actual 
innocence (Northwestern Law & Michigan, n.d.).  The center faculty and staff partner with 
outside pro bono attorneys and students in the clinic at the law school to review requests for 
representation.  The Center on Wrongful Convictions indicates that they receive about 200 
requests per month.  While the main focus is on postconviction cases, similar to The 
Innocence Project, the organization also participates in retrials of previously appealed cases.  
Overall, the organization focuses on raising public awareness about the prevalence, causes, 
and social costs of wrongful convictions, as well as seeking policy reforms to prevent and 
reduce future wrongful convictions.  While the Center on Wrongful Convictions has been 
influential within many wrongful conviction reforms nationwide, with particular importance 
on the expansion of DNA testing in criminal cases and reforms to provide adequate funding 
for the defense of indigent clients, the organization has also started to look at wrongful 
conviction within youth and women.  It should also be noted that the Center on Wrongful 
Convictions and Northwestern Law School is also the co-founder of the National Registry of 
Exonerations database.  Northwestern Law and Michigan Law have partnered to catalogue 
and document the nation’s roster of wrongful convictions.  The database provides detailed 
information, such as the exoneree, conviction offense, the type of evidence responsible for 
the wrongful conviction, and the type of evidence used to exonerate the individual, as well as 
the location and year both the original conviction and the exoneration took place. To this 
date, the National Registry of Exonerations indicates that there have been 1,324 exonerations 
in the United States (The Center on Wrongful Convictions, n.d.). 
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Lastly, the Death Penalty Information Center is a national nonprofit organization that 
analyzes and publishes information on issues concerning capital punishment (Death Penalty 
Information Center, n.d.).  In regards to wrongful conviction, the Death Penalty Information 
Center does not provide direct representation, but it does provide a great amount of data on 
the number of individuals who have been sentenced to death and later exonerated.  The 
comprehensive list, most recently published in the organization’s Innocence and the Crisis in 
the American Death Penalty Report in 2004, indicates that there have been 116 exonerations 
of death penalty inmates since 1973.  The report also breaks down the exonerations of these 
death row inmates by state, race, and gender, as well as the use of DNA evidence and the 
basis for exoneration (Death Penalty Information Center, n.d.).  As previously mentioned, 
while the organization does not provide direct legal assistance to those claiming innocence, it 
still plays a large role in public awareness of the issue and how wrongful conviction affects 
the death penalty.  The occurrence of wrongful conviction in capital cases is shocking and 
continues to be an issue that needs to be addressed as capital punishment is a final 
punishment that cannot be reversed.   
As previously mentioned, some states have established state run and funded 
innocence commissions that are aimed at identifying the causes of and remedies for wrongful 
conviction within that state or jurisdiction (Griffin, 2009; Innocence Project, n.d.; Norris, 
Bonventre, Redlich, & Acker, 2011).  According to The Innocence Project (n.d.), the states 
that have established such organizations include California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Oklahoma, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin.  
While each state has different formations, structures, mandates, and standards for review, 
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each individual commission reviews cases, identifies causes of wrongful convictions, and 
recommends remedial steps to avoid recurrence (Innocence Project, n.d.).  
While each of the examples given for organizations that address wrongful convictions 
may follow different structural approaches, Norris et al. (2011) suggest that innocence 
commissions, in any form, should focus on error correction and systemic reform.  Although 
some improvements have been made to these types of organizations and new organizations 
are continuously being established across the nation, the co-founders of the Innocence 
Project have called for the formation of permanent, systemic reform innocence commissions 
to examine wrongful convictions in specific jurisdictions only.  This model is similar to the 
model previously put into place in North Carolina and other states but would further address 
the causes of wrongful conviction and propose reforms on how to prevent the issue in the 
future.  This same recommendation was presented in 2006 by the American Bar Association 
Innocence Committee. The largest recommendation in regards to innocence commissions has 
been to make sure these organizations and committees are permanently put in place, which is 
important as some of the state level committees are temporary, so they may constantly 
monitor and review wrongful convictions (Norris et al., 2011).  Although many of the 
recommendations set forth for innocence commissions and projects are slowly being 
implemented, which is evident by the large number of individuals who request the assistance 
of innocence projects, there are still many improvements and measures that need to be set 
forth to continue to identify past wrongful convictions and reduce future wrongful conviction 
incidents.  Overall, innocence commissions and projects play a large role in assisting those 
who have been wrongfully convicted and are attempting to seek relief, especially due to the 
complicated legal nature of the appeals process and the various hurdles one must face after 
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conviction in order to start the process of appeal, including finding counsel, which is 
especially difficult for indigent defendants. 
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Chapter 4: Case Law 
Eyewitness Error 
 As previously indicated, mistaken eyewitness identification accounts for over three-
quarters of wrongful convictions (Gould & Leo; 2010; Shermer et al., 2011).  According to 
Bazelon (2013), nearly 75 percent of the 250 convictions overturned by DNA evidence 
between 1989 and 2010 have been due to eyewitness misidentifications.  As it is clear that 
eyewitness evidence is the primary cause of wrongful conviction in the United States, it is 
important to examine the effect eyewitness testimony has on individual cases.   
In 2013, Kash Register was exonerated for the murder of 78 year old Jack Sasson, 
after serving 34 years in prison (Bazelon, 2013).  The incident in question occurred on April 
6, 1979, when Jack Sasson was robbed and shot five times in the carport of his home in 
California.  Sasson died three weeks later due to the fatal wounds.  Register was identified by 
two eyewitnesses who indicated that they had seen a black man running from the carport area 
of Sasson’s home.  Brenda Anderson indicated that she heard the gunshots, looked out her 
window, and saw a black man flee the carport.  She said he also ran back to fire more shots 
and then ran off again.  Three days after the incident, she identified Register, who was a 
former classmate of hers from high school.  The other witness, Elliot Singleton, was shown 
the same photo array as Brenda Anderson and also identified Register.  He indicated that he 
had been painting the house across the street when he witnessed the shooting; he then chased 
the armed shooter for blocks, only stopping when the man turned and pointed the gun at him 
(Bazelon, 2013).  
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It was obvious that this eyewitness testimony had heavy weight in this case, as there 
was no other direct forensic evidence linking Register to the incident (Bazelon, 2013; 
Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  Specifically, the fingerprints on Sasson’s car did 
not match Register’s fingerprints, and there was never a wallet or a weapon recovered from 
the scene.  The prosecution did present blood evidence at the trial, indicating that, when they 
searched Register’s apartment, they found a pair of black pin-striped pants and a burgundy 
shirt, similar to the outfit Singleton identified, with a speck of blood on the pants.  Although 
DNA testing did not exist in 1979, the blood was found to be Type O, which matched 
Sasson's blood type.  The issue with this evidence was that Register himself had Type O 
blood, along with more than three million residents of Los Angeles at the time.  It should be 
noted that Register could account for his whereabouts at the time of the incident; he was at 
the local unemployment office following a lead on a job.  The unemployment office, as well 
as his girlfriend, Cheryl Perry, confirmed his account of the time he had spent there (Bazelon, 
2013; Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  There were also three other alibi witnesses 
who testified as to what Register was doing that day.  Additionally, the employee at the 
unemployment office, Dorothy MacEntire, along with the other three alibi witnesses, testified 
that Register was not wearing clothing consistent with the description given by the two 
eyewitnesses, which consisted of the burgundy shirt and black pants, on the day of the 
incident (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).   
 Being that it was clear that the physical evidence against Register was weak, the case 
against him was based almost entirely on the eyewitness identifications of Anderson and 
Singleton (Bazelon, 2013).  It is even more surprising that, during a preliminary hearing, 
which occurred within a month of Register’s arrest, Anderson admitted that she was not sure 
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of her identification and that she had become confused during the lineup procedure because 
she recognized Register from high school.  Anderson also admitted that she had not seen the 
suspect “that good.”  With this said, the prosecutors set this aside and still took the case to 
trial.  When Anderson took the stand at the trial in October 1979, she indicated that, without 
a doubt, she had seen Register fleeing the scene on the day of the shooting.  Although 
Singleton had indicated that he did not know the height or build of the suspect, he 
specifically identified Register as the shooter (Bazelon, 2013). 
 After three days of deliberation, an all-white jury found Register guilty of first-degree 
murder, attempted robbery, and illegal use of a firearm (Bazelon, 2013; Northwestern Law & 
Michigan Law, n.d.).  At the time of conviction, Register cried out that he did not do 
anything and proclaimed his innocence (Bazelon, 2013).  He was subsequently sentenced to 
life in prison without parole.  According to the Center on Wrongful Convictions, Register’s 
conviction was upheld on appeal in 1981, but later commuted to 27 years, in 1984, due to 
changes in California’s sentencing laws (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  In 1984, 
Register was re-sentenced to 27 years to life, with the option of relief, which came in 1993 
(Bazelon, 2013; Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  Over the next two decades, 
Register participated in 11 parole hearings, in which he maintained his innocence and 
indicated that a mistake had been made that no one wanted to correct.  All of Register’s 
parole requests were denied, even his last request in 2012.  The parole board indicated 
reasons for denial as failure to accept responsibility for his crime and lack of insight and 
remorse (Bazelon, 2013; Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).   
 In 2011, the faulty evidence in the case came to the attention of Register’s attorney, 
Steve Sanders, and his associate Keith Chandler, who were working on a federal challenge to 
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the parole denial that Register had just faced (Bazelon, 2013).  Brenda Anderson’s sister, 
Sheila Vanderkam, contacted Keith Chandler after discovering that Register was still in 
prison while searching an online website of convicted felons.  Vanderkam described being in 
horror when she realized Register was still in prison for the offense her sister had made an 
eyewitness identification in because she knew that her sister had not actually seen the shooter 
flee from the scene the day of the incident.  She knew that her two sisters, Brenda and 
Sharon, had been outside at the time of the murder, heard the gun shots, and saw a man 
slumped over his steering wheel, but she also knew they did not see the gunman as they were 
trying to hurry home due to fact they were afraid they would be caught for stealing several 
hundred dollars’ worth of Avon products from their neighbor’s house.  Vanderkam also 
noted that she had worked as a detective assistant at the West Los Angeles Police Station at 
the time of the incident.  During the time of the investigation, Vanderkam approached the 
lead detective and informed him that her sister was lying about the identification and she was 
an unreliable witness, as she had been a serious drug user for some time (Bazelon, 2013; 
Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  The detective responded to the information by 
placing his finger over her lips and saying “ssshh.”  After Vanderkam discovered the 
injustice was still taking place, she began to review the police reports from the incident and 
found more inconsistencies.  First, the report indicated that her sister Sharon and mother 
Christine were also witnesses to the incident, which was not the case.  She also recalled that, 
at the time of the photo lineup, Brenda Anderson and her younger sister Sharon were both 
taken in for questioning but were separated upon arrival at the police station.  Vanderkam 
later discovered that the police had already indicated to Brenda that the shooter was Register 
and made a deal with her that, if she would identify Register as the shooter and insist he was 
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the man she had seen, they would refrain from sending her to juvenile detention for the Avon 
theft.  Sharon also escaped punishment for the theft by telling no one about seeing the 
suspect or what had happened at the police station (Bazelon, 2013).   
This information, along with sworn statements from Sharon and Vanderkam, was 
enough for Keith Chandler to petition the court to overturn Register’s conviction, by way of a 
habeas petition (Bazelon, 2013; Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  In 2012, after the 
court received the petition, they appointed attorney Herbert Barish to represent Register.  
Barish later became part of the Loyola Law School Project for the Innocent in Los Angeles.  
This benefited Register, as there were many lawyers and law students from the Project for the 
Innocent investigating the case and determining what went wrong (Bazelon, 2013).  The 
innocence group found that the prosecution had failed to disclose many pieces of evidence, 
such as Brenda Anderson’s criminal record, which included forgery charges just days before 
the identification of Register; the false documentation Patty Singleton, the wife of Elliot 
Singleton, as a witness, although she had not been mentioned in the police report or at trial; 
as well as the fact that Elliot Singleton did not actually run after the suspect as had been 
indicated in his testimony.   
After review of this information presented by Barish and the Project for the Innocent, 
in July of 2012, Judge Mader ruled that Register was entitled to an evidentiary hearing 
(Bazelon, 2013; Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  Just before the trial, Barish and 
The Project for the Innocent discovered an even more damning piece of evidence in the trial 
file, which indicated that no one was able to make a clear identification of the suspect, thus 
providing the reason the death penalty was not sought in the case (Bazelon, 2013).  At the 
hearing, Brenda Anderson, Sharon Anderson, Vanderkam, and Singleton all testified as to the 
68 
nature of their identification and the role the police department played in the incident.  
Finally, on November 7, 2013, Judge Mader vacated Register’s conviction and ordered a new 
trial on the grounds that Brenda Anderson was an unreliable witness and lacked credibility, 
Singleton claimed that he no longer remembered anything about the case, and the prosecution 
repeatedly concealed relevant evidence that would have resulted in an acquittal instead of a 
conviction (Bazelon, 2013).  The concealed evidence included Vanderkam’s statement about 
the role of Brenda Anderson and Sharon Anderson’s false statement, as well as the identity of 
another witness, Patty Singleton.  Following this, the Register was finally released on 
November 8, 2013 and, on December 13, 2013, the prosecution dismissed all the charges 
(Bazelon, 2013; Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.). 
This case exemplifies the role of false eyewitness evidence, as well as many other 
issues that may go wrong to obtain a wrongful conviction, such as the prosecution hiding the 
false eyewitness evidence and making deals to ensure cooperation and testimony of Sharon 
Anderson, as well as Brenda Anderson.  While the information and drive to correct a mistake 
from Vanderkam was singlehandedly responsible for the new investigation of the case and 
the granting of the evidentiary hearing, it should be noted that, without help from the various 
attorneys on the case and the innocence project, Register would likely not have been granted 
release.  Even with the validity issues surrounding eyewitness evidence and the multitude of 
cases that have been overturned due to this type of evidence, few states have revamped their 
standards for eyewitness testimony and police practices surrounding the eyewitness 
identification procedures (Bazelon, 2013).  It is important to note that, in 2012, the U.S. 
Supreme Court declined to follow the lead of some states in overturning the admissibility 
standards for eyewitness testimony that were set in 1977, although new empirical evidence 
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has disproved many of the rules for admissibility.  As previously mentioned, the problem 
with eyewitness evidence is further compounded when the prosecutors and police withhold 
important evidence, such as the credibility and motivation of the witness during the 
identification, which was evident in Kash Register’s case (Bazelon, 2013).   
Police Misconduct 
 Police misconduct can influence wrongful conviction due to tunnel vision, 
confirmation bias, or even a self-fulfilling prophecy (Gould & Leo, 2010; Leo & Davis, 
2010).   Evidence of police misconduct was shown in the case of LaMonte Armstrong, who 
was wrongfully convicted of murder due to failure of the police to disclose evidence of 
contradicting witness statements (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  Armstrong was 
convicted for the murder of Ernestine Compton on July 12, 1988.  Compton, a professor at 
North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University, was found murdered in her 
home in Greensboro, North Carolina.  She had been stabbed four times in the chest and 
strangled with an electrical cord.  The evidence gathered at the crime scene included two 
bloody knives, a broken knife blade, hair and fiber samples, and a bloody piece of Compton’s 
clothing.  Armstrong, a former student and family friend of Compton’s, was linked to the 
case due to a longtime police informant, Charles Blackwell, who called Crime Stoppers and 
gave a tip that Armstrong was involved.  Although Blackwell was known as a habitual liar by 
the police, his initial tip to police was pursued, and his later information would be used in the 
case against Armstrong.  When Armstrong was initially approached by police, he indicated 
that he had known the victim for about 23 years but had not been inside her home for quite 
some time, as he had moved to New York after graduation.  He later returned to the 
Greensboro area after several years but still denied doing any odd jobs for Compton or being 
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in her home.  During the investigation of the case, Blackwell contacted Armstrong multiple 
times on behalf of the police in an attempt to obtain incriminating evidence on Armstrong but 
was unsuccessful each time (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.). 
 Due to lack of evidence and the fact that the physical evidence from the crime scene 
could not be linked to either Armstrong or Blackwell, the investigation went dormant about 
eight months after it had started (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  In 1992, 
another suspect, Christopher Caviness, who was in prison for the murder of his father in 
1989, was thought to be connected to the incident, but the examination of the latent finger 
prints and palm prints at the scene did not indicate a match.  After the inability to link 
Caviness, the case went dormant until 1994, when the detectives renewed interest in the case 
and started reexamining a statement from Blackwell shortly after the murder.  Blackwell had 
stated that Armstrong asked to borrow money from him and, after he had turned him down, 
Armstrong requested Blackwell to take him to a payphone.  After the phone call, Armstrong 
allegedly ran up the street and returned 45 minutes later, breathing very heavily, with cash 
and a woman’s watch in his possession.  In March of 1994, the police went to visit Blackwell 
in prison, where he was serving time for an unrelated conviction, to discuss these statements, 
and subsequently to charge him with murder.  In order to avoid the murder charge, Blackwell 
agreed to plead guilty to an accessory to murder charge and testify against Armstrong.  
Blackwell was sentenced to five years for the accessory charge, in addition to the time he 
was already serving in prison (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).   
Shortly after the incident with Blackwell, on April 14, 1994, Armstrong was charged 
with murder (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  He rejected two plea offers for 
sentences of 20 and 15 years.  Throughout the process, Armstrong maintained his innocence, 
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even during the trial, which took place in August of 1995.  During the time between the 
arrest and the trial, Blackwell had written letters to both Armstrong and Harold Murdock, an 
attorney in the Greensboro branch of the NAACP, in which he had recanted his statements 
and claimed that he lied in order to collect the reward offered by Crime Stoppers.  Even with 
this said, Blackwell still testified at trial and was the key witness against Armstrong.  
Blackwell later stated that the only reason he testified was due to the threat of a murder 
charge from the detectives if he did not cooperate.  At the trial, Blackwell told his sixth 
version of the case, which stated that he and Armstrong had gone to Compton’s house to 
borrow money that night to buy drugs and, when Compton would not let them, due to 
Armstrong’s outstanding debt, there was a fight that broke out and Armstrong grabbed a cord 
off the top of the refrigerator.  Blackwell indicated that, at this point, he fled the scene.  The 
defense tried to prove that Blackwell was lying multiple times during the trial by presenting 
the letters he had written to Armstrong and Murdock, in which he said that he only 
implicated Armstrong for the money.  In response to these claims, Blackwell told the jury he 
fabricated the story during the investigation to embarrass a Greensboro detective at whom he 
was angry around the time of the investigation (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).   
 There were also three additional witnesses for the prosecution, which included 
Timothy McCorkle, W. Dwight Blockem, and William Earl Davis (Northwestern Law & 
Michigan Law, n.d.).  First, McCorkle claimed that he was painting a house across the street 
from Compton’s home the day of the crime and saw Blackwell and Armstrong leave the 
victim’s house, even stopping them to talk to them.  Blockem was a jailhouse informant; he 
claimed that, while he shared a holding cell with Armstrong, he said “when he did it, he was 
by himself,” in reference to the crime.  Lastly, Davis indicated that he was a regular 
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informant of the Greensboro police, and he was housed in the same cell with Armstrong prior 
to Armstrong’s trial.  He testified that Armstrong admitted to murdering Compton and 
indicated that he had visited Compton’s home earlier in the day with several other people and 
returned later that afternoon with Blackwell to kill her.  These three witnesses were held in 
the same holding cell during the trial of Armstrong, which gave them an ample amount of 
time to discuss their testimony.  When each witness was asked what benefits they were 
hoping to receive from their testimony, McCorkle admitted that, in 1986, he had been 
convicted of robbery and conspiracy based largely on testimony from Armstrong’s brother, 
Kermit, and that he had been released from prison just four months before Compton was 
killed (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  
Although there were many cards stacked against the defense, specifically in regards 
to jailhouse informants, the defense had several witnesses who testified about the credibility 
of Blackwell’s testimony and statements made during the investigation.  The defense called 
the NAACP’s Murdock, who visited Blackwell in prison after he had received the letter from 
him regarding the statement to the police (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  
Murdock indicated that, during his visit with Blackwell, Blackwell told him that the police 
had fed him the information about the murder and that he had never been to Compton’s 
home.  Several other defense witnesses indicated that Blackwell had also admitted to them 
that he had made up Armstrong’s involvement in the case, with one witness, Dolphus Cates, 
testifying that Blackwell had also told him he did it for the reward money.  The defense also 
called for Armstrong to testify.  Armstrong denied committing the murder, indicating that he 
had never borrowed any money from the victim and that he had been in Winston-Salem on 
the weekend the crime occurred.  In his testimony, Armstrong also indicated that the police 
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had approached him prior to his arrest, asking him to implicate Blackwell in the crime, which 
he refused to do (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).   
Even with the lack of credibility of the prosecution’s star witness, Charles Blackwell, 
and the lack of physical evidence connecting Armstrong to the crime, the jury still convicted 
Armstrong of the murder of Compton on August 18, 1995 (Northwestern Law & Michigan 
Law, n.d.).  Armstrong was sentenced to life in prison.  Shortly after the conviction, 
Blockem, one of the jailhouse informants, wrote a letter to Armstrong’s attorney admitting 
that he had falsified his testimony, but there was nothing done as result of the confession.  
Armstrong later appealed the conviction, but the conviction was upheld.  According to the 
Center on Wrongful Convictions, after the denial of his appeal, Armstrong wrote a letter to 
the North Carolina Center on Actual Innocence concerning his case, which was later referred 
to the Duke Law Innocence Project (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).   
As law students at the Duke Law Innocence Project began to take an interest in the 
case and started re-investigating the facts, the Greensboro Police Department began doing the 
same (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  The files found by the law students 
indicated many pieces of evidence that suggested Armstrong’s innocence in the case.  It was 
later discovered that much of this evidence had not been turned over to Armstrong’s defense 
attorney.  Key pieces of evidence found by the Innocence Project included multiple 
witnesses’ statements to the police that indicated that Compton was seen alive after July 9 
and her body was discovered on July 12, which contradicted Blackwell’s testimony and the 
pathology report that indicated that Compton was killed on July 9, as well as a deal that was 
arranged between the police and Blackwell, which offered Blackwell $200 for his services 
and help implicating Armstrong in the case, which included multiple arranged phone calls to 
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Armstrong.  Additionally, the Innocence Clinic found a statement suggesting an alternative 
suspect, which was never turned over to the defense team.  Following the discovery of this 
evidence, in 2010, Blackwell recanted his trial testimony and said that he had completely 
fabricated the testimony.  Subsequently, in 2011, the Duke Law Wrongful Convictions Clinic 
filed a motion to overturn Armstrong’s conviction.  In March 2012, the Guilford County 
District Attorney’s Office agreed to give Armstrong an evidentiary hearing, which would 
result in a revelation of more key evidence suggesting Armstrong’s innocence.  During 
preparation for the hearing, the prosecution had the latent prints found at the scene re-
examined and found that a palm print on the door frame matched Christopher Caviness’s 
prints.  He was the individual police had originally questioned and performed a DNA test on 
in 1992.  Although a match was found with the improved technology, which was not 
available at the time of the crime, Caviness could not be held accountable for the crime, as he 
was killed in a car accident in June 2010, shortly after being released from prison for his 
father’s murder.  After spending nearly 17 years in prison, on June 29, 2012, Armstrong was 
finally granted a motion for a new trial, and he was released on his own recognizance 
pending trial.  When additional DNA testing, which was sought by the Duke Law Wrongful 
Convictions Clinic as well as the prosecutor’s office, failed to link Armstrong to the crime, 
the prosecution decided to dismiss the charge against him.  The murder charge was officially 
dismissed on March 18, 2013.  Later, in December 2013, Armstrong received a pardon from 
North Carolina Governor Pat McCroy, based on actual innocence (Northwestern Law & 
Michigan Law, n.d.).   
 As it is clear that there were many points in the investigation that pointed to the 
innocence of Armstrong, the case still continued on for many years, particularly due to the 
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determination of the police to find someone guilty of the crime.  With this said, this case is a 
perfect example of police misconduct and the potential of officers to develop tunnel vision.  
Although Armstrong was initially cleared from the case after no physical evidence was found 
to link him to the incident, the police still continued to push for him to confess or implicate 
himself in the many conversations he had with Blackwell.  The police only focused on the 
evidence they had to support the claim that Armstrong had committed the crime, specifically 
the testimony and statements from Blackwell, and ignored the evidence that implicated that 
Armstrong was innocent.  This was clear as Blackwell suggested that the police fed him the 
information he needed in order to contact Armstrong and convince him to implicate himself 
(Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  Additionally, the police handling the 
investigation had three different jailhouse witnesses who proved to have unreliable 
testimony, which was evident when Blockem recanted his testimony in which he claimed that 
Armstrong admitted doing the crime and doing it alone (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, 
n.d.).  
In addition to the idea that the police may have had tunnel vision, which subsequently 
led to the continued pursuit of Armstrong as the suspect, this case exemplifies wrongful 
conduct on part of the police in regards to witness coaching, witness tampering, and even 
failure to turn over evidence to the defense.  After the multiple times Blackwell recanted his 
testimony and shed doubt on his knowledge of the actual crime that took place, it became 
clear that the police were using him as a resource to try to convince Armstrong into 
confessing or implicating himself.  This deal was also confirmed during the re-investigation 
of the case by the Duke Law Innocence Project, which found an actual record of $200 being 
paid to Blackwell for his services and help in the case (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, 
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n.d.).  Aside from the witness coaching and tampering, as well as the use of suggestive 
procedures, evidenced in Blackwell’s statements and testimony, the re-investigation also 
revealed that police failed to turn over a wealth of exculpatory evidence that suggested 
Armstrong’s innocence.  This is highly problematic, as the defense could have better 
prepared for trial and may have even been successful at clearing Armstrong of the charge the 
first time the case was taken to trial if they had had all of the evidence gathered in the case.  
While it is typically the job of the prosecutor to turn over evidence to the defense, the police 
must cooperate with the prosecution in making sure they have all of the evidence, not just the 
evidence necessary to convict.  As the police are the gatekeepers of the criminal justice 
system and are responsible for determining who is a suspect and who is not, there is a great 
threat to justice if these officers engage in misconduct.  In this case, Armstrong was doomed 
from the start; the police had him targeted as a suspect for the crime, and they were 
determined to have him prosecuted and convicted, even if it took continued persecution of 
Armstrong, after a failure to establish any physical evidence against him, or even witness 
tampering and/or coaching.  In cases similar to these, if misconduct starts early on in the 
case, there is a greater likelihood of a wrongful conviction, as there are many other factors 
that may later be misconstrued and misinterpreted due to incorrect evidence presented during 
the beginning of the case.   
False Confessions 
 According to Balko (2011), false confessions occurred in about one-quarter of the 
first 225 DNA exonerations in the United States.  Additionally, it has been shown that about 
65 percent of suspects in custody either fully or partially confess (Keene et al., 2012).  False 
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confessions may occur for a variety of reasons, such as mental state, fear of trial penalty, or 
even police misconduct or coerciveness.   
In 2013, Stanley Wrice was exonerated after serving over 31 years in prison for the 
abduction, rape, and sexual assault of a Chicago woman on September 8, 1982 (Northwestern 
Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  The case of Stanley Wrice was not only one of great detail, but 
also brought to light the role police misconduct can play in false confessions.  Wrice was 
sentenced to 100 years in prison for these crimes, after what he indicated to be a false 
confession caused by police torture.  Additionally, his exoneration came after a landmark 
decision in the Illinois Supreme Court in February 2012, which held that the uses of a 
physically coerced confession as evidence of guilt at a criminal trial was not just a harmless 
error.  According to Wrice, police brutality occurred from the very beginning of his case, 
when he had been severely beaten by Chicago Police Detective Peter Dignan and Sergeant 
John Byrne the day of his arrest for the charges.  The incident for which Wrice was charged 
occurred in 1982.  The victim, Karen Byron, a white female, alleged that she was walking 
home from the liquor store when several African American men offered her a ride.  After 
accepting the ride, Byron indicated that she was taken to a two-story bungalow where she 
was later beaten, severely burned with metal objects, and repeatedly raped.  Byron indicated 
that, when she was finally released, she stumbled into a gas station where the attendant called 
the police.  Treatment at the hospital revealed that Byron had burns that covered over 80 
percent of her body.  The police were able to narrow down the location of the bungalow from 
the details Byron provided them (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).   
After searching the area where the bungalow was suspected to be, the police arrested 
Wrice and three other men:  Michael Fowler, Rodney Benson and Lee Holmes (Northwestern 
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Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  Byron was not able to identify Wrice specifically, but she did 
identify the three other men.  The three other men later pleaded guilty in exchange for a plea 
agreement.  Fowler was sentenced to four years in prison, while Benson and Holmes were 
each sentenced to just 30 months of probation.  Wrice was subsequently charged based on his 
confession given during the investigation.  Wrice’s motion to suppress his confession before 
his 1983 trial included a description of a brutal beating by officers Dignan and Byrne, who 
had taken him to the basement of the police headquarters and repeatedly struck him in the 
head, arms, kneecaps, and groin with a 16-inch flashlight and a piece of rubber after he 
repeatedly denied involvement in the crime.  A physician did examine Wrice the day after his 
arrest and corroborated this story, indicating that the injuries he sustained were consistent 
with his torture allegation.  When the motion was put before the court, Dignan and Byrne 
denied the allegation, and Judge Thomas R. Fitzgerald denied the motion to suppress the 
confession (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).   
At the trial, in addition to Wrice’s confession, prosecutors called two eyewitnesses, 
Bobby Joe Williams and Kenneth Lewis (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  Both 
eyewitnesses testified that they had seen Wrice rape the victim and burn her with a hot 
spoon. Williams also indicated that Wrice had admitted to burning the victim.  Aside from 
the confession, which had already been shown to be questionable, and the eyewitness 
testimony, there was no physical evidence linking Wrice to the crime or a positive 
identification from the victim.  With that said, after only a short deliberation, the jury found 
Wrice guilty of rape and deviant sexual assault.  Judge Fitzgerald sentenced Wrice to 60 
years for the rape and 40 years for the sexual assault, which were to be served consecutively.  
It should be noted that, in 1985, Wrice’s sentence was changed under an Illinois Appeals 
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Court decision, which ordered that his sentences be served concurrently, rather than 
consecutively, which reduced the total term to 60 years.  Following this, Wrice filed a 
petition for postconviction relief, which was later denied by the Circuit Court.  Then, he 
attempted to apply for appeal, which was subsequently denied as well.  Although his appeal 
was denied, his public defender, Heidi Linn Lambros, felt so strongly about innocence and 
helping Wrice that she continued to work on the case on her own time (Northwestern Law & 
Michigan Law, n.d.).  
 Not much activity was seen in the case again until 2006, when a new special 
prosecutor, Edward Egan, who was appointed to investigate police torture, compiled a list of 
about a dozen officers under Burge, the former police commander who was fired in 1993, 
who had been involved in the systematic torture of black suspects to extract confessions in 
the 1980s (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  This list included both Dignan and 
Byrne, whom Wrice had accused of beating him to coerce a confession.  With this 
information in hand, Lambros filed another petition for postconviction relief.  Although the 
petition was denied, the Illinois Appeals Court reversed the decision and ordered a hearing.  
Following the approval for the hearing, the prosecutors appealed the Appeals Court decision 
to the State Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.  Meanwhile, during the process of 
the appeal, Bobby Joe Williams, one of the eyewitnesses who testified for the prosecution at 
the original trial, recanted his testimony, by way of an affidavit that was submitted to the 
Chicago Innocence Project on March 7, 2011.  In the affidavit, Williams alleged that Dignan 
and Bryne had also tortured him, forcing him to implicate Wrice falsely and that a female 
attorney from the Criminal Courts Building showed him photographs of Bryon’s injuries and 
threated to charge him for the crime if he did not assist the police in testifying against Wrice.  
80 
At the time, Williams did not know who the attorney was, but it was later suggested that 
Assistant State’s Attorney Bertina Lampkin, the lead prosecutor on the case, matched his 
description.  Two of the men who pleaded guilty in the crimes, Fowler and Benson, also 
provided affidavits to the Chicago Innocence Project, stating that neither Wrice nor Lewis, 
the second eyewitness who claimed to have seen Wrice at the scene, were present during the 
crime.  It should be noted that by the time Fowler and Benson gave their affidavits, Lewis 
was deceased (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).   
Finally, on February 2, 2012, the State Supreme Court, with a unanimous decision, 
affirmed the Appeals Court decision to order a hearing on Wrice’s torture claim 
(Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  Subsequently, the hearing resulted in Wrice’s 
exoneration.  On December 12, 2013, Judge Walsh vacated Wrice’s conviction on the 
grounds that the torture evidence was unrebutted and that the key prosecution witness had 
recanted his trial testimony.  The prosecution later dismissed all charges, and Wrice was 
released, at the age of 59, after serving 31 years in prison for a crime he did not commit.   It 
should also be mentioned that, at the time of Wrice’s release, the cases of 25 other prisoners 
who were convicted in part as a result of confessions obtained by Burge and his subordinates 
were pending review, in light of the State Supreme Court decision made in Wrice’s case 
(Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  
This case clearly exhibits an instance of police coercion that lead to a false 
confession.  There was no doubt that detectives Peter Dignan and John Byrne engaged in 
police misconduct by forcefully coercing a confession out of Wrice.  It was even more 
troublesome that it was not only these two officers who were found to be part of the 
misconduct, but also the police lieutenant at the time, Jon Burge, who was later promoted to 
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commander.  The Center on Wrongful Convictions indicates that Jon Burge was later 
suspended in 1991 and fired in 1993 for systematically torturing black suspects 
(Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  This evidence suggests that such practices were 
not treated as serious and were possibly thought to be permitted with some officers in the 
department.  This type of culture among police can make officers more susceptible to using 
coercion, suggestibility, and misconduct.   
As previously discussed, police misconduct in any form is detrimental to the criminal 
justice system and can greatly increase the chances of wrongful conviction.  Specifically, 
coerced confessions, such as Wrice’s confession, may be among the worst types of 
misconduct, as they are not easily disproven or stricken.  This was the case in Wrice’s 
situation, in which he was denied the right to have the confession removed.  Many 
defendants assume that, if they confess, they will be still be proven to be innocent in the long 
run by the other evidence in the case, but this is not always the case as some of other 
evidence may not be strong enough or there may be a lack of physical evidence to prove the 
defendant was not involved in the crime.  With this said, it is even more problematic that 
humans, including police and jurors, are poor at detecting a false confession from a true 
confession (Keene et al., 2012).  Additionally, there tends to be a stigma within society, as 
well as the criminal justice system, that “if you confess, you must have done it.”  Even strong 
evidence of police brutality and misconduct, such as that in Wrice’s case, may be difficult to 
prove or present against a confession, even if it is false.  The power of false confessions in 
regards to wrongful convictions may be extremely hard to overcome for some defendants, 
especially when combined with other factors, such as police misconduct and brutality.   
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Forensic Error 
 While many wrongful conviction cases involving forensic error have dealt with latent 
fingerprints and hair analysis, it has also been suggested that there are many other forensic 
practices that may lead to wrongful conviction; specifically noted is the use of forensic arson 
investigations.  As previously mentioned, much of the forensic evidence used in courtrooms 
today is examined by practices that have either been invented in police stations and crime 
labs or have been established for the direct purpose of fighting crime and obtaining 
convictions (Balko, 2011).  With the failure to use peer-reviewed forensic evidence or 
verified scientific practices, the chance of wrongful convictions may further increase as more 
forensic evidence is found in the case.  As previously noted, The Innocence Project indicated 
that about half of the first 225 DNA exonerations were due to flawed or fraudulent evidence 
(Balko, 2011).   
The case of Victor Caminata reveals a clear failure to use scientific-based practices in 
the investigation of a criminal case.  Caminata was charged with arson following the delayed 
investigation of a home fire that occurred in the home that he and his fiancé, Nicole 
Vanderhoef, shared in Michigan (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  Caminata was 
at home at the time of the incident, along with Vanderhoef’s 13 year-old son, Tyler, and her 7 
year-old daughter, as well as his own daughter, Brooke.  When the fire started, Caminata 
indicated that, as soon as he saw smoke coming through the walls, he instructed Tyler to take 
his younger sister, as well as Caminata’s daughter, outside, and he would go into the 
basement and extinguish the fire.  The fire had occurred in the wood stove, which Caminata, 
a former building contractor, had recently installed in the home.  Caminata also indicated that 
he had stoked the fire twice that morning before the fire had started.  After attempting to 
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extinguish the fire, he used a ladder to drop a flame retardant down the chimney, but to no 
effect.  The fire continued to burn, and he had to call for help.  By the time the fire was 
extinguished, the home was declared a loss.  The fire was initially determined to be an 
accidental chimney fire (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  
 While the investigation was ongoing, there was a tip given to the Wexford County 
Sherriff’s department by an anonymous caller, which indicated that a few days after the fire, 
she had heard Caminata saying that, based on his firefighting experience, he knew how to 
burn a house down without getting caught (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  Even 
with this evidence in hand, the fire was initially determined to be an accidental chimney fire 
and the insurance company settled with Vanderhoef for the loss of the home and the 
furnishings in the amount of $273,000.  Shortly after this, Vanderhoef and Caminata split up, 
and Vanderhoef went to the police for the first time to tell them of the events that happened 
the night before the fire took place.  Vanderhoef indicated that she and Caminata had gotten 
into an argument the night before the incident, and she instructed him to leave the home.  
Despite the alleged fight, Caminata stayed in the home, and Vanderhoef went to work the 
next day, leaving Caminata home with all three children.  After this statement, a state fire 
investigator and the insurance company decided to re-examine the evidence in the case, even 
though the house had already been demolished by this time.  Results of the re-examination 
indicated that the cause of the fire was arson, based on the indication of multiple points of 
origin and some of the ignition points, which appeared to be started by a blowtorch 
(Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).    
 In light of the new evidence, Caminata was arrested and charged with arson in 
November 2008 and went to trial on the charges in 2009 (Northwestern Law & Michigan 
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Law, n.d.).  During the trial, arson investigators for the prosecution indicated that the fire did 
not start inside the chimney, and it appeared to be intentionally set.  The prosecution also 
argued that Caminata set the fire intentionally out of fear of losing his “meal ticket” as a 
result of his argument with Vanderhoef the night prior to the incident.  Additionally, it was 
argued that Caminata saw the fire as a way for him to ensure a job of rebuilding the home, as 
he had prior experience as a building contractor.  Although Caminata’s defense included an 
arson expert who testified that the fire did start in the chimney and it was not intentionally 
set, Caminata was still convicted of arson on May 14, 2009.  Caminata was subsequently 
sentenced to 9 to 40 years in prison.  He later appealed the conviction in October of 2010, 
which resulted in a Michigan Court of Appeals denying his claim and upholding his previous 
conviction.  Following the denial of his appeal, Caminata requested the assistance from the 
Michigan Innocence Clinic at the University of Michigan Law School (Northwestern Law & 
Michigan Law, n.d.).   
 After re-investigating the case, the Michigan Innocence Clinic discovered that 
Vanderhoef had filed a false report with the Missaukee County Sheriff’s Department in 2003, 
claiming that her estranged boyfriend had made disturbing phone calls (Northwestern Law & 
Michigan Law, n.d.).  It was later discovered that no such phone calls had been made and 
Vanderhoef had falsely made the claim in order to prevent her estranged boyfriend’s visit 
with their daughter.  Additionally, the Michigan Innocence Clinic obtained arson experts to 
re-examine the prosecution’s evidence.  These experts determined that the arson investigator 
for the prosecution produced a severely flawed analysis that was not based on scientifically 
proven fire standards.  The experts used by the Innocence Clinic found that the photographs 
taken of the chimney indicated poor construction and a buildup of a flammable substance: 
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creosote.  With this said, the experts determined that the fire was a result of an accident and 
an improperly installed stove, as well as fire code violations in the chimney and the walls 
surrounding the chimney. With evidence of Vanderhoef’s false police report in the past, as 
well as a flawed forensic investigation in hand, the Michigan Innocence Clinic filed a motion 
for a new trial.  Only July 2, 2013, at the hearing for the new evidence, the prosecution 
indicated that they believed the original conviction should be vacated.  The judge 
subsequently vacated the original conviction and ordered a new trial.  Pending the trial, the 
prosecution continued to investigate the case and, on January 22, 2014, decided to dismiss 
the charges, after Caminata had served five years in prison.  This dismissal was due to lack of 
evidence to prosecute Caminata (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).   
Although Caminata was not exonerated due to DNA evidence, as many who are 
wrongfully convicted are, it was still found that the evidence used in the original trial was 
flawed and not based on scientific standards set for arson investigations.  The use of flawed 
and unscientific evidence in any trial or case is very troublesome for the criminal justice 
system, as it not only reduces the integrity of criminal investigations, but also increases the 
risk of wrongful convictions.  As forensic evidence is considered to be the most reliable 
evidence by jury members, the general public, and even judges, it can be difficult for a 
defendant to contest incorrect and even poorly analyzed evidence during a trial (Smith et al., 
2011).  Additionally, it can be challenging to refute such evidence, as forensic examiners can 
be costly, which many defendants may not be able to afford without the assistance of outside 
programs, such as The Innocence Project or similar organizations.  It should be noted that, 
while DNA may lead to many exonerations, it is not extremely common for DNA evidence 
to be gathered in criminal cases, as fingerprint, hair, and fiber evidence is much more 
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common.  As in the Caminata case, there was no evidence that involved DNA testing, which 
made the process of refuting the arson conviction even more difficult.  Overall, the practices 
of forensic testing and investigation in criminal cases in the United States lack quality 
scientific evidence and background, which in turn reduces the quality of the evidence and 
increases the chance of error and a wrongful conviction.  It is even more problematic that 
these poor scientific practices are more common with more frequently used types of 
evidence, such as fingerprint, hair, and arson analysis.  
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 According to Balko (2011), prosecutorial misconduct was found in about one-quarter 
of the first 225 DNA exonerations in the United States.  Prosecutorial misconduct can 
include practices such as overly suggestive witness coaching, during investigation as well as 
trial preparation, inappropriate or suggestive closing arguments, or even failure to disclose 
exculpatory evidence to the defense (Gould & Leo, 2010).   
The case of Daniel Taylor exhibits an example of prosecutorial misconduct, in the 
form of failing to turn over exculpatory evidence and witness tampering (Northwestern Law 
& Michigan Law, n.d.).  Taylor was charged in the robbery, home invasion, and murder of 
Jeffrey Lassiter, a drug dealer, and Sharon Haugabook, a prostitute, which occurred on 
November 16, 1992, in Chicago.  Taylor was implicated in the crime after the police 
questioned two individuals, Lewis Gardner and Akia Phillips, who were selling drugs on a 
street corner near where the murder took place.  Fifteen year old Gardner, who had an IQ of 
70, identified Deon Patrick as being involved in the murder and indicated that he was the 
person from whom he bought his drugs.  Additionally, both Gardner and Phillips implicated 
Dennis Mixon, Paul Phillips, Rodney Mathews, Joseph Brown, and Daniel Taylor, who was 
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17 years old at the time, in the murder of the two victims. Both Gardner and Phillips 
indicated that they had been lookouts for those involved in the murder (Northwestern Law & 
Michigan Law, n.d.).   
Taylor was taken into custody on December 3, 1992, at 3 a.m. from the juvenile home 
where he was residing (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  Three hours after being 
taken into custody, he gave a confession that was transcribed by a court reporter and placed 
into record.  His confession stated that Matthews, Patrick, and Mixon went to the apartment 
to collect a drug debt that Lassiter owed to Mixon and that Gardner, Brown, and the Phillips 
brothers remained outside the home as lookouts.  Additionally, Taylor also indicated that 
Patrick shot Lassiter when he refused to pay the debt and then turned to shoot Haugabook, as 
he and Mixon were holding her arms.  Taylor indicated that, prior to the shooting, the group 
had met at the park around 7 p.m. to plan the visit to the home.  During the same night that 
Taylor was brought into the station, Matthews, Brown, and the Philips brothers were also 
arrested and gave recorded confessions that confirmed Taylor’s confession.  Taylor almost 
immediately recanted this confession as he was being taken to lockup later that evening.  He 
told the detectives that he was in jail at the time of the murders due to being caught fighting 
in a nearby park, which was later confirmed by jail records.  Jail records indicated that Taylor 
had been arrested at 6:45 p.m. on November 16, 1992 and was bonded out at 10 p.m., which 
was more than an hour after the murders took place.  Aside from this, the investigation 
continued and there were statements by two officers, on December 12th, which indicated that 
they had seen Taylor in an alley near the shooting location at about 9:30 p.m. on the night the 
incident took place.  Additionally, three months after Taylor was placed in jail and confessed, 
Mixon was arrested and gave a recorded confession, which confirmed the same story the 
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others, as well as Taylor, had indicated in their confessions (Northwestern Law & Michigan 
Law, n.d.).   
 Taylor went to trial in August 1995 on the charges of murder, robbery, and home 
invasion (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  By the time of his trial, Matthews had 
already been acquitted by a jury after testifying that his confession was coerced and the 
charges against Akia Phillips and Brown were dismissed on the grounds of illegal arrest and 
improperly promising leniency in return for a confession.  During Taylor’s trial, the 
prosecutors presented his confession, along with the evidence that he had been placed in jail 
that night, but indicated that he may have been released earlier than 10 p.m., as the officer 
could have waited to sign off on the bond slip.  The two officers who indicated that they had 
seen Taylor on the street shortly after the murders took place testified and indicated that they 
also saw him running into a nearby apartment after they arrived on the scene of the crime.  It 
was subsequently indicated that the supposed apartment was the residence of Akia and Paul 
Phillips.  The officers claimed that they had gone into the home and arrested Andrea Phillips, 
the mother of Akia and Paul Philips, for possession of cocaine, then dropped Taylor off at the 
youth shelter at 10 p.m.  In addition to the police testimony locating Taylor on the streets, 
rather than in jail, near the time of the crime, the prosecution had Adrian Grimes, a convicted 
drug dealer, testify at the trial.  Grimes indicated that he saw Taylor in the park at about 7:30 
p.m., which was about an hour before the murders (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, 
n.d.).  
 Taylor was convicted in September of 1995 and later sentenced to life in prison with 
the possibility of parole (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  He appealed the 
conviction but was denied.  His case did not gather any more attention until December 2001, 
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when the Chicago Tribune published a series of articles that examined false and coerced 
confessions that were obtained by the Chicago Police Department.  They found that there 
were nearly 250 murder cases that involved confessions by defendants who were acquitted or 
had charges dismissed.  This series of articles also included newly discovered evidence in 
Taylor’s case, which stated that four months before the two officers had written the 
statements about seeing Taylor in the alley after the time of the shootings, one of the officers, 
Berti, had been accused by a judge of lying under oath.  As if this did not add enough 
suspicion, it was also found that Grimes, who testified to seeing Taylor just before the time 
of the murders, had recanted his testimony and indicated that he had only testified for 
promised leniency on a drug charge.   Additionally, Mixon later admitted that he was present 
at the time Lassiter and Haugabook had been killed, but added that none of the seven others 
who gave confessions were involved in the crime.  The newspaper later found computer 
reports at the youth center that proved that Taylor did not return to the center until 3 a.m., 
which discredited the officers’ claim that they had returned him to the center at 10 p.m., after 
arresting Andrea Phillips.  With this information in hand, the newspaper dug up the police 
lockup log book and located another individual who was in jail the same night that Taylor 
was, James Anderson, who indicated that he recalled being in lockup with Taylor that night 
(Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).   
 In response to the series of articles, the Cook County State Attorney’s office re-
opened the investigation, but later indicated that Taylor was guilty (Northwestern Law & 
Michigan Law, n.d.).  Based on the findings of the newspaper and the failed re-investigation 
by the Cook County State Attorney’s office, Taylor filled numerous appeals but was 
unsuccessful.  In 2011, Taylor’s case was taken by the Northwestern University’s Center on 
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Wrongful Convictions and a writ of habeas corpus petition was filed on his behalf.  The 
petition indicated that the prosecutor had failed to disclose information that showed that, 
prior to the trial, the police had interviewed Anderson, who had indicated that he had been in 
lockup with Taylor the night of the murders, and ignored his statement.  While the original 
petition was dismissed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reinstated 
the petition in October 2011.  During the time in which the case was awaiting a new trial, the 
Illinois Attorney General’s Office reviewed the State’s Attorney’s trial file and discovered 
pre-trial notes written by the prosecutor, after Taylor was charged, that indicated that seven 
different police officers, including the two who testified at the trial, had confirmed that 
Taylor was in fact in lockup at the time of the crime.  These notes were turned over to 
Taylor’s lawyers in federal court (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).   
 Finally, on June 28, 2013, the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office filed a motion 
to vacate Taylor’s conviction, which was granted and the charges were later dismissed after 
Taylor had served more than 20 years in prison (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  
Additionally, in light of this decision, the case of one of the co-defendants, Deon Patrick, was 
re-opened and re-investigated, which resulted in the dismissal of the charges against him and 
his release.  In January 2014, the Cook County Circuit Court Chief Judge Paul Biebel Jr. 
awarded Taylor with a certificate of innocence.  Following this, in February 2014, Taylor 
filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against the city of Chicago and the eight Chicago police 
officers involved in the investigation and prosecution of his case (Northwestern Law & 
Michigan Law, n.d.).   
 This case provides clear evidence of prosecutorial misconduct in many ways, such as 
the failure to turn over exculpatory evidence, especially the reports confirming that Taylor 
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was in jail at the time of incident, witness tampering, by way of offering leniency for the 
testimony of Grimes, and even failure to dismiss or reinvestigate the case after finding that 
Taylor could not have been at the scene of the crime.  It could be suggested that the 
prosecutors, as well as the police in this case, could have been subject to the tunnel vision 
phenomenon, as they overlooked multiple pieces of evidence that indicated Taylor’s 
innocence.  Not only did the prosecution continue on with the case, but it also proceeded to 
have witnesses testify at trial in exchange for leniency.  This behavior on behalf of the 
prosecution not only led to the wrongful conviction of Daniel Taylor, but also led to more 
than 20 years of his life being taken away.  This type of behavior has been directly linked to 
increased chances of wrongful conviction.  Although prosecutorial misconduct to this extent 
has not been thought to occur commonly, it is still very detrimental to the integrity and 
accuracy of the criminal justice system, as it can greatly increase the chance of wrongful 
convictions, such as the wrongful conviction of Daniel Taylor.   
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 According to Gould & Leo (2010), it has been suggested that ineffective defense 
lawyering was the biggest contributing factor to the wrongful conviction or death sentence of 
criminal defendants within the last twenty three years.  There are many ways in which 
defense attorneys may inadequately represent their client, which include not adequately 
challenging witnesses, unwarranted plea bargaining confessions, failing to file the proper 
motions, failing to challenge forensic evidence, and inadequately investigating the case 
(Smith et al., 2011).   
An example of inadequate defense is shown in the case of Daniel Larsen, who was 
convicted of possession of a concealed weapon in June 1999 and was sentenced to 28 years 
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to life, due, in part, to California’s Three Strikes Law (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, 
n.d.).  The original incident occurred on June 6, 1998, when a fight broke out in the parking 
lot of the Gold Apple Cocktail Lounge in Northridge, California.  The individual who called 
the police indicated that he/she saw a man with a green shirt and a ponytail waving a knife.  
When the officers arrived on the scene, there were more than a dozen people standing in the 
area.  One of the officers indicated seeing a man with a green shirt, but with a shaved head, 
who took a knife from his waistband and threw it under a car.  Following this, the knife was 
recovered, and the officers arrested 30-year-old Daniel Larsen as the man who threw the 
knife.  Larsen was subsequently charged with possession of a concealed weapon, but the 
initial charge was dismissed, as the judge found no evidence of concealment, which was a 
required element of the crime.  The prosecutor later charged Larsen a second time with the 
possession of a concealed knife, after the officer who identified Larsen as the suspect 
changed his testimony at the second preliminary hearing.  At the second hearing, the officer 
indicated that Larsen’s shirt was untucked and covered the knife, and that Larsen reached 
under his shirt, grabbed the knife and threw it under the car after the police had arrived 
(Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).   
 After the second preliminary hearing, Larsen was officially charged in the case and 
went to trial in June 1999 (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  At the trial, the officer 
proceeded to testify to seeing Larsen pull the knife out from under his shirt and throw it 
under the car, although this was not what he had initially indicated.  Larsen was convicted by 
a jury on June 23, 1999, and sentenced to 28 years to life in prison, due to the fact that he had 
three prior felony convictions, which required a life sentence under the Three Strikes Law in 
California (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).   
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Larsen’s case did not receive any further attention until 2004, when the California 
Innocence Project at California Western School of law began working on his case 
(Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  In 2005, a writ of habeas corpus was filed in the 
Los Angeles County Superior Court, after the initial appeal had been declined.  The habeas 
petition indicated that Larsen had received a constitutionally inadequate defense, due to the 
fact that his trial lawyer, who was later disbarred, failed to investigate the case prior to trial 
and failed to discover the multiple witnesses who would have testified that Larsen did not 
have a knife at the scene of the fight.  The petition indicated that Larsen’s defense attorney 
failed to request a fingerprint analysis on the knife in question.  In regards to the alleged 
witnesses who indicated that Larsen did not have a knife and did not throw the knife, there 
were multiple declarations from several witnesses attached to the petition, including one 
from James McNutt, a retired Army sergeant and former police chief.  McNutt indicated that 
he was in the parking lot of the tavern at the time of incident and he saw a man named 
William Hewitt arguing with Daniel Harrison, his step-son.  He also indicated that he 
witnessed Hewitt take the knife from his waistband and throw it under the car after the police 
had arrived.  Another statement came from Hewitt’s girlfriend, Jorji Owen, who indicated 
that, after the incident, he had told her that it was he who threw the knife and he felt so bad 
about the incident that he sold his motorcycle to get money to post Larsen’s bond.  Hewitt 
himself later submitted an affidavit confirming Owen’s statement and indicating that the 
knife was his and that Larsen had not thrown it under the car.  Even with the sworn affidavits 
and multiple witness statements, the petition for habeas corpus was denied.  The denial was 
also later upheld on appeal by the California Court of Appeals and the California Supreme 
Court (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.). 
94 
 Following this, Larsen filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 2008 
(Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).  The prosecution appealed the petition, stating 
that it was filed beyond the one-year deadline for such petition after state challenges to a 
conviction are final; however, the federal court denied the prosecution’s appeal and ordered a 
hearing on the petition to determine if the case qualified as an exception to the one-year 
requirement.  The hearing was finally held in 2009.  At this hearing, McNutt, the former 
police chief, testified that Larsen was not in possession of the knife nor did he throw the 
knife at the scene of the incident in question.  McNutt also identified Hewitt as the person 
who threw a metal object under a car as the police arrived.  McNutt revealed that he did not 
come forth sooner due to the fact that he and his wife had returned to their home in North 
Carolina, and he was not aware that Larsen was convicted.  Following this hearing, the judge 
found that Larsen had established actual innocence, and he qualified for an exception to the 
one-year deadline.  The judge also found that Larsen’s trial lawyer had failed to provide 
adequate defense in the case.  With this said, the judge vacated the original conviction and 
ordered a new trial.  The prosecution appealed this ruling but was later denied by Ninth 
Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals in September 2013.  On January 27, 2014, the Los 
Angeles County District Attorney’s Office dismissed the charge against Daniel Larsen, after 
he had served 14 years in prison (Northwestern Law & Michigan Law, n.d.).   
 This case exhibits a clear example of inadequate legal representation, as Larsen 
would not have been convicted or spent any time in prison if the witness statements and 
forensic evidence would had been investigated or examined prior to the trial.  If Larsen’s 
defense attorney had received statements from other individuals at the scene, he would have 
likely found that Larsen was not the one who had the knife that night.  While it has been 
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suggested that many of the problems with inadequate defense occur in cases with indigent 
defendants, these problems may occur in any defense case when specific factors are present, 
such as a lack of funding, an absence of quality control, and a lack of motivation in behalf of 
the defense attorney (Gould & Leo, 2010; Hartley et al., 2010; Williams, 2013).  Inadequate 
legal defense has been suggested as one of the largest factors in wrongful convictions, as the 
defense attorney is supposed to protect the defendant from the mistakes of others that could 
have occurred early in the case, such as police misconduct, prosecutorial misconduct, or 
issues with eyewitness testimony.  In the Larsen case, it was apparent that the officer who 
testified at both preliminary hearings did go back and change his account of the incident, 
whether it was done intentionally to ensure a charge or not.  If the defense attorney for 
Larsen had suspected this issue or a threat to his client, he may have proceeded with more 
investigation, such as looking into and questioning the other witnesses at the scene of the 
incident.  Overall, inadequate legal defense is a factor of wrongful conviction that can 
directly affect the outcome of the case, as the quality and amount of defense the defendant 
receives is directly associated with the ability to correct errors that may have occurred earlier 
in the case and, subsequently, prevent a wrongful conviction of the defendant.   
Racial Disparity 
 As previously discussed, research has found serious race effects within the 
identification, prosecution, and sentencing of criminal suspects (Gould & Leo, 2010).  It has 
been found that minorities are more likely to be subject to some of the sources of wrongful 
conviction, as well as a wrongful conviction itself (Gould & Leo, 2010; Konvisser, 2012).  
The largest example of racial disparity is within eyewitness identifications, as it has been 
found that errors are more likely when the victim and the perpetrator are of a different race 
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(Gould & Leo, 2010).  This was the cause in the well-known Ronald Cotton trial, in which an 
African American male was wrongfully convicted of two counts of rape and two counts of 
burglary in North Carolina (Innocence Project, n.d.).  Both incidents in question occurred in 
July of 1984, when an assailant broke into an apartment, severed phone wires, sexually 
assaulted a woman, searched through her belongings, and stole money and other items from 
the home.  Ronald Cotton was arrested for these two separate incidents on August 1, 1984, 
after a photo identification by one of the victims and a police lineup identification by the 
other victim.  The other evidence against Cotton included a flashlight found in his home that 
resembled the one used by the assailant and a piece of rubber from Cotton’s tennis shoe that 
was consistent with rubber found at one of the crime scenes (Innocence Project, n.d.).   
With the eyewitness identifications and other minor physical evidence in hand, 
Cotton was convicted of the first offense, including one count of rape and one count of 
burglary, in January of 1985 (Innocence Project, n.d.).  Following the conviction, Cotton 
appealed the case to the North Carolina Supreme Court, which resulted in the overturning of 
the original 1985 conviction, based on the fact that the second victim had identified another 
man in the lineup and the trial court had not allowed this evidence to be heard by the jury.  In 
November 1987, Cotton was retried for both cases, due to the fact that the second victim later 
decided that Cotton was her assailant after the first trial.  Before this retrial, it was found that 
there was a man in prison at the time who had confessed to have been the assailant in the 
crimes of which Cotton had been convicted.  At the second trial, the superior court judge 
refused to allow this information into evidence, which resulted in Cotton being convicted of 
both rapes.  Cotton was subsequently sentenced to life plus fifty-four years (Innocence 
Project, n.d.).   
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In 1988, Cotton’s appellate defender filed a brief on his behalf, but failed to include 
the second suspect’s confession, which resulted in an affirmation of Cotton’s conviction 
(Innocence Project, n.d.).  Due to this failure to include exculpatory findings, the chief 
appellate defender requested that two new lawyers take over Cotton’s defense.  These two 
lawyers filed a motion for appropriate relief on the grounds of inadequate counsel, as well as 
a motion for DNA testing, which was granted in October 1994.  The DNA evidence in the 
case, including the assailant’s semen, was turned over by the Burlington Police Department 
for testing in 1995.  Although one of the victim’s DNA samples had deteriorated too much to 
prove to be useful in the DNA testing, the other victim’s vaginal swab and underwear were 
compared to Cotton’s DNA and did not result in a match.  With this finding in hand, the 
defense requested that the results be sent to the State Bureau of Investigation’s DNA 
database, which consists of DNA of convicted violent felons in North Carolina prisons, in 
attempt to find a match.  The state’s database showed a match with the man who had earlier 
confessed to the crime prior to Cotton’s second trial in 1987 (Innocence Project, n.d.).   
As a result of the DNA test results, the district attorney and the defense filed a motion 
to dismiss all charges in May of 1995 (Innocence Project, n.d.).  On June 30, 1995, Cotton 
was officially released from prison and cleared of all charges, after serving ten and half years 
in prison.  Shortly after this, in July 1995, the governor of North Carolina officially granted a 
pardon for Cotton, which made him eligible for $5,000 in compensation from the state for his 
time served in prison.  This case was especially monumental as one of the victims, Jennifer 
Thompson, who had identified Cotton as the assailant, started a campaign to increase 
awareness of the dangers of eyewitness testimony and how it can affect a conviction, after 
Cotton’s release from prison (Innocence Project, n.d.).   
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The case of Ronald Cotton has played a large role in the increased awareness of the 
inaccuracies of eyewitness testimony, as well as the role eyewitness testimony plays in 
wrongful convictions, and increased awareness for racial disparities that may occur within 
the criminal justice system.  While there may not have been direct evidence of racial 
discrimination in the Cotton case, it can be suggested that the increased chances of 
eyewitness error that results from the defendant and the victim being of different races played 
a role in the conviction.  It has been shown that this is particularly the situation in rape cases, 
such as that of Cotton, in which a white victim is raped by an African American or Hispanic 
man and unintentionally identifies an innocent person as the suspect during the lineup (Gould 
& Leo, 2010; Vallas, 2011).  Smith and Hattery (2011) indicated that this problem is fairly 
common for African American men, as it is suggested that they are more than four times 
more likely to be exonerated for raping white women compared to the number of times they 
actually commit this crime.  It has been suggested that the racial history of the United States 
has contributed to this phenomenon, which makes the problem more difficult to overcome.  
This case, as well as the events that occurred after the case, such as the advocacy and 
awareness campaign by Jennifer Thompson and Ronald Cotton himself, through books and 
multiple speeches, has led to a greater awareness of racial disparity within the criminal 
justice system and has provided an example of how multiple factors can culminate to produce 
a wrongful conviction, such as racial disparity within eyewitness identification.  
System Issues 
 As previously argued, there are many issues within the criminal justice system that 
may cause wrongful convictions, such as inadequate funding and lack of resources, increased 
caseload problems, and increased use of plea bargaining (Roberts, 2003).  As it is well 
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known that plea bargaining may be a result of increased caseloads and lack of funding and 
resources, it has also been advocated that these issues can result in inadequate defense 
services, particularly by court-appointed and defense attorneys for the indigent (Smith et al., 
2011).   
An example of inadequate defense was presented in the case of Jimmy Ray 
Bromgard, who was convicted of three counts of sexual intercourse without consent and 
sentenced to three 40-year terms in prison, which were to be served concurrently (Innocence 
Project, n.d.).  The incident in question occurred on March 20, 1987, when a young girl was 
attacked in her home by an intruder who broke into the home through a window.  The 
intruder proceeded to rape the girl vaginally, anally, and orally.  The intruder then stole a 
purse and a jacket and left the home.  During the investigation, the police collected the girls’ 
underwear and bed sheets, which contained semen and several hairs.  The victim also assisted 
the police in producing composite sketch of the intruder.  Following the production of the 
composite sketch, an officer familiar with Bromgard indicated that he resembled the 
individual in the sketch.  Bromgard eventually agreed to participate in a lineup at the police 
station, which was videotaped.  During the lineup, the victim picked out Bromgard but 
indicated that she was not sure if he was the right man, saying that she was only about 60 to 
65 percent sure.  Even with her uncertainty, she was still allowed to identify Bromgard in 
court as her assailant.  It is important to note that Bromgard’s assigned counsel never 
objected to the in-court identification (Innocence Project, n.d.).   
 During the trial, the prosecution’s case revolved around the identification by the 
victim and the misleading testimony of the state’s forensic expert, who testified that the head 
and pubic hairs found on the sheets were indistinguishable from Bromgard’s hair samples 
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(Innocence Project, n.d.).  After failing to type the semen found on the victim’s underwear, 
the prosecution’s forensic expert could only rely on the hairs found on the bed sheets, which 
led him to indicate that there was a less than a one in ten thousand chance that the hairs did 
not belong to Bromgard.  This crucial testimony was found to be fraudulent, as there has 
never been a standard established to statistically match hairs through microscopic inspection.  
The state’s forensic expert had forged the evidence and presented extremely misleading 
testimony.  Other than this forensic evidence, the only other physical evidence presented by 
the prosecution included a checkbook from the victim’s purse that was found on a street near 
Bromgard’s home (Innocence Project, n.d.).   
 In regards to the defense’s case, Bromgard testified that he was at home asleep when 
the crime occurred (Innocence Project, n.d.).  Additionally, none of his fingerprints had been 
found in the victim’s home or on the checkbook that was later discovered near his home.  
The defense had no further argument besides Bromgard’s own testimony.  At this point in the 
case, it was clear that Bromgard’s defense was extremely inadequate, as his attorney did not 
investigate the case, failed to hire an expert to debunk the state’s forensic expert, filed no 
motions to suppress the identification of the young girl, who indicated that she was only 
about 65 percent certain that she identified the right man, failed to give an opening statement, 
did not prepare a closing statement, and failed to file an appeal after Bromgard’s conviction.  
With a lack of adequate defense, Bromgard was convicted in December 1987 of three counts 
of sexual intercourse without consent and sentenced to forty years in prison for each count 
(Innocence Project, n.d.).   
 In 2000, The Innocence Project started working on Bromgard’s case, shortly after he 
was denied parole release due to a failure to participate in the sex offenders program in 
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prison (Innocence Project, n.d.).  During the re-investigation, the students with The 
Innocence Project worked with Bromgard’s postconviction attorney to have the initial 
evidence released and re-tested.  The results of the new test conducted on the victim’s 
underwear indicated that Bromgard was not a match to the sperm located on the underwear.  
Following the finding that Bromgard was not guilty, on October 1, 2002, he later became the 
111th person in the United States to be exonerated by postconviction DNA testing.  Overall, 
Bromgard spent fourteen and a half years in a Montana prison for a crime he did not commit.  
This case was monumental for the state of Montana, as the ACLU filed a class action lawsuit 
against the indigent defender system in seven Montana counties for not providing adequate 
counsel for indigent clients.  Additionally, the forensic science division in the state was given 
much attention, as many advocated for an audit to be conducted by the Attorney General’s 
office due to the junk science presented at trial and forensic science misconduct on behalf of 
the state’s forensic science expert who testified at the trial (Innocence Project, n.d.).   
 In regards to inadequate indigent defense, it has been shown that the lack of funding 
for indigent defense or public defenders offices can lead to wrongful convictions, due to an 
inability to compete with the prosecution.  Specifically, if defense attorneys do not have the 
funding and resources to adequately investigate and counter the resources of the prosecution, 
they may not be able to convince the court that their client is not guilty (Smith et al., 2011).  
As previously noted, these issues are likely to be even worse for indigent defendants who 
have court appointed counsel or a public defender, as these attorneys are less likely to have 
funding and resources (Hartley et al., 2010; Williams, 2013).   In the Bromgard case, it did 
seem as though this could be an explanation for some of the failures on behalf of his court 
appointed defense attorney, but some of the other failures, such as failing to object to the in-
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court identification or even file for appeal upon conviction, can only be attributed to bad 
lawyering (Innocence Project, n.d.).  While system factors and issues, especially lack of 
funding, can attribute to wrongful conviction by way of inadequate defense services, it 
should be noted that system issues as a whole also have detrimental effects on individual 
cases and may lead to wrongful convictions.  Not only can system issues lead to wrongful 
convictions, in multiple ways, wrongful convictions may also lead to further exacerbation of 
these system issues, typically by way of the large amount of funding spent on incarcerating 
wrongfully convicted individuals. 
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Chapter 5: Possible Remedies and Prevention Mechanisms 
Remedies 
Lawsuits 
 According to Brooks and Simpson (2012), there are hundreds of inmates who have 
been exonerated in the past twenty years and released back into society with no resources to 
start a new life.  Kahn (2010) indicates that many of these inmates spend thousands of dollars 
funding their appeal, leaving them in substantial debt, deprived of job experience and wages 
they would have earned had they had not been in prison, facing unique impediments to 
securing employment, and being burdened by considerable emotional, psychological, and 
physical harm as a result of imprisonment.  The culmination of these issues makes it 
exceedingly difficult for recently freed individuals to resume a normal life.  While this is the 
case for all inmates upon release, it is even more difficult for those wrongfully convicted, as 
they cannot proclaim or indicate their innocence on government documents or job 
applications unless they have been fully exonerated, pardoned, or obtained a statement of 
innocence.  A legal finding of innocence may still not be able to remedy physical and 
psychological consequences of imprisonment or be able to rid the individual of the social 
stigma caused by imprisonment.  Although it seems clear that there is a loss of liberty, as 
well as many of the core components of a normal life, such as familial ties, job attainment, 
psychological health, and physical health, as a result of wrongful conviction, and that those 
who are wrongfully convicted should be compensated in some manner, there are still many
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 disagreements about how this should be done or how much should be given to these 
individuals.  This inadequate or non-existent compensation leads many individuals to pursue 
legal or legislative alternatives, which can include constitutional or common law tort 
remedies, private legislative bills, and, more commonly, action under state compensation 
statutes (Kahn, 2010).  Overall, while there seem to be a variety of ways in which individuals 
who are wrongfully convicted may seek compensation, these individuals are still likely to 
face many barriers and legal hurdles.  The most common barrier to accessing all three 
methods tends to be the immunity of the government agencies against which these 
individuals are filing suits.  In this regard, it is well known that, in these cases, the 
government immunity is likely to block most of these suits from ever seeing a courtroom or 
even a settlement mediation (Brooks & Simpson, 2012; Kahn, 2010). 
Constitutional and Common Law Tort Remedies. 
 According to Kahn (2010), under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a wrongfully convicted person 
may sue the government for the deprivation of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by 
the Constitution and laws.  The largest issue with this type of suit is that it is usually very 
difficult for wrongfully convicted persons to satisfy the requirements to succeed with such a 
claim.  Specifically, the first step of such a claim is to identify the specific constitutional right 
allegedly infringed, which may be problematic for some wrongfully convicted individuals, as 
there may not have been one specific right covered under §1983 that was violated.  An even 
larger issue with this type of claim is that the defendant must prove that there was culpable 
conduct on the part of the government.  This is troublesome, as many wrongful convictions 
do not arise from misconduct on the part of the government, but are usually a culmination of 
factors such as unintentional misidentifications by eyewitnesses or false testimony by 
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jailhouse informants, etc.  Even if there are cases in which there was direct misconduct from 
a government official, whether it was due to negligence or it was intentional, it is difficult to 
prove and is even more difficult to challenge official authority due to the complete or 
qualified immunity police and prosecutors are granted by the courts.  Additionally, common 
law tort claims, such as malicious prosecution and false imprisonment, suffer from similar 
issues.  Specifically, both of these claims require a showing of intent on the part of the 
government, in addition to an absence of probable cause for arrest.  Specifically, if an 
individual were to bring up a claim of false arrest, he/she must show that he/she was 
intentionally confined without consent and justification.  Additionally, these common law 
tort claims are subject to the same police officer and prosecutor immunity protections, which 
are difficult to defeat or bypass.  It is important to note that, even if a defendant is successful 
at pursuing a constitutional or tort remedy, a favorable judgment may take years to recover, 
which will leave the wrongfully convicted individual to front the costs of yet additional legal 
counsel, while also attempting to make ends meet on the limited income that may be 
extremely difficult to find with prior arrests and prison time on his/her record (Kahn, 2010).   
Private Compensation. 
 When a wrongfully convicted individual seeks private compensation, he/she is 
seeking a private bill from the state legislature, which can allocate money to the individual 
directly (Kahn, 2010).  This method seems to be difficult for many individuals who seek to 
obtain compensation, as many states interpret their constitution as precluding this type of 
recovery.  Additionally, many state legislatures are simply not equipped to handle the 
growing number of wrongfully convicted individuals who are seeking compensation after the 
so-called “postconviction DNA testing boom” and innocence movement.  Specifically, 
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legislatures do not have the time or resources to examine, debate, and vote on compensation 
for numerous individuals.  This type of relief is rarely used.  Lastly, a compensation bill, such 
as those pursued during private compensation efforts, is highly subjective to political climate 
and budgetary concerns.  These two factors alone can be a determining factor in the fate of 
the bill and the merits of the claim for compensation, as well as the amount of compensation.  
As previously noted, these types of compensation claims are not commonly used, which is 
especially the case as many states have now established compensation statutes to handle such 
issues in a streamlined manner (Kahn, 2010).  
Compensation Statutes. 
Twenty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government have 
enacted formal compensation statutes aimed at providing relief for those wrongfully 
incarcerated (Brooks & Simpson, 2012; Kahn, 2010).  These statutes have been enacted 
“amid heightened awareness of instances of erroneous conviction and growing interest in 
providing new legal remedies for persons exonerated after serving time in prison” (Kahn, 
2010, p. 135).  These statutes are aimed at making it easier to establish and satisfy criteria for 
recovery, rather than only relying on negligence on behalf of the government.  These statutes 
allow for recovery even in the absence of any government culpability and are available to 
anyone who meets certain eligibility requirements, regardless of political connections.  It is 
clear that these statutes are aimed at fixing the direct issues of constitutional and common 
law torts, as well as private compensation claims.   
The issue with these statutes, on a nationwide level, is that they are commonly flawed 
and misinterpreted, which hinders exonerees from being provided relief (Brooks & Simpson, 
2012).  Additionally, these statutes are likely to favor an administrative process rather than a 
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civil suit, which could affect defendants in a variety of ways.  Specifically, the compensation 
amounts may vary and there may be a variety of caps placed on total compensation available 
in specific areas (Kahn, 2010).  Similar to the appeals process, the defendants seeking 
compensation under these statutes may be faced with more legal issues, such as strict statutes 
of limitations or a high burden of proof to qualify for compensation.  Kahn (2010) indicates 
that the even larger issue surrounding compensation statutes is that succeeding on such a 
claim is too difficult and takes too long for the compensation received.  Meritorious claims 
are often defeated due to the burden placed on the defendants, which include the costs of 
litigation and the difficulty of producing evidence related to a crime that took place years 
ago.  Even when the claimant does succeed, the process itself takes years to complete, which 
leaves the wrongfully convicted individual without any money, which is a similar issue seen 
with private compensation processes (Kahn, 2010).     
Brooks and Simpson (2012) indicate that the statutes put in place in Alabama, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Tennessee, Nebraska, 
Oklahoma, Texas, and California require an administrative hearing to determine eligibility 
for compensation.  Some of these states also allow compensation without a civil suit 
occurring.  On the other hand, the District of Columbia, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, 
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Vermont, and West Virginia all require wrongfully 
convicted inmates to bring civil claims against them rather than utilize an administrative 
process.  It should also be noted that Florida, Iowa, and Utah utilize a combination of these 
approaches by using a three step process in which the defendant first files a claim in the 
courts, then the claim is reviewed by the administrative agency, which finally makes a 
recommendation to the court on the relief for the defendant.  The court may accept or 
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completely dismiss the recommendation in these combined practices (Brooks and Simpson, 
2012).   
It seems that there is not a universal way in which an inmate may apply for 
compensation; since each state can differ greatly in their procedural guidelines, it has become 
even more difficult for some defendants in states such as Illinois, Maine, Maryland, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia due to highly restrictive requirements 
for seeking compensation (Brooks & Simpson, 2012).  Specifically, these states require the 
inmate to have secured either a pardon or a finding of actual innocence before he/she can 
even become eligible for compensation (Brooks & Simpson, 2012; Kahn, 2010).  It should be 
noted that, in some of these states where strict guidelines are followed, there is no method of 
relief for compensation for those convicted of misdemeanors, meaning only those convicted 
of felonies are able to petition for compensation (Kahn, 2010).  It is clear that this may leave 
out a substantial number of wrongfully convicted individuals, as these smaller cases may be 
overlooked more often and pleas may be more likely to take place, as previously mentioned.  
Additionally, the implications of incarceration, even if it is within jail rather than prison, may 
still be detrimental or have negative consequences on the individual’s life, especially in 
regards to job placement.  These strict guidelines are likely to cause even more unnecessary 
difficulty for wrongfully convicted individuals, as it is very hard to secure a pardon, and it is 
even more difficult to meet the high burden required to secure a finding of actual innocence.  
Additionally, these processes may be even more difficult for those inmates who are not 
familiar with the procedures and rules that must be followed and who do not have any kind 
of legal assistance in seeking compensation or any type of relief (Brooks and Simpson, 
2012).   
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Kahn (2010) indicates that another strict guideline that is used in about half of the 
compensation statutes is the exclusion of defendants who in some way caused or contributed 
to their own conviction.  This is especially detrimental for those who are wrongfully 
convicted, as it has already been indicated that false confessions and coerced testimony from 
the defendant may play a large role in wrongful conviction.  Additionally, this rule also 
applies to those who pleaded guilty, committed perjury, fabricated evidence, or made a false 
statement that contributed to the conviction (Kahn, 2010).  Although similar requirements 
have been placed during the appeals process itself, these are still troublesome for those 
wrongfully convicted, as they may not be able to seek compensation, even if they were later 
exonerated by DNA evidence, if their initial case involved a guilty plea or any suggestive 
testimony on their behalf.  While states such as New York have indicated that these 
provisions should not affect the ability of defendants who have cases involving coerced 
confessions and involuntary or invalid guilty pleas to seek recovery, it does not seem clear 
that they would stand a chance of making it far in the process if new evidence is not 
introduced and they are not given a chance to provide proof of innocence, which is unlikely 
even during the initial appeals process (Kahn, 2010) 
Number of Successful Compensation Lawsuits.  
As it is clear that statutes and processes for seeking compensation vary greatly by 
state, it is important to determine how many individuals have been successful at achieving 
compensation for wrongful conviction through these varying policies.  According to Garrett 
(2008), only 41 percent of the 200 exonerees in his study have received some kind of 
compensation for their years of imprisonment for crimes they did not commit.  It has been 
indicated that this low percentage of those receiving compensation may be due to the high 
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burden of proof; for instance, in order for an exoneree to pursue a federal civil rights action 
suit, he/she must be able to show that government officials acted with sufficient fault.  In the 
Garrett (2008) study, 78 of the 200 filed civil claims, mostly in federal courts.  With this said, 
only 49 of those who brought wrongful conviction lawsuits received a favorable judgment or 
settlement.  Of those who did receive compensation, several of the suits were for many 
millions of dollars.  The high amount of these settlements is thought to provide a deterrent 
effect to law enforcement and prosecutors so that they will not violate fair trial rights, 
although evidence has not been conclusive on this matter thus far.  Additionally, 18 
exonerees in this study received compensation by way of no-fault compensation statutes that 
have been put into place in some states, while 15 more have received compensation through 
special legislative bills (Garrett, 2008).  While it seems that almost half of those in the study 
were able to receive compensation for wrongful conviction, it is still problematic that over 
half of those who were exonerated by way of DNA evidence still have not been compensated 
for their time in prison, away from their family, out of the work force, and with an overall 
loss of liberty.  Garrett (2008) and Kahn (2010) indicate that even those who did receive 
compensation faced many obstacles in obtaining relief, such as meeting eligibility 
requirements for statutes, statutes of limitations, high burden of proof standards, and caps on 
recovery of damages, no matter the length of time wrongfully incarcerated.  Lastly, according 
to Kahn (2010), more than half of those who do receive compensation nationwide wait two 
years or longer after exoneration for the first payment and typically leave prison with less 
help, such as pre-release counseling, job training, substance-abuse counseling, housing 
assistance, and other services, than those who have not been wrongfully convicted or are 
simply released on parole.   
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Access to Postconviction DNA Testing 
 While the federal government has already put some provisions in place to protect 
defendants who have been charged and convicted of a federal offense, through the Justice for 
All Act, there is currently a lack of similar standards at the state level (Innocence Project, 
n.d.).  As previously mentioned, the Justice for All Act permits defendants convicted of a 
federal offense, who have been sentenced to imprisonment or death, to apply to the court 
where the original conviction was entered for DNA testing of specific evidence.  This statute 
also requires the preservation of biological evidence, which has been noted as another 
potential reform option for the issue of wrongful conviction.  The Justice for All Act 
indicates that the court shall grant the defendant’s motion to test the DNA evidence if 
specific requirements have been met. First, the applicant asserts that he/she is actually 
innocent of either a federal offense for which he is currently sentenced to imprisonment or 
death, or of a federal or state offense that was used as evidence during a death sentence 
hearing.  Second, the evidence to be tested was obtained in connection with the investigation 
of the state or federal offense noted previously.  Third, the evidence has been maintained by 
the federal government, has been subject to proper chain of custody, and remains to be 
suitable for testing.  Fourth, the scope of the testing in question is reasonable and conforms 
with accepted scientific methods.  Fifth, the applicant’s theory of defense is not inconsistent 
with an affirmative defense at trial and would establish the actual innocence of the defendant.  
Sixth, during the trial that resulted in the conviction there was a question of the identity of the 
perpetrator.  Seventh, testing of the DNA evidence would produce new material evidence 
that would support the defense theory and raise a reasonable suspicion that the defendant is 
innocent of the crime in question.  Eighth, the applicant certifies that he/she will provide a 
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DNA sample.  Finally, the motion is filed in a timely manner, which must be within 5 years 
of the enactment of the law, or three years of the conviction, whichever comes later.  This act 
also allows for the appointment of counsel during these hearings, as well as payment for the 
DNA testing by the government, if the defendant proves to be indigent.  This is a large 
improvement within the system, as many indigent defendants who have been wrongfully 
convicted face many barriers with regards to understanding the process of refuting wrongful 
convictions, requesting DNA testing, and even affording the postconviction testing 
(Innocence Project, n.d.).  
 While the Justice for All Act expanded the accessibility to postconviction DNA 
testing for defendants convicted of a federal offense, there are still many shortcomings of 
state statutes that are aimed at protecting defendants convicted of state offenses.  According 
to The Innocence Project (n.d.), although all 50 states have postconviction DNA testing 
access statutes, they are limited in regards to scope and substance.  For instance, some state 
laws present many insurmountable hurdles to the defendant by putting the burden on the 
wrongfully convicted person to solve the crime and prove that the DNA evidence in question 
implicates another individual.  This can be especially difficult for individuals who are not 
familiar with how the criminal justice system works or the specific terminology used within 
many of these statutes.  Additionally, many state laws do not allow for postconviction DNA 
testing of individuals who have pleaded guilty or confessed to the crime, despite the fact that 
approximately 30 percent of the 311 wrongful convictions proven by DNA evidence in the 
United States have involved a false confession, admission, or guilty plea.  Although the 
federal statute specifies that better methods of preservation of DNA evidence must be put 
into place, many state statutes do not address this and do not present adequate safeguards for 
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preserving the evidence, which can lead to lack of access for some defendants.  It has also 
been found that some states do not have time limitations or requirements for prompt hearings 
once the petition has been filed, which can leave some defendants remaining in prison for 
extended amounts of time as they await a decision on the petition.  Lastly, several states do 
not allow for individuals to appeal denied petitions for testing.  Although it cannot be argued 
that the federal statute for access to postconviction DNA testing is perfect, it has been shown 
that many of the state statutes present even more barriers for those who have been wrongfully 
convicted.  In regards to cost to the state, it should be noted that the 2004 Justice for All Act 
allocates various justice-related funding to any state that grants DNA testing access to 
inmates claiming innocence, which should ideally remove one of the barriers to testing for 
the defendant (Innocence Project, n.d.).   
 In regards to the postconviction DNA testing access in North Carolina, the DNA 
Database and Databank Act of 1993 permits a defendant to make a motion before the trial 
court that entered the judgment of conviction against the defendant for performance of DNA 
testing (Innocence Project, n.d.).  If the testing in question complies with the FBI 
requirements and the data meets National DNA Index System standards, the profiles obtained 
from the testing will then be searched and/or uploaded to the FBI’s national DNA 
identification index system, also known as CODIS, upon meeting the specified criteria.  The 
criteria for North Carolina postconviction DNA testing includes a provision that  the 
evidence must be material to the defendant’s defense; is related to the investigation or 
prosecution that resulted in the conviction; and was either not previously tested or was 
previously tested with inaccurate or unreliable methods and results.  Additionally, North 
Carolina does allow for the right to appeal denial of the motion for DNA testing.  This statute 
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includes information as to the appointment of counsel for the hearing, as well as the appeal of 
a denial of the motion, if the defendant has been identified as indigent.  Lastly, North 
Carolina does advocate for increased preservation of biological evidence collected in the 
course of a criminal investigation or prosecution.  It should be noted that North Carolina does 
note the term of preservation depends upon the length of conviction or extent of conviction.  
Additionally, if a defendant was convicted after pleading guilty, the evidence in this case will 
only be preserved for up to three years from the date of conviction or three years after 
release, whichever is earlier.  This is troublesome, as it has already been indicated that there 
are a substantial number of wrongfully convicted individuals who either confess, plead 
guilty, or admit to the commission of the crime, for a variety of reasons (Innocence Project, 
n.d.).   
 Overall, while postconviction DNA testing statutes exist in every state, as well within 
the federal government, there are still many issues with the limitations and barriers placed 
upon defendants requesting this service.  Some of the key issues defendants face with the 
current statutes in place, both federal and state, include limits on testing for those who 
pleaded guilty, strict time limits for requesting the testing, failure of the states to preserve the 
biological evidence adequately, costs, and limits on the amount of time the biological 
evidence is kept (Innocence Project, n.d.).  The Innocence Project (n.d.) indicates that an 
effective postconviction DNA access statute must allow for testing in cases where DNA 
evidence could establish innocence, even if the defendant pleaded guilty, must not include a 
“sunset provision” or an expiration date for access to testing, must require states to preserve 
and account for biological evidence, must eliminate the procedural barriers to DNA testing, 
which include appeals for a denied request, and must provide money to back up the new 
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statute so that it can actually be implemented.  Although DNA testing is not extremely 
common in criminal cases, wrongfully convicted individuals should still be allowed to have 
access to postconviction testing, as it could exonerate them and help to find the actual 
perpetrator.  While there have been many accomplishments and pushes for increased 
postconviction DNA testing access, it is clear by the continued rate of wrongful conviction 
that there are still many barriers that are difficult to overcome by defendants seeking to prove 
their innocence by way of DNA evidence (Innocence Project, n.d.).     
Evidence Preservation  
 Despite the increase in laws enabling inmates to seek postconviction DNA testing, 
there are still many limitations to these tests, especially if the evidence has been lost, 
destroyed, or contaminated due to improper storage.  The Innocence Project (n.d.) indicates 
that more than half of the states, as well as the federal government, have passed legislation 
that compels for the automatic preservation of biological evidence upon conviction.  The 
federal government, as well as most states, classifies biological evidence as sexual assault 
forensic examination kits, semen, blood, saliva, hair, skin tissue, and other identified 
biological material collected during the investigation of a crime; however, many of these 
laws are limited in regards to the timeframe of how long the evidence should be kept and 
which types of evidence should be preserved.  An additional issue has started to arise from 
the passage of these statutes, as not all of these statutes advocate for the preservation of 
physical evidence that was collected prior the passing of the statute, meaning they only 
require the evidence that is gathered after the passage date to be kept.  This issue has resulted 
in many states legally allowing old evidence to be destroyed, even if it is attached to 
innocence claims or old unsolved cases.  On the other hand, some states do not have a 
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mandatory policy for keeping evidence, which results in some of these states only mandating 
preservation after a petition for re-testing of evidence has been filed in the case.  As a result, 
in many states, there are large quantities of evidence that are destroyed between the time of 
the conviction and when the petition is filed.  These states indicate that this practice is in 
place in order to make way for incoming evidence, due to concerns about storage space.  The 
push for better standards of preserving physical evidence has become evident in the past few 
decades, especially with the passage of the Justice for All Act of 2004.  This statute provides 
financial incentives for states to preserve evidence and withholds funding from those who do 
not adequately preserve evidence (Innocence Project, n.d.).   
 Although it has already been indicated that many states include preservation 
requirements within their DNA testing access statutes, including North Carolina, the 
Innocence Project (n.d.) indicates that not all of these states are fulfilling their mission.  
Specifically, The Innocence Project has come across multiple examples of cases in which the 
DNA evidence associated with the case has not been preserved.   This has been more 
commonly found in cases in which the evidence was destroyed during the window of time 
between the conviction and the filing of a postconviction petition for testing or re-testing of 
the biological evidence.  Additional shortcomings of current statutes for preserving evidence 
include the limits placed on the types of crimes for which evidence is preserved, the types of 
evidence preserved, the allowing of premature disposal of evidence, which is allowed by 
nearly every state with an existing statute, and the failure to sanction parties responsible for 
the disposal or corruption of evidence (Innocence Project, n.d.).   
It has been recommended by The Innocence Project (n.d.)  that all physical evidence 
should be properly preserved as long as the defendant is incarcerated, under any type of 
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supervision, including probation and parole, in civil litigation involving the crime in 
question, or subject to registration as a sex offender.  Additionally, it has been suggested that 
all types of physical evidence relating to felony crimes should be preserved, regardless of 
whether the defendant files a motion for postconviction DNA testing or not.  Other 
recommendations by The Innocence Project include the retention of all crime scene evidence 
in unsolved cases and increased sanctions for those who are responsible for the improper 
destruction of evidence.  Additionally, it has been suggested that, in cases in which evidence 
has been improperly destroyed, the courts should take action, ideally by vacating the 
conviction, granting a new trial, and instructing the new jury that the physical evidence in the 
case was destroyed in violation of the law.  Overall, the preservation of physical evidence is 
imperative to the increased use of postconviction DNA testing and determining innocence for 
wrongfully convicted individuals.  If the evidence is not properly preserved, it could result in 
increased punishment for those wrongfully convicted, as there may not be another way for 
them to prove their innocence, and they may spend an even greater amount of time 
incarcerated, or even worse, face the death penalty, for a crime they did not commit 
(Innocence Project, n.d.).   
Prevention Measures 
Eyewitness Identification Reforms 
 While DNA testing and evidence preservation may lead to exoneration or a 
determination of innocence after the fact, it is important to look at ways to prevent wrongful 
convictions in the future.  Since eyewitness error is the leading factor in wrongful conviction 
and still plays a large part in many cases today, it is imperative to look at the issues 
surrounding eyewitness identification.  First, it has been suggested that the practice of 
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misleading lineups and outdated practices have led a large number of wrongful convictions.  
According to The Innocence Project (n.d.), most law enforcement agencies use the same 
methods for eyewitness identification that were in place decades ago, which consist of live 
and photo lineups, as well lineups conducted without a blind administrator or proper 
instructions.  These methods have been shown to place stress on the victims and 
eyewitnesses as they attempt to force them to identify someone, even if they do not feel 
strongly about their identification.  As previously mentioned, the eyewitness may also be 
faced with a gap in memory or the desire to make an identification at all costs, both of which 
can produce errors and false identifications.  Additionally, error may come about if police are 
in any way suggestive towards a particular suspect, whether it is intentional or not.  Even 
with the wide array of mistakes that may occur within the practice, eyewitness identifications 
remain among the most common and compelling evidence brought against criminal 
defendants (Innocence Project, n.d.).   
 According to The Innocence Project (n.d.), all of these mistakes are preventable and 
the reforms for the eyewitness identification procedures are simple to put in place.  First, it 
has been widely suggested that the administration of the eyewitness identification should be 
completed by a blind administrator.  Blind administration of the process has been shown to 
decrease the risk of misidentification sharply, partly due to the fact that the officer 
administering a photo or live lineup is not aware of whom the suspect is and will not be able 
to make indicative gestures or comments.  Second, a change in lineup procedures has been 
advocated as a reform for eyewitness identification.  This change would include the 
placement of better “fillers,” or non-suspects included in the lineup, who would resemble the 
eyewitness’s description of the perpetrator.  Additionally, the suspect should not differ 
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greatly from the other individuals in the lineup, such as being the only one to have facial hair 
or being the only one of a different race.  Next, reforms should include better and less 
suggestive instructions for the eyewitnesses during identification procedures.  Specifically, 
the person viewing the lineup should be told that the perpetrator may not be in the lineup and 
that the investigation will continue regardless of the result of the lineup.  The eyewitness 
should also be instructed that he/she should not look toward the administrator for guidance 
during the identification process.  Fourth, it has been suggested that, as part of the 
identification procedure, the investigators should request a confidence statement from the 
eyewitness immediately after the process has been completed. The confidence statement 
from the witness would indicate, in his/her own words, the level of confidence in the 
identification he/she made.  This could play a large role in the stability and credibility of the 
eyewitness testimony in court, as there have been a large number of exonerations that have 
later revealed that the eyewitness was less than 50 percent sure of the identification.  If this 
confidence statement could be entered into the trial as testimony, along with the eyewitness 
identification itself, the identification may not carry as much weight during the trial.  Lastly, 
some advocates have argued that recording the identification procedures can protect innocent 
suspects from any misconduct by the lineup administrator.  The process of recording the 
lineup may also help the prosecution by showing a jury that the procedure was legitimate.  It 
has been added by many advocates that, along with these improvements, jurisdictions should 
consider using sequential lineup procedures.  As previously indicated, it has been shown that 
sequential lineup procedures, or the presenting of the lineup members one by one, can 
decrease the rate at which innocent people are identified.  Research has indicated that, when 
a witness is viewing several suspects at once, he/she is more likely to choose the person who 
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looks most like the perpetrator, even though it may not be the perpetrator (Innocence Project, 
n.d.). 
 These recommended changes have been implemented in various places across the 
United States, including Wisconsin, New Jersey, and North Carolina, and have proven to be 
successful (Innocence Project, n.d.).  Specifically, the recommendations in North Carolina 
include using sequential lineup procedures, the use of double-blind procedures, the 
instruction that that the suspect may or may not be in the lineup, the use of a minimum of 
eight photos for photo lineup procedures, the use of a minimum of six individuals in a live 
identification, no feedback from the administrator during or after the identification process, 
and the gathering of feedback and a confidence statement from the witness after the 
identification.  North Carolina has also given specific guidelines and instructions for each 
type of procedure that can be used.  Even with these guidelines recommended by the state, it 
is important that they are actually implemented to their full extent and monitored to make 
sure individual departments are making the necessary changes to their eyewitness 
procedures.  While North Carolina, along with a handful of other states, has implemented 
these recommendations and changes from the federal government and The Innocence Project, 
there are many other states that are behind on new practices within eyewitness identification 
and continue to use outdated and faulty procedures.  The failure of these other states to 
conform and adapt to the new research on this topic continues to threaten the reliability and 
accuracy of police investigations, as well as increase the risk of wrongful convictions, as the 
most common element in all wrongful convictions later overturned by DNA evidence has 
been eyewitness misidentification (Innocence Project, n.d.).   
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Forensic Science Oversight 
 As previously discussed, in more than 50 percent of the DNA exonerations 
nationwide, unvalidated or improper forensic science contributed to the wrongful conviction 
(Innocence Project, n.d.).  Improper forensic techniques can range from forensic techniques 
that have not been subject to rigorous scientific evaluation, such as shoe print comparisons, 
bite mark comparisons, hair microscopy, and firearm tool mark analysis, to testing that is 
improperly conducted or analysis that is not accurate, as well as forensic misconduct.  While 
there have been many case examples of poor forensic testing on part of the experts, it has 
also been suggested that part of the issue stems from lack of funding to support growing 
caseloads and demand for forensic testing.  Recommendations for improving the forensic 
science field include federal support for research and national standards and enforcement 
practices, increased research, assessment of the validity and reliability of existing practices, 
quality assurance, accreditation and certification procedures, state oversight commissions or 
advisory boards, and enforcement of the existing requirements in place (Innocence Project, 
n.d.).   
First, federal support for research and national standards could lead to the creation of 
a national forensic science agency with comparable authority to other federal agencies, such 
as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (Innocence Project, n.d.).  This agency could 
scrutinize the forensic devices and methods that are currently in use and in development to 
ensure that each one meets a specific standard.  Additionally, this agency could improve the 
quality of forensics used in the criminal justice system by focusing on increased research, 
assessment of validity and reliability of current and new methods, as well as quality 
assurance, accreditation procedures, and certification of laboratories and practitioners.  While 
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each of these three main foci would be important to a national forensic science agency, each 
is equally important for the field itself, even without the development of a national agency.  
The identification of research needs, the establishment of priorities, and the designing of 
criteria for reviewing forensic disciplines is important in expanding and improving the 
current practices.  It has been suggested that, in order to complete this task, there would be a 
need for increased funding to expand basic and applied research and to help develop new 
technologies to solve crime.  It is also equally, if not more, important to review existing and 
new research data to determine whether a technique, device, or procedure is scientifically 
valid and reliable.  In this regard, it is essential for the national agency, or the scientific 
community, to ensure the discontinuation of any invalid or unreliable method.  Within this 
agency, it has been suggested that there should be some type of quality assurance standards 
set for public and private laboratories, as well as for individuals conducting forensic tests and 
examinations with intended use in the federal and state courts.  These quality assurance 
measures will secure the integrity of the ultimate forensic product in the laboratory and in the 
courtroom.  In this same regard, quality assurance measures should be a part of the forensic 
oversight used to ensure compliance with accreditation and certification of laboratories and 
individual forensic scientists; meaning, if the rules are violated, there could be a loss of 
accreditation, individual certification, and a cessation of the business.  As previously 
mentioned, the development of these standards and review process could be better facilitated 
through the use of a national forensic science agency, but it is also important to improve 
upon these topics within the general science community (Innocence Project, n.d.).   
Outside of the scientific community and the development of a federal forensic science 
agency, it has been advocated that a state oversight commission or advisory board should be 
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established (Innocence Project, n.d.).  The establishment of this board, which would consist 
of independent panels, separate from government entities, would allow for the securing of 
adequate resources for the forensic science field.  Specifically, these independent panels 
would be made up of a wide range of experts in the field who understand the forensic science 
community, as well as the criminal justice system.  It has been noted by The Innocence 
Project (n.d.) that several states have already created these types of commissions to increase 
the reliability and output of forensic science methods, as well as to ensure adequate funding 
and support for these essential resources.   
Lastly, it has been advocated by those in the both the criminal justice system and the 
scientific community that the current requirements put in place should be better enforced 
(Innocence Project, n.d.).  Specifically, every state receives federal grant money under the 
Paul Coverdell Forensic Science Improvement Grant Program, as well as the Justice for All 
Act, which both require that states have oversight mechanisms in place in order to receive 
money for their crime labs.  These statutes indicate that the jurisdictions seeking federal 
funding must identify an independent external government entity with appropriate processes 
established to conduct investigations into allegations of negligence or misconduct affecting 
forensic results.  According to The Innocence Project (n.d.), although the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s Office of Justice programs hands out the grants, as of 2009, they have not given 
applicants the proper information and guidance they need to comply with these oversight 
requirements.  While it is the responsibility of the states to develop these oversight 
mechanisms, it has been difficult for them to develop mechanisms that abide by the statutes’ 
guidelines without much guidance from the federal government.  As a result of this lack of 
instruction and guidance, as well as other factors, many states do not have the independence 
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and/or processes necessary to ensure the integrity of analysis from crime labs and other 
forensic facilities.  With this said, many states have accepted the grants, but have yet to 
comply with the requirements, resulting in no improvement of forensic science mechanisms.  
This is important, as the government must fully enforce the current requirements and 
standards in place before implementing the new recommendations.  For this reason, many 
suggest that the development of the national forensic science agency may better allow for 
enforcement of existing requirements, in addition to any new requirements.  Overall, an 
efficient forensic science system that minimizes errors and focuses resources on identifying 
the guilty is beneficial to crime victims, police, prosecutors, and the courts (Innocence 
Project, n.d.).   
Recording of Interrogations 
 Balko (2011) and The Innocence Project (n.d.) indicate that about 25 percent of the 
wrongful convictions overturned by DNA evidence in the United States include some type of 
false confession, admission, or statement to law enforcement.  As previously noted, it has 
been shown that there are specific factors that cause innocent people to confess falsely, 
ranging from young age, mental health issues, low self-confidence, and police coercion 
(Gould & Leo, 2010; Keene et al., 2012; Leo & Davis, 2010; Orenstein, 2011).  With the 
wide range of factors that may influence a false confession and the great deal of weight a 
confession may play in a criminal case, it has been suggested that the recording of 
interrogations may reduce the number of false confessions that occur.  As suggested by The 
Innocence Project (n.d.), the recording should begin as soon as the Miranda rights have been 
read and continue throughout the entire custodial interrogation in order to be credible and 
reliable.  The recording of the interrogation can increase the credibility and reliability of 
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authentic confessions, while also protecting innocent suspects who may feel pressured or 
have been coerced to confess.  This is particularly the case when it has been shown that the 
police feed the defendant information and later hold the knowledge of the information 
against him/her and indicate that being aware of these specific details is evidence of guilt.  
Another form of coercion or suggestibility can be seen through threats or promises made to 
the suspect off camera, then the camera will be turned on for the false confession.  These 
examples of police misconduct during the investigation support the need for recording of 
interrogations from beginning to end.  Specifically, the recording of interrogations can deter 
officers from using illegal tactics, such as those previously described, to secure a confession.  
Additionally, without the objective record of the interrogation, it is difficult to gauge the 
reliability of the confession, especially if the defendant is claiming that the false confession 
was coerced.  Recorded interrogations may also benefit law enforcement personnel, as they 
may prevent disputes about how a suspect was treated, create a clear record of the suspect’s 
statement, and even increase the public’s confidence in the criminal justice system 
(Innocence Project, n.d.).   
 The recording of interrogations has been implemented in over 800 jurisdictions 
nationwide (Innocence Project, n.d.).  The Supreme Courts of Alaska and Minnesota have 
put laws into place making the recording of custodial interrogations a matter of due process 
and requiring that defendants be entitled to the recording.  In 2003, Illinois became the first 
state to require by law that all police interrogations of suspects in homicide cases must be 
recorded.  In regards to individual counties, police departments in Broward County, Florida 
and Santa Clara County, California, as well as other counties across the nation, have begun to 
record interrogations without a law requiring them to do so.  Proactive policies such as these 
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have been adopted due to the benefits that recorded interrogations provide to police and 
prosecutors, as well as innocent suspects.  The Innocence Project (n.d.) indicated that a 2004 
study conducted by Illinois officials in 200 locations found that police departments 
overwhelmingly embraced the reform and indicated that it was a measure of good law 
enforcement.  The surprising receptiveness toward this policy from all of those involved 
offers a substantial amount of support for requiring interrogations to be recorded and the 
benefits that would follow.   
Innocence Commissions  
 Much research has called for the formation of innocence commissions in one form or 
another.  The most commonly recommended form of innocence commissions is at the state 
level.  Innocence commissions would be responsible for investigating wrongful convictions 
within their jurisdiction to determine their causes, assign responsibility, and recommend 
measures to prevent the error from happening again (Norris et al., 2011; Schehr, 2005).  
According to The Innocence Project (n.d.), these commissions would also help to implement 
improvements within investigations, lab operations, defense, prosecution, and judicial review 
necessary to help ensure the integrity of the criminal justice system.  As previously mentioned, 
there are several states that have established these types of organizations, which include 
California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Oklahoma, New York, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin (Innocence Project, n.d.; Norris et al., 2011).  Out of these 
11 states that have put innocence commissions in place, there have been some signs of 
improvement within the arena of wrongful conviction.  For example, the 30-member North 
Carolina Actual Innocence Commission that was created in 2002 has focused on the causes of 
wrongful conviction and is considered a national model for effectiveness and reform 
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(Innocence Project, n.d.).  Additionally, in Pennsylvania, where nine men have been proven 
innocent by DNA evidence in recent years, the senate created an Innocence Commission in 
2006.  California, Connecticut, and Wisconsin have also followed suit in creating innocence 
commissions to investigate the causes of wrongful convictions, as well as Illinois, which in 
2003 passed into law 85 different recommendations made by a special commission on capital 
punishment.  These 85 recommendations that were placed in Illinois state laws were also found 
to be general safeguards against all wrongful convictions (Innocence Project, n.d.).   
 While there is clear evidence that attention to wrongful convictions has greatly 
increased over the past few decades, specifically by way of the creation of innocence 
commissions in eleven different states, there are still key areas where improvement is needed.  
It has been suggested by the co-founders of the Innocence Project and the American Bar 
Association Innocence Committee that there should be permanent innocence commissions in 
place across the nation, as many of the currently established state innocence commissions are 
temporary (Innocence Project, n.d.; Norris et al., 2011).  If permanent innocence commissions 
were put into place, they could provide continual monitoring and review of wrongful 
convictions.  Overall, it should be noted that innocence commissions do play a large role in 
assisting those who have been wrongfully convicted, but they could have an even larger effect 
if they were permanently established in each state throughout the nation.  If more innocence 
commissions were established, it has been argued that they may be able to successfully prevent 
some wrongful convictions in the future, as they would be aware of the causes of wrongful 
conviction and could propose reforms to safeguard against these issues in the future (Norris et 
al., 2011).  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 As it has already been indicated that wrongful convictions may occur due to a variety 
of reasons or due to a culmination of errors, it is important to determine the effects of such 
errors.  Wrongful conviction is not as uncommon as many people would assume, with an 
estimated 1 to 5 percent of all convictions in the United States being a wrongful conviction 
(Gould & Leo, 2010; Konvisser, 2012; Smith et al., 2011).  Wrongful convictions not only 
cost the criminal justice system a lot of money, including the costs for the time and resources 
investigating the case, the costs of prosecuting the suspect, and even the costs of 
incarceration, but also places a heavy burden on those subject to wrongful conviction.  Those 
who are wrongfully convicted may be subject to psychological issues, such as anxiety, 
depression, or post-traumatic stress disorder, as well as the other physical and lifestyle issues 
that may result from being wrongfully incarcerated (Konvisser, 2012).  These individuals are 
subject to a loss of freedom, liberty, and even life, as they are no longer able to take part in a 
normal life, even after release from prison.  The effects of wrongful conviction on the 
individuals subject to this phenomenon, as well as the criminal justice system, bring to light 
the importance of determining how to prevent these miscarriages of justices from occurring.  
 When estimating the actual occurrence of wrongful conviction, it is evident that there 
is a clear disconnect between catalogue estimates of wrongful convictions, estimates on 
behalf of criminal justice officials, and inmate self-report estimates.  Catalogue estimates 
indicate that, as of 2014, there have been 312 individuals exonerated by DNA evidence alone 
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(Innocence Project, n.d.).  The Center on Wrongful Convictions (2014) indicates that there 
have been 1,283 exonerations nationwide, which include exonerees who have been 
exonerated by DNA evidence, as well as other evidence, such as recanted eyewitness 
testimony.  In regards to estimates of exonerations of those on death row, it has been shown 
that, between 1973 and 2004, there had been 117 persons sentenced to death who were later 
exonerated (Death Penalty Information Center, n.d.).  On the other hand, criminal justice 
officials are more skeptical of a high rate of wrongful convictions, with 5.6 percent of 
officials in the Huff et al. (1986) study denying that wrongful conviction existed, 71.8 
percent indicating that it only occurred in less than one percent of convictions, and 22.6 
estimating that it occurred in more than one percent.  Research shows that a majority of 
police, prosecutors, and judges believe that wrongful convictions do not occur with sufficient 
frequency to warrant system reforms (Huff et al., 1986).  Lastly, inmate self-report data of 
estimates on wrongful conviction are significantly higher, with estimates suggesting that a 
wrongful conviction happens in 15.4 percent of cases (Poveda, 2001).  Inmate self-report 
estimates are thought to be much higher than both catalogue estimates and estimates from 
criminal justice officials due to the inmates’ perceptions of their criminal conduct (Poveda, 
2001).  The difference in these three estimates speaks to the lack of information regarding the 
extent to which wrongful convictions actually occur, as well as the reasons why they occur. 
 While the estimates of the overall rates of wrongful conviction vary, it has also been 
shown that the types of crimes in which wrongful convictions are more likely to occur may 
also vary.  Specifically, many would assume that wrongful conviction is more likely in 
capital cases, as exonerations are more likely to occur due to the presence of DNA evidence.  
According to Risinger (2007), the wrongful conviction rate in capital rape-murder cases from 
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1982-1989 ranged from 3.3 to 5 percent.  On the other hand, research suggests that 
exonerations for nonviolent crimes are now better represented than ever, specifically for 
crimes such as robbery, forgery, and drug related offenses (Roberts, 2003; Webster, 2012; 
Zalman et al., 2008).  The presence of wrongful conviction in these cases is thought to be due 
to the increased use of plea bargaining and false confessions, which are used by defendants in 
an attempt to end the case quickly or to avoid serious punishment.  While there is not as 
much evidence to specify a specific wrongful conviction rate for these non-violent offenses, 
it is suggested that the wrongful conviction rate may be much higher than we are estimating 
if these offenses are taken into account, as plea bargains happen every day, and these 
defendants are less likely to be successful with an appeal if they entered a guilty plea and a 
lack of DNA evidence exists (Risinger, 2007; Roberts, 2003). 
 Due to the nature of wrongful convictions and the factors associated with the 
phenomenon, it is difficult to indicate specific solutions to the problem.  As previously noted, 
there are many factors that may lead to wrongful convictions, which include faulty 
eyewitness evidence, false confessions, forensic error, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective 
assistance of counsel, racial disparity, and a variety of system issues (Balko, 2011; Davies & 
Hine, 2007; Gould & Leo, 2010; Penrod & Cutler, 1995; Smith et al., 2011; Zalman et al., 
2008).  While these factors alone may result in a wrongful conviction, it has been shown 
within multiple case studies of exonerees that many of these issues combine to result in the 
wrongful conviction of an individual.  During the initial investigation, the wrongdoing or 
misconduct may start at the beginning of the case and become more severe as the case 
continues and subsequent errors are combined.  In regards to police and prosecutors, this can 
be a result of tunnel vision, as they may be so focused on the prosecution of one suspect that 
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the other evidence is presented only in favor of their version of the crime story (Gould & 
Leo, 2010; Leo & Davis, 2010).  As research has indicated, tunnel vision is not always an 
intentional practice on part of those investigating the crime, but it may have a large effect on 
the result of the case.  Research findings also suggest that wrongful conviction is not only an 
issue caused by police and prosecutors, as there may be many other actors involved in the 
miscarriage of justice.  Specifically, there may be outside influences, such as eyewitnesses or 
jailhouse informants, expert witnesses, in addition to the defendant’s own attorney.  The 
combination of these factors, as well as variety of participants within a criminal case, makes 
it even more difficult to target each underlying issue.  
 While it is difficult for many of these defendants to counter the evidence and power 
of those conducting the investigation and prosecuting the case, it is even more difficult for a 
wrongfully convicted individual to refute the conviction after it has already been entered.  As 
previously indicated, an individual must overcome many hurdles to challenge a wrongful 
conviction, especially when attempting to introduce new evidence or claim the existence of a 
procedural error during the original trial.  Common barriers include short statutes of 
limitations for the filing of motions, high standards of proof for the new evidence presented, 
and a large amount of discretion on part of the judge overseeing the hearing for the motion 
(Griffin, 2009).  Even with the discrepancies in state and federal statutes on appeals, many 
defendants are not able to argue for a collateral review of their original case, as many statutes 
require the proof a constitutional error with their conviction.  In regards to claims directly 
associated with the factors of wrongful conviction, such as ineffective assistance of counsel, 
prosecutorial misconduct, police coercion, etc., which are typically filed by way of habeas 
corpus petitions, it has been shown that these claims are even more difficult to prove (Heder 
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& Goldsmith, 2012).  While the appeals process in and of itself provides many hurdles for 
defendants to overcome,  it can become even more difficult, as many jurisdictions do not 
provide the right to counsel or any type of assistance during the process of filing these 
motions and throughout the appeals process.  As previously noted, this is a huge issue for 
wrongfully convicted individuals, as these limitations can prevent them ever receiving their 
day in court, especially if they pleaded guilty during the original trial, which may prohibit 
participation in some methods of relief, or if they do not meet the strict guidelines and 
timelines specified in the appellate statutes.   
 Findings from the review of multiple case studies, as well as previous literature, show 
that only about 14 percent of those who were exonerated by DNA evidence received a 
reversal during the appeals process (Garrett, 2008).  When capital cases were not included in 
this estimate, the reversal rate dropped to nine percent, which suggests that the group 
receiving a capital punishment had the highest reversal rate.  When compared to a matched 
comparison group within the study, Garrett (2008) found similar rates of reversal between the 
innocent group, who had been exonerated by DNA evidence, and the comparison group, who 
had filed for appeals in similar types of cases but had not been exonerated.  Overall, the data 
on reversals for those later exonerated is troubling, as the results show a sufficient number of 
cases involving postconviction DNA exoneration were initially denied appellate review or 
relief.   
 While it is clear that it is very difficult for wrongfully convicted individuals to seek 
appellate relief and rare for these same individuals to be granted a reversal or a new trial, it is 
even more problematic that the main issues with the appellate system are directly linked to 
the causes of wrongful conviction.  Specifically, research indicates that the appellate system 
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does not focus on actual innocence, but rather constitutional and procedural violations, and 
overlooks many claims of misconduct and/or errors within the original case.  It has been 
suggested by Garrett (2008) that the appellate courts have been unable to detect mistaken 
eyewitness evidence, false confessions, faulty forensic evidence, false informant testimony, 
prosecutorial misconduct, as well as ineffective assistance of counsel.  These failures on the 
part of the appellate system in detecting these issues and errors in these cases speak to the 
difficulty in correcting and reforming the underlying issues of wrongful conviction.   
 While the appellate system may not always be successful in detecting these claims 
made by wrongfully convicted individuals, there has been a substantial amount of 
improvement within appellate assistance.  Some states have enacted statutes, as well put new 
organizations in place, outside of innocence projects, that are designed to investigate and 
review claims of wrongful conviction (Griffin, 2009).  While these organizations vary by 
state, many of these organizations, such as the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry 
Commission, review the case; if they have suspected actual innocence, they request 
testimony from eyewitnesses of the original incident, then decide if the convicted person is 
innocent by clear and convincing evidence.  If the person is deemed to be innocent of the 
crime in question, the conviction will then be vacated or the charges dismissed against the 
person.  It should be noted that some states even provide assistance of counsel, different from 
their original counsel, for the appellate process, which allows for these defendants to pursue 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (Griffin, 2009).   These organizations at the state 
level have shown to be beneficial, as they reduce the numbers of cases taken into the court of 
appeals by resolving a high percentage of postconviction challenges at the motion stage 
(Findley, 2009).   
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Additional appellate assistance may come from various wrongful conviction 
organizations, which have been established throughout the country.  Examples of these 
organizations include The Innocence Project, the Center on Wrongful Convictions, the 
National Registry of Exonerations, and the Death Penalty Information Center.  While 
innocence projects and wrongful conviction organizations have been in place since 1983, the 
innocence movement that started in the 1990s has contributed to a large increase in the 
development of many of these organizations (Schehr, 2005).  Currently, there are innocence 
projects in 35 states, with seven having more than one innocence project.  Innocence projects 
may also be developed at universities, particularly law schools, which may help provide 
additional legal assistance through law students enrolled at the university (Schehr, 2005).  
The services provided by these organizations are not always directly related to individual 
appeals cases but typically provide both legal and financial assistance for those trying to seek 
appeals and compensation for wrongful convictions.  
 While the innocence movement has spurred the creation of additional innocence 
projects throughout the nation, it has also been attributed to increased advocacy for 
postconviction DNA testing access for all inmates, as well as increased focus on the 
individual factors of wrongful conviction.  Review of case law for each factor of wrongful 
conviction shows the increased participation of innocence projects and wrongful conviction 
organizations, as well as how individual factors may combine to produce an even greater risk 
of wrongful conviction.  The case law presented provides a deeper understanding of the 
wrongful conviction phenomenon and how it can take place in many types of criminal cases 
for a variety of reasons.  These case examples show the difficulties a wrongfully convicted 
individual faces when attempting to seek compensation and/or relief.  As exhibited in many 
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of the cases provided, it can take an extended amount of time to secure an appeal or even a 
new trial, with the amount of time individuals spend incarcerated ranging from 5 years to 34 
years in prison for crimes they did not commit.  Not only did these individuals lose time, 
freedom, and liberty, but they also faced many difficulties reintegrating into society and 
attempting to shed the reputation and label that had been previously applied to them by 
mistake.  While a substantial amount of criminal justice research focuses on the disparate 
effects on indigent and minority defendants, these cases exhibit the true nature of wrongful 
convictions, showing that it can occur in a wide variety of cases, to a wide variety of people, 
not only minorities, and even for many different reasons.   
 In conclusion, while case law and previous research both show a large problem with 
wrongful convictions and many factors that may lead to the issue, it imperative to develop 
strategies to remedy and even prevent it from occurring in the future.  Although 27 states, the 
District of Columbia, and the federal government have compensation statutes in place to 
provide some kind of relief for those wrongfully convicted, many of the statutes are 
commonly flawed and misinterpreted (Brooks & Simpson, 2012, Kahn, 2010).  Additionally, 
according to the study conducted by Garett (2008) only about 41 percent of the 200 
exonerees in the study successfully received some kind of compensation for their years of 
imprisonment.  Although this number does appear to be close to half of the study 
participants, it is still troublesome that over half of those who were exonerated by way of 
DNA evidence still have not been compensated for their time in prison, away from their 
family, out of the work force, and overall loss of liberty.  Problems associated with 
compensation statutes include strict eligibility requirements, statutes of limitations, high 
burden of proof standards, and caps on recovery of damages, no matter the length of time 
136 
wrongly incarcerated (Garrett, 2008; Kahn, 2010).  Being that lawsuits are the only direct 
way to compensate these individuals who have been wrongfully convicted, it should not be 
so difficult to pursue or successfully obtain some type of compensation, especially as these 
individuals have already faced many difficulties in appealing the case and having the 
conviction overturned.   
Aside from lawsuits, many reform advocates have also pushed for increased access to 
postconviction DNA testing as a way of providing relief to wrongfully convicted individuals.  
Although the federal government has already put some provisions in place to protect 
defendants who have been charged and convicted of a federal offense, through the Justice for 
All Act, there is a lack of similar standards at the state level (Innocence Project, n.d.).  These 
statutes, both federal and state, provide many limitations and barriers for defendants who 
have been wrongfully convicted.  Some of the key issues include limits on testing for those 
who pleaded guilty, strict time limits for requesting the testing, failure of the states to 
preserve the biological evidence adequately, costs, and limits on the amount of time the 
biological evidence is kept (Innocence Project, n.d.).  Although DNA evidence is not 
extremely common in criminal cases, wrongfully convicted individuals should still be 
allowed to have access to postconviction testing, as it could exonerate them and help to find 
the actual offender.  In this same regard, advocates have pushed for increased evidence 
preservation standards.  Recommendations include preserving all physical evidence as long 
as the defendant is incarcerated, under any type of supervision, including probation and 
parole, in civil litigation involving the crime in question, or subject to registration as a sex 
offender.  Additionally, it has been suggested that all types of physical evidence relating to 
felony crimes should be preserved, regardless of whether the defendant files a motion for 
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postconviction DNA testing or not.  Other recommendations for preservation of DNA 
evidence include increased sanctions for those who are responsible for the improper 
destruction of evidence (Innocence Project, n.d.).  The preservation of DNA evidence, along 
with the ability for wrongfully convicted individuals to file lawsuits, allows for relief to be 
offered to those attempting to actively appeal a wrongful conviction or seek a life after 
incarceration for a crime they did not commit. 
In regards to recommendations aimed at preventing wrongful convictions, the 
suggestions include the reform of eyewitness identification procedures, increased forensic 
science oversight, recording of interrogations, and increased use of innocence commissions 
(Innocence Project, n.d.).  While each of these reforms would target a factor of wrongful 
conviction, they would also allow for increased reliability and integrity within criminal 
investigations, as well as the criminal justice system as a whole.  As many efforts have been 
made to work towards each of these reforms, at the state and federal level, each of these 
individual issues continues to need treatment.  Wrongful conviction happens too often, as it is 
estimated to occur in about 1 to 5 percent of all convictions, and serves as an injustice to all 
of those involved.  The phenomenon not only affects those who are wrongfully punished, but 
also decreases the integrity of the criminal justice system, breaks apart families and 
communities, and serves as an injustice to victims of the crimes in question (Gould & Leo, 
2010; Konvisser, 2012; Smith et al., 2011).  While it is essential to be vigilant and provide 
compensation for the mistakes made with past wrongful convictions, it is even more 
important to address the current factors leading to the issue, from a variety of standpoints, to 
assure that the phenomenon does not continue to lead to the incarceration, and possibly the 
death, of the wrong person. 
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